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Concepts figure prominently in the defense and elaboration of representational 
accounts of phenomenal consciousness. Indeed, any adequate defense of (reductive) 
representationalism will require an appeal to so-called phenomenal concepts to 
deflect a group of related anti-physicalist (and hence anti-representationalist) 
arguments. What’s more, an elaboration of representationalism requires a detailed 
account of the representational content of phenomenally conscious experience. 
The goal of this dissertation is to contribute to the defense and elaboration of 
representationalism as it relates to concepts, first with a defense of 
demonstrative/recognitional accounts of phenomenal concepts (and a defense of the 
more general physicalist strategy in which they figure); and second, with the 
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Concepts figure prominently in the defense and elaboration of representational 
accounts of phenomenal consciousness. Indeed, any adequate defense of (reductive) 
representationalism will require an appeal to so-called phenomenal concepts to 
deflect a group of related anti-physicalist (and hence anti-representationalist) 
arguments. What’s more, an elaboration of representationalism requires a detailed 
account of the representational content of phenomenally conscious experience. 
The goal of this dissertation is to contribute to the defense and elaboration of 
representationalism as it relates to concepts, first with a defense of 
demonstrative/recognitional accounts of phenomenal concepts (and a defense of the 
more general physicalist strategy in which they figure); and second, with the 
development of a partially conceptual account of experience. The goal of this 
introduction is to set the stage and provide the background the reader needs to make 
sense of these issues and see why they matter. 
 
1. What is phenomenal consciousness? 
 
Perceptual experiences, bodily sensations, emotions, etc., are mental states that 
(often) feel a certain way to those who undergo them. There is something it’s like to 
see the fresh green of a new leaf, to hear a bird singing, to touch grass with bare feet, 




subject—what it’s like for me to see fresh green is different from what it’s like for me 
to hear a bird.  
The phenomenology, or phenomenal character, or phenomenal feel of an 
experience (sensation or emotion) is just what it feels like for a subject to have that 
experience (sensation or emotion). If what it’s like for you to taste English peas is 
different from what it’s like for you to taste string beans, then these two perceptual 
experiences do not have the same phenomenal character or feel. We’ll say that a 
mental state is phenomenally conscious if there is something it is like for the subject 
to undergo that state. And we can say, derivatively, that a creature is phenomenally 
conscious if and only if it has some phenomenally conscious states. 
I take it to be rather obvious that there are phenomenal characters, as I’ve 
“defined” them.
1
 A number of philosophers have denied that there are qualia (e.g. 
Dennett 1988)—and since the term ‘qualia’ is sometimes used to mean, simply, 
phenomenal characters, it may seem as though philosophers have (rather forcefully) 
denied that there are phenomenal characters. But the term ‘qualia’ is slippery; some 
claim, for instance, that   “qualia are ineffable or non-physical or ‘given’ to their 
subjects incorrigibly (without the possibility of error)” (Tye 2008); some add that 
they are atomic, unanalyzable, simple, private and homogenous (Dennett 1988). 
Certainly, to say that there are qualia, in this strong or bold sense, is to say a lot more 
than that there are phenomenal characters. So if there is a debate about whether or not 
there are qualia, it is one about whether or not there are strong qualia (qualia in the 
                                                 
1
 Of course I haven’t “defined” phenomenal characters in any strict sense. As Block (1995) writes “I 
cannot define P[henomenal]-consciousness in any remotely noncircular way. …The best one can do 
for P-consciousness …is point to the phenomenon” (380—page numbers are to the 1997 reprint). 




sense of ineffable, non-physical, incorrigible features of our experience) and not 
qualia in the “modest” sense of phenomenal characters. Still, there are a number of 
substantial disagreements about phenomenal characters and their nature. First, we 
may wonder exactly which states are phenomenally conscious. Many perceptual 
states have phenomenal characters, like the seeing of new green, or the hearing of 
birdsong, but that’s not to say that all perceptual states are phenomenally conscious. 
A great many such states might not be phenomenally conscious—as, for instance, the 
visual (and so in some sense perceptual) states that David Marr (1982) posits in early 
vision. Similarly, it is not obvious that every bodily sensation or every emotion is 
phenomenally conscious. And it is unclear what other mental states (beliefs, desires) 
have phenomenal characters. Second, we may wonder which creatures have 
phenomenally conscious states—do rats have them? Do bees? Do infants? (See for 
instance Tye 1997, 2000, Carruthers 2000, 2004). Finally, we might wonder about 
how phenomenal characters are related to the brain, its properties, and the natural 
world more generally. It is this last question—about the relationship between 











2. What is physicalism? What is anti-physicalism? 
 
Physicalists believe that phenomenal characters can be reduced to non-phenomenal 
(and ultimately non-mental) things or properties.
2
 Anti-physicalists (dualists), on the 
other hand, deny that such a reduction is possible. Phenomenal characters are 
irreducibly phenomenal and in some sense non-physical.  
It may help to think of the disagreement about phenomenal characters as 
similar to the 19
th
 century disagreement about life. “Physicalists” about life, for 
instance, were those who believed (as most everyone does today) that the phenomena 
we associate with being alive could be reduced to non-“living” phenomena, e.g. 
chemical and physical phenomena. They thought that there was nothing more to 
being alive than being chemically or physically made up a certain way. On the other 
hand, anti-physicalists about life (or rather vitalists) were those (rather prevalent at 
the time) who believed that life could not be reduced to non-“living”, chemical and 
physical phenomena and processes. Life, they thought, is irreducible. Being alive is a 
matter of an organism having a life-force, an élan vital, something over and beyond a 
particular biological and chemical makeup.  
In much the same way, physicalists about phenomenal characters believe that 
there is nothing to being phenomenally conscious over and above having brain states 
of a certain sort (with certain functional or representational properties). Anti-
physicalists, meanwhile, deny that this is the case. According to the latter, 
phenomenal characters are irreducible; being phenomenally conscious is a matter of 
                                                 
2
 There are a number of different kinds of physicalism. Type vs. token physicalism; supervenience 
physicalism; Stoljar’s t-physicalism and o-physicalism (2001). But the very general characterization 




an organism having some phenomenal, non-physical properties, something over and 
above a particular brain makeup. Because anti-physicalists believe that there must be 
two radically different kinds of properties in the world—the physical, natural ones 
(which physics, chemistry and biology tell us about) and phenomenal, non-physical 
ones—they are sometimes called property dualists.
3
 
Of course, anti-physicalists about life are rare today. “The spectacular 
successes of molecular biology make it virtually certain that biological phenomena 
[like life] are just very special cases of physical phenomena” (Rey 1997, 22).  
Physicalists about phenomenal characters hope that phenomenal characters will 
ultimately prove to be biological, chemical, physical sorts of things—just as life 
ultimately proved to be a chemical, physical sort of thing. But anti-physicalists go on 
to make a rather strong claim: they argue that regardless of what progress and 
discoveries our sciences might make, phenomenal characters will remain irreducible. 
It is not simply that phenomenal characters cannot be reduced to biological or 
chemical phenomena that we know of now; but that phenomenal characters are not 






                                                 
3
 A substance dualist believes that there is an immaterial, non-physical substance—non-physical stuff 
(like blobs of ectoplasm, say). Descartes famously thought that the mind itself was made up of an 
immaterial substance. The property dualist, however, doesn’t think there is a non-physical substance 




3. What is (reductive) representationalism? 
 
Since physicalists believe that phenomenal characters can be reduced to physical sorts 
of things, it would make sense for them to pay special attention to the advances and 
successes in the sciences of the mind (including psychology, linguistics, 
neuroscience, or more generally cognitive science). After all, we think that the 
physicalist about life was right to take seriously the scientific developments in 
chemistry and biology—she claimed that life was reducible to chemical and 
biological phenomena. Similarly then, a physicalist about phenomenal character 
should take into account developments in the relevant sciences.  
 Over the past 50 years or so, one research program has proved to be especially 
successful in cognitive science: the computational/representational program. As a 
result, a physicalist theory of phenomenal characters incorporating some insights of 
the computational/representational framework has become increasingly prominent 
(see Dretske 1995, Tye 2000, Rosenthal 1995, Lycan 1996, Carruthers 2000, Rey 
1998). I will call these types of theories reductive representational theories (or 
reductive representationalism). I will say a bit, first, about the 
computational/representational program (3.1), before coming back to reductive 





3.1. Computational/Representational theory of mind (CRTM
4
)  
According to CRTM mental states involve relations to mental representations. It will 
help to think of mental representations as mental symbols which stand for other 
things—as symbols usually do. The symbol ‘=’ stands for ‘is the same as’ or ‘is equal 
to’ and words too are symbols. The English word ‘tree’ stands for actual trees. So we 
can say that the word ‘tree’ is a representation and that its content (what it stands for) 
is [tree]. (I put contents in brackets.) The French word ‘arbre’ is a symbol too, and 
like ‘tree’, its content is [tree]. 
  According to CRTM, there are symbols in the head (mental representations) 
that stand for things outside the head. And to undergo certain mental states (like 
beliefs, desires, hopes) is to be related in some way to strings of mental symbols with 
particular contents. For instance, to believe that grass is green is to be related in some 
way (the belief way) to a mental representation (a string of symbols in the head) that 
stands for grass is green, or as we will say, whose content is [grass is green]. To hope 
that grass is green is to be related in a different way (the hope way) to the same string 
of symbols that stands for grass is green. To perceive a red tomato is to be related 
(presumably, again in a different way, say, the visual way) to a mental representation 
with a particular content. (How to cash out the content of perceptual representations is 
an important and challenging question that proponents of CRTM must answer. The 
question will be relevant to my project as well, see section 4 of this introduction).  
Moreover, according to CRTM mental processes involve the transformation, 
manipulation and storage of these mental representations. Deductive reasoning, for 
instance, would involve the manipulation of mental symbols according to certain 
                                                 
4




rules (see Rey 1997, pgs 211 to 221 for a discussion of what manipulations might be 
involved in deductive reasoning, induction, abduction and decision making).  
Thinking of the mind in this way (as transforming and storing strings of 
mental symbols) has provided a helpful theoretical framework in the cognitive 
sciences. Thagard, in his Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Cognitive Science, writes: 
“the central hypothesis of cognitive science is that thinking can best be understood in 
terms of representational structures in the mind and computational procedures that 
operate on those structures” (2007).
5,6 
 Here are two examples of how CRTM has 
been insightful. 
First is in the study of perception. Marr, in 1982, proposed to think about the 
visual system (and other information processing systems) as a computational system 
describable at three levels. At the first level, the visual system is describable in terms 
of what it does. It requires that we answer the following kind of questions: “what is 
the goal of the computation, why is it appropriate, and what is the logic of the strategy 
by which it can be carried out?” (1982, 25) So we may take the goal of the visual 
system to be the building of a three-dimensional, colored representation of the world 
from various inputs (light intensity, wavelength, etc.). And doing this may require the 
system to perform a number of intermediate tasks, which we can, in turn, characterize 
in terms of their intermediate goals, such as the building of the representation of an 
edge, of color, of a surface, of motion, etc. The second level of a computational 
theory is algorithmic: it is the level at which we attempt to describe the step by step 
                                                 
5
 In the introduction to his 2005 Mind: An introduction to cognitive science, he writes again that “most 
cognitive scientists agree that knowledge in the mind consists of mental representations” (4).  
6
 Of course, this isn’t to say that there is no further disagreement, among cognitive scientists, about the 




transitions between states of the system, which would take it from input 
representation (of light intensities, say) to output representation (of an edge, say). The 
second level, then, characterizes how the system might be doing what it does as 
described by the first computational level. The third level is the level of 
implementation. The question, here, is the following: “how can the […] algorithm be 
implemented physically,” for instance, in the brain (1982, 25)? This kind of 
computational framework is the “framework within which most current theories of 
visual perceptions are cast” (Palmer 1999, 71). In other words, most current theories 
of visual perceptions are in the business of figuring out how representations are 
manipulated and transformed to yield other representations. 
The computational model can also explain interesting facts about the way we 
think, e.g., the fact that our thought is productive and systematic (Fodor 1987). I will 
focus here on productivity. Consider the fact that we can understand sentences we’ve 
never heard before—sentences that combine words in ways we’ve never heard them 
combined. And consider the fact that we can produce such sentences too. To produce 
them, it must be that we can think thoughts we’ve never thought before. And if we 
had all the time in the world, it seems that there would be no end to the new thoughts 
we could think—that Rambo’s cat just had a bad hair day; that purple giraffes take 
their time when bowling, etc. This suggests that we could store an endless number of 
thoughts in our heads. Yet we are finite beings. So how can we produce endlessly 
many thoughts? Here is an answer within a CRTM: there are a finite number of stored 
and (relatively) simple mental representations, like a mental representation standing 




of new thoughts is the fact that these simple mental representations can be combined 
and recombined in many, many ways. Though I’d never thought that Rambo’s cat had 
a bad hair day, I may have thought that Rambo has long hair, and that cats have bad 
days, etc. Thinking a new thought, then, is merely my combining mental 
representations in a new way. Such an explanation does require that we think of some 
mental representations as being structured, i.e., made up of more simple 
representations. So when I believe that grass is green, I am related to a structured 
representation that takes several simpler representations as constituents—one that 
stands for grass, another for green. In so far as some people embrace a computational 
theory of mind while denying that mental representations are structured in this way 
(e.g. Smolensky), not all computational theories of mind will be able to explain 
productivity. But it is nonetheless a positive feature of CRTMs that some of their 
instantiations can explain facts like productivity 
 
3.2. Representationalism and phenomenal character 
Now, if reductive representationalists can make the case that phenomenal characters 
can be reduced to the representational contents of certain states (like visual states), 
then they will have found a place for phenomenal characters within an empirically 
rather successful theory of the mind. And this, I think, makes reductive 
representationalism especially worth investigating.  
It should be noted that most of the philosophers who are interested in 
phenomenal characters are representationalists in some sense. They usually think that 
perceptual systems work roughly as CRTM would say that they do. Still, they deny 




characters are reducible to representational contents. Chalmers for instance does 
believe that perceptual experiences are representational states that do indeed involve 
relations to mental representations (1996); but he argues that phenomenal character is 
the one thing which can’t be explained representationally. And ultimately he reaches 
an anti-physicalist conclusion.
7
 In the rest of my dissertation I will use the term 
‘representationalist’ (tout court) to stand for “reductive representationalist” unless 
otherwise noted.  
 One last thing: representationalists are for the most part functional 
representationalists (save for Carruthers 2000). This means they believe that 
phenomenal characters can be reduced to representational contents iff their 
representations themselves play the right functional role. This matters quite a bit. 
After all, imagine that the content of a subject’s red visual experience (she’s focusing 
on a red wall) is the content [red]. Unfortunately many representations, besides her 
visual representation, will have that content: the word ‘red’ on this page for instance 
also has the content [red]. And if they claim that phenomenal characters are reducible 
to representational contents alone, then they will be committed to the claim that any 
two representations with those same contents will have the same phenomenal 
characters too. So the representationalist would have to say that if Sara’s visual red 
experience has the content [red] and the word ‘red’ has the content [red], then both 
Sara’s visual red experience and the word ‘red’ have the same phenomenal character. 
That is clearly counterintuitive. Sara’s experience of red does feel like something 
                                                 
7
 Block (2003), like Chalmers, thinks that perceptual states are representational, but, like Chalmers, he 
does not think phenomenal characters are reducible to experiential contents. Unlike Chalmers, he does 
not draw from this an anti-physicalist conclusion—phenomenal characters have more to do with 




(there is something it’s like to undergo it). But the word ‘red’ is not even the kind of 
thing that could have a phenomenal character (seeing the word ‘red’ would have a 
phenomenal character, but the representationalist I’ve described is committed to 
saying that the word ‘red’ itself has a particular phenomenal character).
8
 To avoid 
such conclusions, the representationalist might add a functional aspect and claim that 
phenomenal characters are reducible to representational contents, whose 
representations play the right role (whose representations are poised to impact beliefs 





4. Concepts and reductive representationalism  
 
Concepts figure prominently in the defense and elaboration of representational 
accounts of phenomenal consciousness. But I have yet to say what concepts are. Our 
starting point will be this: concepts are the constituents of beliefs. Here is one way to 
make sense of that claim within CRTM:
10
 when a thinker believes that grass is green, 
she is related (in some way, say, the belief way) to a mental representation, whose 
constituents are the concepts GRASS and GREEN (I use small caps for concepts). 
                                                 
8
 Carruthers needn’t worry about this particular problem. Even though he is not a functional 
representationalist, he thinks that phenomenal characters are reducible to “dual” contents – like 
[red/seems red], which can be acquired only when certain simpler contents (like [red]) can be targeted 
by a higher-order thought system. Clearly, the content of the word ‘red’ is not a content that can be 
targeted by a higher-order thought system. So there is no worry here for Carruthers’ view.  
9
 Lycan (2006) points out that Dretske and Tye are both functional representationalists (Block 2003 
calls them quasi-representationalists).  Here is a quote from Lycan: “The representational theory of 
qualia cannot be purely representational, but must appeal to some further factor, to distinguish visual 
representations from other sorts of representations of redness. Dretske (1995) cites only the fact that 
visual representation is sensory and what he calls "systemic." Tye (1995) requires that the 
representation be nonconceptual and "poised".” (2006) 
10
 Which is not to say that if CRTM is roughly right, concepts must be mental representations. After 
all, some vocal defenders of CRTM do think that there is something wrong with the psychological 




Concepts on this view (which Laurence and Margolis 2007 call the psychological 
view) are mental representations which can be combined and recombined, and to 
which we can be, at the very least, belief-related. Though I will talk of concepts as 
mental representations throughout, I don’t think that many of my conclusions require 
that this be the way to think about concepts.
11
 (It could be that concepts are abstract 




Concepts, then, play an important role in the defense and elaboration of 
reductive representationalism. Indeed, the representationalist must deal with a group 
of related anti-physicalist (and hence anti-representationalist) arguments; and any 
adequate reply to this family of arguments requires an appeal to so-called phenomenal 
concepts—concepts deployed in thought to pick out, via introspection, our 
phenomenal feels. Moreover, representationalism claims that a red phenomenal 
character can be reduced to the content of the red perceptual experience. Any fully 
developed representationalist account will therefore require an account of the 
representational content of these phenomenally conscious experiences. And an 
adequate account of those experiential contents must explain the relation between 
them and concepts. I spell this out in more detail below.  
 
                                                 
11
 Though it might be incompatible with the view that concepts are abilities. See Laurence and 
Margolis (2006). 
12
 I also don’t think I will have to commit myself to a particular account of the structure of concepts 




4.1. Phenomenal Concepts 
Anti-physicalists like to underscore some well-known “data” regarding our 
phenomenally conscious experience, which, they argue, shows that physicalism is 
false. They point out, for instance, that we can conceive of creatures 
representationally identical to us but with inverted phenomenal characters, or with no 
phenomenal characters at all. They point out that Mary, the brilliant color scientist 
raised in a black-and-white room, seems to learn something new upon leaving the 
room and seeing red for the first time, even if we suppose she had learned everything 
scientific there was to know about color experience. They point out that there is, and 
must be, an explanatory gap in physicalist explanations of phenomenal feels, 
including representationalist ones. For explaining the feel of a red experience 
(explaining this feel, pointing to a red experience) in terms of experiential contents 
will never feel satisfactory the way that typical explanations are in science, e.g., the 
explanation of water boiling in terms of H2O molecules and their properties. 
The physicalist has had most success replying to this line of argument by 
taking the non-physicalist’s “data” as a given, but by insisting that it can be explained 
entirely by appealing to certain (physicalist) features of our phenomenal concepts. 
The anti-physicalist is sympathetic to the move. After all, she is ready to grant that an 
appeal to phenomenal concepts is needed to fully explain her data. However, she still 
claims that it is impossible to fully explain that data using the phenomenal concept 
strategy and remain a physicalist about these concepts and/or their referents. 
 The goal of Part I is to show that the anti-physicalist is wrong. Phenomenal 




a weak sense—and refer directly) which can both explain the relevant data and 
themselves be physically explicable. I begin Part I with a discussion of the anti-
physicalist “data” (Part I, section 1) and an introduction of phenomenal concepts 
(section 2), spelling out the ways in which they relate to other concepts (2.1) and to 
their referents (2.2). I then show how phenomenal concepts can be used to explain the 
anti-physicalist data (section 3), before arguing that the two main anti-physicalist 
objections to the phenomenal concept “strategy” fail (section 4).  
 
4.2. Concepts and Experience 
Representationalists claim that phenomenal characters can be reduced to the 
representational contents of experience. They must go on to say something about the 
features of these contents, including how they relate to concepts. This is especially 
important because the representationalist must explain how experiences (which have 
phenomenal characters) differ from other mental states, most importantly 




Since concepts are, as I’ve said, the constituents of belief, spelling out the 
difference between experience and propositional attitudes will require spelling out the 
relation between experience and concepts—and contrasting that relation with the 
relation between belief and concepts.
14
  
                                                 
13
 There are exceptions here of course. See Chalmers 2003.  
14
 At the beginning of Part II I also argue that it is more important for the representationalist to spell 
out the relation between experience and concepts than she realizes. Indeed, what she says about 
experience and concepts will affect the way the representationalist can deal with a famous argument 




The conceptual/nonconceptual debate is one that attempts to address this very 
question about the relation between experience and concepts. Part II begins with a 
number of distinctions, which allow me to identify the most interesting (and relevant) 
aspect of that rather messy debate (section 2). I take conceptualists to be those who 
maintain that the constituents of experience and the constituents of belief are of the 
same kind—such that, in principle, constituents of experience could be constituents of 
belief. Nonconceptualists, on the other hand, maintain that the constituents of 
experience and the constituents of belief are of a different kind. I argue, ultimately, 
that the best account of experiential content is a (more rarely defended) one according 
to which some of the constituents of experience are like those of belief and some are 
not. I do this by showing first that arguments for nonconceptualism don’t quite 
succeed (section 3)—at most, we can conclude from these arguments that either 
nonconceptualism succeeds or partial conceptualism does. I then argue that 
nonconceptualism fails (section 4). I end Part II with a discussion of partial 





Part I – Phenomenal Concepts  
 
1. Introduction  
 
The phenomenal concept strategy is arguably the most promising strategy available to 
the representationalist (and fellow physicalist) against an entire family of anti-
physicalist arguments. These anti-physicalists like to underscore well-known “data” 
about our phenomenally conscious experience; this data, they argue, shows that 
physicalism is false. They point out, for instance, that we can conceive of inverts and 
zombies, or that there is an explanatory gap—and they maintain that these 
conceivability judgments, or the existence of the explanatory gap, cannot be 
explained by a(ny) physicalist account of phenomenal feels.  
The physicalist’s most promising line of response has involved taking the 
non-physicalist’s data for granted while insisting that it can be explained entirely by 
appealing to certain (physicalist) features of our thinking about phenomenal feels, 
more specifically to features of the constituents of our phenomenal thoughts, i.e. 
phenomenal concepts. The anti-physicalist is not dismissive of the physicalist’s 
strategy entirely, for she is ready to grant—indeed she believes—that an appeal to 
phenomenal concepts is needed to fully explain her data. Still the physicalist is 
wrong, she claims, for it is impossible to 1) explain the data in question fully by 
appealing to phenomenal concepts and 2) remain a physicalist about these concepts 




either of two ways. First, making a quite general point against the physicalist’s 
strategy, the anti-physicalist will argue that the features of phenomenal concepts that 
do the crucial explanatory work, whatever those might be, cannot possibly fit within a 
physicalist framework. Chalmers (2007) makes just this kind of claim. Take F to be 
the features of phenomenal concepts the physicalist believes will explain the anti-
physicalist data. Chalmers argues (recruiting zombies in the process) that a) either F 
do not in fact fully explain the data, or b) F are incompatible with a physicalist 
universe. The details about features F (how individual physicalists might spell out 
what these features are—and they seem to disagree about that) are irrelevant to 
Chalmers’ argument. Property dualists who don’t share Chalmers’ fondness for 
zombies nonetheless argue along similar general lines—concluding that if 
phenomenal concepts do in fact have features F (which will successfully explain the 
relevant data), they (phenomenal concepts) must pick out non-physical properties.   
Another kind of anti-physicalist’s move against the physicalist’s strategy 
involves singling out particular (detailed) physicalist accounts of phenomenal 
concepts, criticizing them one at a time. For instance, Levine (2007) argues 
specifically against demonstrative accounts of phenomenal concepts which, he 
claims, cannot explain all the relevant data—Levine more specifically contends that 
such accounts cannot explain the significance and substantiveness of what Mary 
learns upon leaving her room.   
In any case, the goal of this half of the thesis is to show that it is indeed 
possible to explain the relevant data and remain a physicalist. Making this case will 




discussion of what phenomenal concepts are (section 2); a discussion of the 
phenomenal concept strategy—namely of how physicalists use phenomenal concepts 
to explain the anti-physicalist’s data (section 3); and finally a discussion of general 
arguments against the phenomenal concept strategy (section 4).  
 
1.1. Anti-physicalist arguments 
The anti-physicalist offers three related arguments against physicalism—and it is in 
these arguments that we find the data the anti-physicalist urges us to explain. I start 
off, then, by reviewing the three arguments. 
 
1.1.1. Conceivability Arguments 
I begin with conceivability arguments strictly so-called, i.e. the inverted qualia 
argument and the absent qualia argument. There is a sense in which all the arguments 
discussed in this section may fall under the loose heading of ‘conceivability 
arguments’ (see, for instance, Levine 2001), but absent and inverted qualia arguments 
appeal to conceivability explicitly, making them especially deserving of the name.  
 The anti-physicalist points out that our phenomenal thinking is such that the 
folk find a number of scenarios conceivable. For instance, the folk find conceivable 
that two people could be physically (functionally, representationally) identical and yet 
have “inverted” feels: when one of them, call her Adi, looks at a yellow flower, her 
experience has the same phenomenal feel as her twin’s experience (call her I-Adi) 
when the latter looks at another flower, identical to the first in every way except for 
its color, which is blue. A roughly identical conceivability judgment is said to be 




others. In the philosophical literature, we find mention of such conceivability 
judgments as far back as John Locke’s Essay. He claims it isn’t obviously false that  
the same Object should produce in several Men's Minds different Ideas at the 
same time; e.g. if the Idea, that a Violet produced in one Man's Mind by his 
Eyes, were the same that a Marigold produces in another Man's, and vice 
versa. (1689/1975, II, xxxii, 15) 
 
That the folk can conceive of inverts has some degree of plausibility, then. Some anti-
physicalists go on to make another (less plausible) claim about what the folk find 
conceivable, namely that they find Adi’s zombie twin (Z-Adi) conceivable. Z-Adi, 
like I-Adi, is a creature physically (functionally, representationally) identical to Adi, 
though Z-Adi’s experiences, unlike Adi’s, are “absent” such that if both twins looked 
at an identically colored flower, Adi’s flower experience would feel one way to her 
while Z-Adi’s experiences would feel like nothing at all. (Let me note that I have 
found it quite hard to convince some folk that they can conceive of zombies).  
 The fact that the folk can conceive of inverts and zombies alone does not 
ground any anti-physicalist conclusions, as the anti-physicalist herself is aware. 
Rather she reaches her conclusion by an appeal to the relation between what the folk 
find conceivable and what is in fact possible (in some relevant sense), as follows:  
 
(1) I-Adi (Z-Adi) is conceivable. 
(2) Whatever is conceivable is possible. 
(3) I-Adi (Z-Adi) is possible. 
(4) If I-Adi (Z-Adi) is possible, then physicalism is false. 
(5) Physicalism is false. 
 
Physicalism does seem committed to the claim that any two physically identical 
individuals must be phenomenally identical too—physicalist functionalists and 




physically/functionally identical or representationally identical individuals must be 
phenomenally identical. Premise (4) is true then—there is some relevant sense of 
‘possible’, such that if it is possible (in that sense) for Adi’s twin to have inverted 
feels, then two physically identical individuals fail to be phenomenally identical and 
physicalism is false.  
 What is less clear, however, is that premises (1) and (2) are true; more 
specifically, it is not clear that there is some kind of conceivability that entails the 
right kind of possibility (the kind that entails the falsity of physicalism in premise 
(3)), and that zombies are indeed conceivable in that way. In fact, some critics (see 
Kirk 2006) argue that this gives rise to an interesting tension in the anti-physicalist’s 
argument: the broader the sense of conceivability, the easier it is to make the case that 
zombies and inverts are conceivable (i.e. that premise (1) is true), but the harder it is 
to make the case that conceivability entails the right kind of possibility (i.e. that 
premise (2) is true). To see this, take ‘conceivable’ to mean prima facie conceivable, 
where something S is prima facie conceivable if “S is conceivable for that subject on 
first appearances” (Chalmers 1999, 8). Unpacked, assume that this means that, on 
first appearances, the subject cannot “detect any contradiction in the hypothesis 
expressed by S” (ibid). I- and Z-Adi are very likely to be conceivable in that sense: 
on first appearance, subjects may not detect any contradiction in the hypothesis that 
Adi may have an inverted or zombie twin. But unfortunately, it seems quite obvious 
that something being prima facie conceivable does not entail that it is possible in the 
relevant sense. After all, something may be conceivable on first appearances but not 




conceivability on further reflection, how can it be a guide to possibility? Restricting 
the sense of conceivability would indeed make it much more likely that conceivability 
might actually entail possibility, while making it much less plausible that inverts and 
zombies are indeed conceivable. Take, for instance, ‘conceivable’ to mean ideally 
conceivable, where something S is ideally conceivable “if an ideal reasoner could not 
rule out the hypothesis expressed by S a priori” (ibid). It is at least somewhat 
plausible that something which is ideally conceivable may indeed be possible in the 
relevant sense; but now it is far from obvious that I- and Z-Adi are so conceivable. 
Would an ideal reasoner find the thought of I- or Z-Adi to involve a contradiction? It 
isn’t obvious that she would—what’s more, it isn’t clear that, as non-ideal reasoners, 
we may ever be in a position to know whether or not these thoughts involve a 
contradiction.   
 The anti-physicalist can bypass some of these worries by construing 
conceivability arguments as arguments to the best explanation along the following 
lines:  
(1) I-Adi and Z-Adi are conceivable—that is, we can conceive of two physically 
(functionally, representationally) identical twins who aren’t phenomenally 
identical. 
(2) What best explains (1) is that there in fact can be two physically (functionally, 
representationally) identical twins who aren’t phenomenally identical—i.e. 
what best explains (1) is the falsity of physicalism 
(3) Therefore, physicalism is false. 
 
In the rest of the discussion, I will think of conceivability arguments as arguments to 
the best explanation using a rather broad sense of ‘conceivability’. The folk do 




sense of conceivable (say in the sense that there is no a priori contradiction in our 
description of zombies and inverts the way there would be in our description of, say, 
apples-that-aren’t-apples). And one may have to explain why the folk should make 
such conceivability judgments. 
 
1.1.2. The Knowledge Argument 
The most well-known version of the knowledge argument is due to Frank Jackson 
(1986). He imagines Mary, a woman born and raised exclusively in a black-and-white 
room, her environment controlled in such a way that she never experiences any other 
colors. Mary becomes, as an adult, the world’s leading color scientist—color science 
being as advanced as it can be, Mary actually comes to know every scientific fact 
(including every functional and representational fact) there is to know about color 
vision and color experience. Yet, when Mary is finally allowed to leave her black-
and-white room, she learns something: she learns what it’s like to actually experience 
color. What kind of fact is that, asks Jackson? Since we made Mary such that she 
knew every scientific—physical, functional, representational—fact about color prior 
to leaving her room, this new fact she learns upon leaving it cannot be one of those. It 
follows, then, that there are non-scientific, non-physical facts. Since physicalism can 
be construed as the thesis that every fact is a physical fact, Mary’s story shows 
physicalism to be false. The argument is schematized by Jackson as follows:  
(1) Mary (before her release) knows everything physical there is to know about 
other people.  
(2) Mary (before her release) does not know everything there is to know about 
other people because she learns something about them on her release. 
(3) Therefore, there are truths about other people (and Mary herself) that escape 




 1.1.3. The Explanatory Gap 
Reductive explanations, when they are successful, are satisfying. Why is it that water 
expands when it freezes? The answer goes something like (but is much more 
complicated than) this: water is made up of molecules of H2O, and its constituent 
hydrogen and oxygen atoms have certain properties which allow them to bond with 
each other in various ways. Water expands because of the way hydrogen atoms bond 
when H2O molecules have low energy. The explanation, if actually spelt out in all its 
lovely detail, would be satisfying, one might claim, because being merely told facts 
about molecules, their constituent elements and their properties would allow one to 
deduce the behavior of water at the macro-level. Knowing, that is, how atoms of 
hydrogen and oxygen behave would enable one to know what happens to water when 
it freezes.  
 Reductive explanations of phenomenal feels, unlike reductive explanations of 
the behavior of water at different temperatures, don’t feel satisfying and never will, 
the argument goes. Why is it that seeing red feels this particular way? Why is it that 
experience, more generally, feels like anything at all? There seems to be no satisfying 
answer. Consider, for instance, a physicalist who claims that experiences feel like 
something because of the role (physical) experiential states play—a red experience 
feels the way it does because of its particular functional role. We can tell that such an 
explanation, even spelt out in detail, wouldn’t quite do the trick. The important point 
may be this: that knowing how brain cells behave, or how functional states of the 
brain work, or how representational states interact still won’t enable one to deduce 




phenomenal feels—unlike reductive explanations of other physical phenomena—fail 
to feel satisfying? The best explanation may be that phenomenal feels—unlike other 
physical phenomena—are not physical phenomena. 
 Levine (2001) adds to this that there is a “core contrast” between usual 
scientific identities, like water is H2O, and psychophysical identities such as thisR feel 
is representational property R.  Though scientific identities might start off seeming 
arbitrary—why is water H2O?—learning the relevant facts will dissipate the feeling. 
In fact, it would not make much sense for someone who does possess all the relevant 
facts to keep thinking that the proposed identity ‘water is H2O’ was still arbitrary (see 
Levine 2001, 83 and 2007, 147). Psychophysical identities too might start off feeling 
arbitrary, however no amount of learning will make that feeling subside. 
Psychophysical identities remain arbitrary—no matter how much is learned. It always 
makes sense for someone to wonder whether thisR feel is indeed representational 
property R and not some other physical property. 
 
1.2. Data and explanation 
1.2.1. The data 
The preceding three arguments are best construed, I think, as bringing to our attention 
four related observations which the anti-physicalist insists anyone—and that includes 
the physicalist—must explain. These observations include: i) that we make certain 
conceivability judgments, ii) non-derivability/non-deducibility; iii) the fact that Mary 
learns something substantial when she leaves her room; iv) a core contrast between 




 (i) Quite obviously, the fact that the folk make certain conceivability 
judgments is at the core of conceivability arguments—and a physicalist who accepts 
this fact will need to explain why it is that the folk make such judgments. 
 (ii) Non-derivability and non-deducibility are related features of the 
Knowledge Argument and the Explanatory Gap. In keeping with what seems to be the 
standard notation, let ‘P’ stand for all the scientific/(micro)physical facts, and let ‘Q’ 
stand for phenomenal facts, like the fact that “this is what is feels like to see red”. 
 At the core of both non-derivability and non-deducibility is the fact that 
‘P→Q’ is not knowable a priori. Jackson’s thought experiment makes the case that 
Mary cannot deduce phenomenal facts she does not know from the scientific/physical 
facts she learned about in her science books—facts about brains, 
functional/representational states and color. Merely knowing P (the scientific/physical 
facts) does not enable her to deduce Q (that red feels like this). In other words, ‘P → 
Q’ is not knowable a priori. This is indeed how Chalmers (2004) thinks of it: “the 
initial moral of the knowledge argument is that Q cannot be deduced from P by a 
priori reasoning. That is, the material conditional 'P → Q' is not knowable a priori.” 
(8) The Explanatory Gap is also in large part concerned with the fact that 'P → Q' is 
not knowable a priori. But it is arrived at by noticing that someone who knows P and 
Q (unlike Mary who knows P but not Q) will not be able to derive Q from P. 
 (iii) The anti-physicalist next presses us to explain why the knowledge that 
Mary learns when she leaves her room seems so substantive and significant. A 
satisfactory account of Mary’s new knowledge requires more than an appeal to non-




facts, without the learning of these former facts being anything significant or 
substantive. Anna the astronomer may know all the facts about Hesperus (e.g., that it 
is 40 million kilometers away), but if she does not possess the concept PHOSPHORUS, 
she won’t be able to deduce from the facts she knows that Phosphorus is 40 million 
kilometers away. Phosphorus-facts cannot be deduced a priori from Hesperus-facts. 
But imagine that Anna now acquires the concept PHOSPHORUS and is told that 
Hesperus is Phosphorus. If she really knew all the facts about Hesperus would 
acquiring that new concept be cognitively significant? Would Anna think that she just 
learned something striking, or surprising? Presumably she would not. At most she 
would learn that some think Hesperus is sometimes thought of as Phosphorus. But 
that hardly seems as though it would be very significant at all for Anna. And certainly 
it seems much less significant that what Mary learns when she learns that thisR is 
what it feels like to see red. It seems possible, then, for someone to account for non-
derivability without accounting for the substantiveness of the knowledge acquired. 
But it is quite important, the anti-physicalist insists, that one explain not only why 
phenomenal facts cannot be deduced from physical facts, but also why Mary’s 
learning of phenomenal facts is as significant and substantive as it seems to be.  
 (iv) Finally, the anti-physicalist demands that one explain the remaining core 
contrast between (ordinary) a posteriori scientific identity claims (like Hesperus is 
Phosphorus or water is H2O) and what are, according to the physicalist, similar a 
posteriori identity claims involving phenomenal concepts (like thisR is 
representational property # 50). The latter (psychophysical) identity claims don’t ever 




 Again, merely accounting for non-derivability is not enough, the anti-
physicalist argues. Imagine now that Anna the astronomer knows a number of 
Hesperus facts and a number of Phosphorus facts without knowing that Hesperus is 
Phosphorus. Anna won’t be able to derive Phosphorus-facts from Hesperus-facts. Yet 
the relevant identity claim (that Hesperus is Phosphorus) would not feel arbitrary for 
her for very long. Presumably, convincing Anna of the truth of the identity claim 
would involve showing her how Venus (the purported single referent of both her 
concepts), because of its trajectory say, would come to look to someone like Anna as 
though it has the properties she associates with the concept HESPERUS and the 
properties associated with the concept PHOSPHORUS. And if once we showed Anna 
this, she still thought the identity claim was arbitrary, “I believe we wouldn’t 
understand what [she] was talking about” (Levine 2007, 147). Yet, if Mary “were to 
follow her exclamation [so that’s what it’s like to see red] with the question, “But 
why should it be like that?” we’d know what she means” (ibid). It makes sense to feel 
as though the psychophysical identity claim remains arbitrary, even after learning all 
there is to know about the relevant facts. And that needs to be explained. 
 Presented with this set of observations, which the anti-physicalist insists must 
be explained, the physicalist has (roughly) two options: she can either maintain that 
the observations in question are false/misguided—and explain why that is—or she 
can take them for granted, and show how they can be explained within a physicalist 






1.2.2. The role of phenomenal concepts 
How, then, can one account for this set of observations? Anti-physicalists and 
physicalists agree that an appeal to our phenomenal thoughts and their constituents 
(phenomenal concepts) is needed—even the anti-physicalists agree that merely 
positing anti-physical properties would do little to explain the observations in 
question. After all, the observations to be explained are epistemic. They concern what 
we can conceive of (zombies and inverts); what Mary can or cannot know, what she 
can or cannot think; what we can or cannot deduce or derive; which questions it 
makes sense for us to consider, and which would be we wouldn’t understand. A full 
explanation of these observations will require, then, an account of phenomenal 
belief—and of those constituents of phenomenal beliefs seem to pick out phenomenal 
feels, phenomenal concepts.  
 The disagreement between physicalists and anti-physicalists is therefore a 
disagreement about whether an appeal to phenomenal concepts can successfully 
explain the set of observations within a physicalist framework. Physicalists believe 
they can; anti-physicalists believe they cannot. To put it another way, the core 
disagreement is one about whether it is possible 1) to explain the relevant 
observations fully, by appealing to phenomenal concepts, and 2) to remain a 
physicalist about phenomenal concepts and/or their referents. The term ‘phenomenal 
concept strategy’ (a term coined by Stoljar (2005)) refers to the physicalist’s attempt 
at showing that it is possible to do both 1) and 2)—and that is how I will use the 




phenomenal concepts—which on their view pick out non-physical properties—
manage to fully explain the data.  
 It is crucial to keep in mind that the phenomenal concept strategy is a 
defensive physicalist strategy. Some critics (see Stoljar 2005) seem to take advocates 
of the strategy to be arguing that a successful appeal to phenomenal concepts entails 
the truth of physicalism, but that is not the case. A successful appeal to phenomenal 
concepts shows that physicalism is consistent with the existence of the Explanatory 
Gap, not that physicalism must be true. 
 
2. Phenomenal Concepts  
 
Phenomenal thoughts are thoughts about phenomenal feels, like the thought that 
green feels are annoying, or that thisR is what it feels like to see red. Some of the 
constituents of these phenomenal thoughts will presumably play an especially 
important role in explaining the anti-physicalist’s data, if only because they are those 
constituents of phenomenal thoughts that actually refer to phenomenal feels (as for 
instance GREEN FEELS and THIS above).  
 We can use the expression ‘phenomenal concepts’ broadly to include any such 
constituent of a phenomenal thought that refers to phenomenal feels. Of course, to 
token phenomenal concepts (broadly construed)—i.e. to have a thought in which such 
a concept figures as a constituent—someone must be able to think about her own 
experience and its properties. It is important to realize, then, that creatures that are 




deploying phenomenal concepts. Now, the fact that phenomenal concepts are higher-
order (and require that someone introspect her own phenomenal feels) does not entail 
that higher-order thought is required in order for creatures to have phenomenal feels 
at all. The existence of higher-order concepts of experience is compatible with first-
order theories of phenomenal feels. Tye, for instance, has forcefully defended (1995, 
2000) a first-order representationalist theory of phenomenal feel: he claims that an 
experience is phenomenally conscious if and only if it has poised, abstract, 
nonconceptual content (PANIC). A creature can be in a PANIC state (hence be 
phenomenally conscious) according to Tye without being capable of higher-order 
thought. Yet, Tye himself acknowledges that to token phenomenal concepts—
concepts that pick out these phenomenal feels—requires being able to think about 
PANIC states, something which naturally requires the capacity to introspect.
15
 
Phenomenal concepts, as those constituents of thought that pick out our phenomenal 
feels, are necessarily higher-order concepts. 
 Fully explaining the data—conceivability judgments, what Mary learns, etc.—
will require that we say more about phenomenal concepts, especially a subset of these 
concepts (broadly construed) whose members seem more intimately connected to 
phenomenal feels themselves. Some phenomenal concepts (broadly construed) seem 
relational, picking out phenomenal feels by their causes: like the concept THE FEEL 
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 I take it that this is uncontroversial. However, some use the phrase ‘phenomenal concept’ to refer not 
to concepts of experience, but rather to those (sentential) representations to which phenomenal feels 
themselves are reduced. We see this in Rey (2007), who talks of the “gap between physical and 
phenomenal concepts (and/or non-conceptual contents; the distinction won’t be significant for 
purposes here.)” By phenomenal concepts, then, he means the nonconceptual contents that phenomenal 
feels are reducible to on his computational/representational theory of qualia. The distinction is 
certainly important to us here: by ‘phenomenal concepts’ we do mean concepts of experience—not 
nonconceptual contents (see Part II of the dissertation for a discussion of conceptual and 




TYPICALLY CAUSED IN NORMAL MEMBERS OF MY COMMUNITY BY PARADIGMATIC RED 
THINGS or a similar (individual) concept THE FEEL TYPICALLY CAUSED IN ME BY 
PARADIGMATIC RED THINGS (see Chalmers 2003, 224).  But other phenomenal 
concepts seem to refer more directly to phenomenal feels, as, for instance, the 
demonstrative concept THISR (pointing to a red phenomenal feel as I introspect). In the 
rest of Part I, I will use the expression ‘phenomenal concepts’ narrowly to refer to 
members of the relevant subset of these concepts (like THISR), unless otherwise noted. 
I do not mean to thereby suggest that phenomenal concepts (narrowly construed) are 
necessarily demonstrative concepts (as some indeed believe—see below) 16. However, 
I find using the demonstrative THISR to be helpful in avoiding various kinds of 
confusions and will use it for this reason.
17
 
 The goal of this section is to make sense of (narrow) phenomenal concepts by 
spelling out the features physicalists widely assume that they have. I should note that 
physicalist accounts of phenomenal concepts (narrowly construed) seem to fall into 
three or four categories (demonstrative accounts, recognitional accounts and 
quotational accounts, along with a hybrid of the first two) and are presented as such. 
This is not how I will introduce phenomenal concepts in this section. What I will do, 
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 Chalmers distinguishes between demonstrative phenomenal concepts and pure phenomenal 
concepts—the latter being the ones that play the crucial explanatory role. Demonstratives, like THIS 
QUALITY, pick out any phenomenal feel a thinker might be demonstrating. Pure phenomenal concepts, 
like R pick out red phenomenal feels. The demonstrative concept I use throughout (THISR) is, in some 
ways, more of a pure phenomenal concept (given Chalmers’ definition)—since it is “coupled” with a 
demonstration and thus anchored (it’s the concept THISR (pointing to a red phenomenal feel via 
introspection)). Chalmers himself acknowledges that “if someone wants to count pure phenomenal 
concepts…as ‘demonstrative’ in a broad sense…, there is no great harm in doing so, as long as the 
relevant distinctions are kept clear” (227). Again, my motivation for using the demonstrative THISR 
throughout the discussion is clarity.  
17
 Tye for instance  uses the expression ‘REDP’ for the phenomenal concept which picks out red 
phenomenal feels via introspction (2000—in his 2003 he uses RED*) and the expression REDNP for the 
nonphenomenal concept red which picks out redness. This suggests that the two concepts (RED* and 




rather, is discuss first the (purported) relation physicalists believe exists between 
phenomenal concepts and other concepts (2.1); second, I will discuss their 
(purported) relation to their referent, i.e. to phenomenal feels (2.2). I will come back 
to general accounts of phenomenal concepts in subsection (2.3), arguing that we can 
best understand these accounts in light of the discussion in 2.1 and 2.2. In 2.4, I 
explain how I think we should understand the connection between the possession of 
phenomenal concepts (narrowly construed) and “knowing what it’s like”.  
 
2.1. Phenomenal concepts and other concepts 
Phenomenal concepts are related to other concepts in some interesting ways. Spelling 
out these relations, the physicalist believes, will help explain the data we started off 
with. Of course the anti-physicalist, too, will have to say something about the 
relations between phenomenal concepts and other concepts. To reiterate the (rather 
obvious) point made earlier, positing non-physical properties cannot help the anti-
physicalist explain why phenomenal facts cannot be deduced from physical facts even 
by someone who knows all the physical facts. After all, what explains why Anna the 
astronomer cannot deduce Phosphorus-facts from Hesperus-facts has nothing to do 
with how many planets there are; but rather with the concepts she possesses—the 
concept HESPERUS and the concept PHOSPHORUS—and the relation between them. 
Similarly, that Mary cannot derive phenomenal facts from physical facts must be 
explained by an account of the concepts she possesses (phenomenal and physical 
concepts) and the relation between them. (Though nothing prevents the anti-




concepts are related as they are, we must posit non-physical properties, which is in 
fact what they do, see section 4.1.) 
  It is widely believed that phenomenal concepts are, in some way or other, 
conceptually isolated from physical concepts. Loar (1997) characterizes this 
conceptual isolation (alternatively called “cognitive irreducibility” or “conceptual 
independence”) as follows: phenomenal concepts “neither a priori imply, nor are 
implied by, physical-functional concepts” (295
18
). Tye (1995, 2000) writes that “no 
amount of a priori reflection on phenomenal concepts alone will reveal phenomenal-
physical or phenomenal-functional connections” (2000, 30). Carruthers (2004) says 
that phenomenal concepts have “no conceptual ties with physical concepts, or with 
concepts of causal role and/or concepts of intentional content” (PG).
19
 My goal here 
is to spell out in more detail what it means to say that phenomenal concepts are 
conceptually isolated. 
 
  2.1.1. Clarifications 
It may help to think of conceptually linked concepts as standing in a privileged 
relation to other concepts “generally by way of some type of inferential disposition” 
(Laurence and Margolis 1999, 5). It seems plausible to suppose that “one would have 
certain [a priori] dispositions linking RED and COLOR—for example, the disposition to 
infer X IS COLORED from X IS RED” (ibid) a priori. Or that one would have certain a 
priori dispositions linking BACHELOR and UNAMARRIED MAN. 
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 Page numbers refer to the reprinted version of the paper in Chalmers’ 2002 anthology Philosophy of 
Mind.  
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 To say that phenomenal concepts are conceptually isolated, then, is to say that 
a thinker could possess the phenomenal concept THISR (picking out a red phenomenal 
feel) without possessing any of the concepts of cognitive science—concepts like 
NEURON, S CONES, V1, BRAIN, REPRESENTATION, CONTENT, FUNCTIONAL ROLE, etc. 
That is, the thinker could think of some X that “X is thisR feel” without being a priori 
disposed to think that “X is representational property #50”.  
 Interestingly, there seem to be no a priori connections between the 
phenomenal concept THISR and the more general concept PHYSICAL STUFF. A thinker 
may think of some X that “X is thisR feel” without thinking that “X is physical stuff”. 
In this way we might think that phenomenal concepts are unlike many other concepts 
(like WATER), which seem a priori connected with the concept PHYSICAL STUFF. 
Anyone who thinks of some X that “X is water” might be disposed to infer that “X is 





To claim that thinkers have no a priori disposition to link phenomenal concepts and 
physical concepts is not to say that phenomenal and physical concepts are not 
connected a priori in some general way, say logically. So those who defend (even a 
strong) conceptual isolation of phenomenal concepts need not (and do not) deny that 
a number of a priori logical connections will hold between these concepts and 
physical concepts. If Adi knows that some X is “either thisR or representational 
property # 50 (rp50)”, then she will know a priori of X that “if it isn’t thisR, then it is 
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 This is not to say that phenomenal concepts are the only concepts that are not a priori connected to 




rp50”. Such an a priori logical connection might seem to hold between any 
concepts—and proponents of phenomenal concepts can grant that it holds between 
phenomenal and physical concepts as well. Still, these proponents will insist that 
phenomenal and physical concepts are conceptually isolated, meaning (more 






The claim about conceptual isolation appeals to a priori connections between 
concepts, and as such it may seem incompatible with the atomist account of concepts. 
After all, according to the atomist, there are no a priori connections between 
concepts. Take the concept BACHELOR. The atomist will deny that it is constitutive of 
possessing the concept BACHELOR that there be a connection between that concept 
and the concepts UNAMMARIED and MALE. Hence there are no a priori connections 
between the concepts BACHELOR, UNAMMARIED and MALE.  
If the atomist denies that there is an a priori connection between BACHELOR 
and UNAMARRIED MALE, then she won’t be impressed with our claim about 
phenomenal concepts. After all, to say that the concept THISR and the concept 
REPRESENTATIONAL PROPERTY # 50 (RP#50) aren’t connected a priori, is to say 
nothing more than that phenomenal and physical concept pairs are like every other 
pair of concepts.  
There is no way I can fully address this worry here. I do think there are 
plausible ways of dealing with it however, along the lines suggested by Laurence and 
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Margolis (1999).  They point out that though the atomist denies that there are a priori 
connections between concepts (connections that are constitutive of concept 
possession), she doesn’t claim that there are no connections at all between concepts. 
Like any other theorists, the atomist holds that people associate a considerable 
amount of information with any concept they possess. The only difference is 
that whereas other theorists say that much of the information is collateral (and 
that only a small part is constitutive of the concept itself), atomists say that all 
of it is collateral (Laurence and Margolis 1999, 65). 
In other words, even on an atomist view, concepts will be connected to each other. 
It’s just that none of these connections are a priori. Still, the atomist can claim that 
subjects will often believe (falsely) that some connections between their concepts are 
a priori while others are not.
22
 And so while subjects believe (falsely) that there are a 
priori connections between the concepts BACHELOR, and MALE, they won’t similarly 
believe that there are a priori connections between phenomenal concepts and physical 
concepts.  This will be enough for us to draw a contrast between BACHELOR and the 




2.1.2. How isolated are phenomenal concepts?  
Phenomenal concepts are thought to be isolated from physical concepts in such a way 
that there are no a priori connections between them. How plausible is that claim?  
 
Not isolated at all?  
Levine (2007) argues that phenomenal concepts aren’t isolated at all. “We have a rich 
body of beliefs concerning the causes and effects of phenomenal states—composed of 
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 This is by no means to suggest that there are no objections to this move on behalf of the atomist. See 




both phenomenal and nonphenomenal concepts in the very same cognitive states” 
(152). Adi will be disposed to connect her belief that she is undergoing thisR feel to 
beliefs like the following: that this is the feel caused by seeing red; that this is the feel 
people in her community typically undergo when seeing red; etc. Levine concludes 
that “phenomenal concepts maintain […] links to nonphenomenal concepts […] so it 
seems as if cognitive isolation isn’t really the issue” (153).  
 Levine is right, of course. Phenomenal concepts will often be conceptually 
connected to nonphenomenal concepts—as those who believe phenomenal concepts 
to be conceptually isolated themselves will grant. Indeed, to say that phenomenal 
concepts are conceptually isolated is not to say that there are no connections between 
them and physical concepts; it is to say that there are no a priori connections between 
them and physical concepts. And it isn’t obvious that the connections Levine has in 
mind are a priori connections. Certainly the connection between THISR and the 
description “the feel people in my community …” is not a priori. 
 
Semi-isolated? 
Some might insist, in the spirit of Levine, that there are a number of other physical 
concepts which are linked a priori to our phenomenal concepts—physical concepts 
which, though they are used in the cognitive sciences are also part of our ordinary 
everyday stock of concepts, like RED. So the phenomenal concept THISR (pointing to a 
red phenomenal feel) might seem connected a priori to the physical color concept 
RED.
24
 However, I don’t think that it is. Imagine that Mary is finally allowed out of 
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her black and white room but instead of being let out into the open, she is ushered 
into another room, one full of variously colored wallpaper (a variation on Nida-
Rümelin’s Marianna thought experiment (1996, 1998)). The wallpaper does not come 
labeled, and Mary is not allowed any equipment that would enable her to find out 
which panel of wallpaper is green, which is red, which is orange. In this odd room, as 
Mary stands looking at the panel of red wallpaper, she can token the phenomenal 
concept THISR. Yet she won’t be disposed to think that she is seeing red—after all she 
doesn’t know whether she’s seeing red, or green, or orange. So the phenomenal 
concept THISR is not a priori connected with the concept RED.  
 Now what about the concept COLOR? Certainly, Mary would be disposed to 
think that she is seeing some color or other. But could someone possess the 
phenomenal concept THISR without connecting it with the concept COLOR? That is, 
could someone think of some X that “X is thisR feel (pointing to a red phenomenal 
feel)” and not be a priori disposed to infer that “X is related to color in some way or 
other”…say, as opposed to shape? We may wonder also about the connection 
between phenomenal concepts and concepts of the sense modality involved (like 
SEEING or HEARING). Could someone think of some X that “X is thisR feel” and not be 
a priori disposed to infer that “X is related in some way to seeing” as opposed to 
hearing? This is where things become increasingly unclear.
25
 We could try to imagine 
a thinker who has always been blind. We could imagine a neuroscientist causing that 
                                                                                                                                           
‘RED*’ or ‘REDP’ to stand for the phenomenal concept that picks out red phenomenal feels. Which is 
one reason that I think this notation is misleading.   
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connections are controversially a priori (for instance Chalmer’s (200X) claim that the concept WATER 
is a priori connected to the concepts CLEAR DRINKABLE LIQUID is far from obviously true. I come back 




thinker’s brain to token a red experience—and hence we could imagine that the 
thinker now possesses the phenomenal concept THISR. But could the thinker fail to 
know, then, that the feel she was introspecting was a color feel? It isn’t obvious. Or 
we could try to imagine a thinker who never had any visual or auditory experiences.  
Again, a neuroscientist causes the thinker’s brain to token a red experience—and the 
thinker as a result of thinking about that red experience tokens the concept THISR. 
Could she fail to know that the phenomenal feel was a seeing kind of phenomenal 
feel as opposed to an auditory one? Again, the answer is not immediately clear.  
The lack of clear intuitions in these cases should not worry the proponent of 
phenomenal concepts, however. Ultimately, those who care about conceptual 
isolation need not claim that there are no a priori connections between phenomenal 
concepts and any other concepts. That sort of claim is too strong and is not needed. 
What will matter, ultimately, is not that phenomenal concepts are completely 
conceptually isolated, but rather that they are quite significantly conceptually isolated 
from the concepts of our physical, brain, and cognitive sciences, including the general 
concept PHYSICAL STUFF.  
 
Strict a priori connections vs. pre-theoretical connections 
So far, our test for a priori connections has been rather strict. To find out whether the 
concept THISR is conceptually linked with the concept RP#50, we should ask whether it 
is possible for someone to possess the concept THISR and not possess the concept 
RP#50. If the answer is “yes,” then the concepts are conceptually isolated; if the 




But maybe this is too strict a test. After all, it seems possible (despite what I 
might have claimed) for someone to possess the concept THISR and not possess the 
concept PHYSICAL—which means that the concepts in question would be conceptually 
isolated. Moreover, it often seems that proponents of conceptual isolation do have in 
mind a slightly looser connection than the one I’ve been talking about. What matters 
might be what a thinker would come to believe pre-theoretically about the referent of 
her concept “armed only with her understanding of [the concept] and a bit of a priori 
reflection” (Byrne and Pryor 2004).
26
 And now it becomes plausible to say that, 
armed with her grasp of the concept THISR and a bit of a priori reflection, a thinker 
might fail to draw the conclusion that thisR is physical. Or that she might even draw 
the conclusion that thisR is nonphysical. (Note that these are two different claims: the 
first says that there are no a priori connections between THISR and the concept 
PHYSICAL. The second – not entailed by the first – says that there is an a priori 
connection between THISR and the concept NONPHYSICAL.) 
Indeed, some recent data suggests that a belief in a “nonphysical” mind may 
be part of our innate theory of mind. Bloom (2004) and others (see Kuhlmeier et. al 
2004, Bering and Bjorklund 2004) have recently argued that human beings innately 
believe that the mind and the body are two different kinds of things. In one 
experiment, very young children were told the story of an alligator killing a mouse. 
Asked whether the mouse’s brain worked, or whether it would need food, the children 
overwhelmingly answered negatively. However, despite thinking that the mouse was 
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dead, the children seemed to think that it still had a mental life (that it sill loved its 
mother and liked cheese). This suggests that children do not seem to connect 
physical, bodily lives and mental lives (see Bering and Bjorklund 2004).  
 We can add that phenomenal concepts seem pre-theoretically connected to a 
number of other interesting concepts, at the very least concepts like INTROSPECTION or 
THINKING. Anyone who thinks of some X that “X is thisR feel” is disposed to think 
that “X is the thing that I’m introspecting”, or “X is the thing I’m thinking about” if 
nothing else. Again, we should be hesitant to accept any strong intuitions about strict 
a priori connections, so we needn’t claim that these concepts are connected a priori in 
a stricter sense—such that it would be impossible for someone to possess the concept 
THISR and not possess the concept INTROSPECTION or THINKING. But they seem quite 
obviously connected pre-theoretically. 
Other pre-theoretical connections might hold between phenomenal concepts 
and the concepts that people have traditionally associated with qualia: concepts like 
PRIVATE, INEFFABLE etc. For before they learn much of anything about phenomenal 
consciousness, thinkers might indeed be disposed to infer that their feels are private, 
ineffable, etc. Again these connections are not strictly a priori. One can possess the 
phenomenal concept THISR without possessing the concept PRIVATE or INEFFABLE. 
They are a priori in a looser sense. 
 
2.1.3 Summary 
Phenomenal concepts are widely believed to be a priori conceptually isolated from 




First, in a strict sense: phenomenal concepts aren’t a priori connected to physical 
concepts iff it is possible for a thinker to possess a phenomenal concept and not 
possess any physical concept. Phenomenal concepts might indeed lack any such a 
priori connections to physical concepts (though there are unclear cases). Second, we 
can think of these connections as pre-theoretical connections. Phenomenal concepts 
might be a priori connected, in this looser sense, to a number of concepts. Most 
importantly phenomenal concepts seem a priori connected in this way to the concepts 
INTROSPECTION and THINKING, NONPHYSICAL and possibly also to the concepts 
PRIVATE, INEFFABLE, etc. 
 That phenomenal concepts are connected with some concepts a priori won’t 
be a problem for the physicalist at all—as will become obvious when we put 
phenomenal concepts to work in section 3. And naturally it does not entail that 
phenomenal concepts are not, a posteriori, connected with physical concepts in a 
number of intricate ways.  
2.2. Phenomenal concepts and their referents  
Narrowly construed phenomenal concepts are thought to be related to their 
referents in two interesting ways. First, it seems that (narrow) phenomenal concepts 
can be tokened in someone’s tho 
ught only if that person has actually undergone an experience with the referent 
phenomenal feel. Someone can think that thisR is what it feels like to see red, only if 
they’ve actually had a red experience. Second, it seems that phenomenal concepts 




separable features of phenomenal concepts and their referents, as will become clear in 
my discussion of each.)  
 
2.2.1. Undergoing the feel 
If phenomenal concepts can be tokened only once a thinker has actually undergone an 
experience with the referent feel, then phenomenal concepts should remind us of 
another kind of concept, namely, recognitional concepts. A concept is recognitional, 
it is often suggested, if possessing it (being able to think a thought involving it) 
requires the ability to recognize or re-identify things that fall under the concept. The 
concept RED is widely considered to be the paradigmatic recognitional concept:
27
 
possessing it (being able to think thoughts with the concept RED as a constituent), 
seems to require at the very least the ability to re-identify red objects as red (to 
recognize that they fall under the concept RED) relatively reliably at different points in 
time (see Fodor 1998, who goes on to “sort of prove” that there are no recognitional 
concepts). From which it follows, that a thinker can token the recognitional concept 
RED only if she has come into contact with (i.e., perceived) red objects before, just as 
a thinker can token the concept THIS (in the thought so this is what it’s like to see red) 
only if she has “come into contact” with referent red phenomenal feels before. 
 So it seems as though phenomenal concepts are a species of recognitional 
concepts. Note, however, that phenomenal concepts also seem unlike other 
recognitional concepts (such as RED). Though it is sometimes the case that someone 
will have the ability to recognize or re-identify a feel as falling under a phenomenal 
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concept she deployed earlier, it will be more often the case that we have experiences 
to which we can refer to using what seem to be phenomenal concepts, even while we 
lack the ability to recognize or re-identify the experience as having that feel when we 
undergo it later on. Adi’s poi tasting experience at dinner one day and at lunch the 
next may trigger the same phenomenal concept, e.g. it’s this kind of taste again. But 
Adi, at the paint store, thinks “so this is what it feels like to see firefly green” even 
though she lacks the ability to recognize this exact feel when she undergoes it again.
28
 
It would seem that her concept THIS is a phenomenal concept (in our narrow sense)—
though not a recognitional concept in the traditional sense. 
 As it turns out, the re-identification requirement on recognitional concepts 
may be weakened. So we may claim that the possession of a (weak) recognitional 
concept does not require that the thinker have an ability (or disposition) to recognize 
that two things are of the same kind at different points in time—call such an ability a 
diachronic ability. Rather, all that may be required to token a weak recognitional 
concept may be the ability (or disposition) to recognize that two things are of the 
same type at one given point in time—call such an ability a synchronic ability (see 
Chuard 2006 for a nice discussion of re-identification conditions, though in another 
context). And indeed, Adi has dispositions to identify her feel as belonging to the 
same type as other feels when they are presented to her at the same time. If presented 
with a patch of lime green (another shade of light green) and a patch of firefly green 
at the same time, Adi would not be disposed to identify the respective feels caused in 
her by those patches as of the same kind. And another patch of firefly green, 
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presented to her at the same time, would indeed cause Adi to think that there is 
another one of these feels.  
 We can conclude that some recognition/re-identification condition is required 
on phenomenal concepts (as for other (weak) recognitional concepts), though we can 
deny that what is required is diachronic recognition/re-identification. (Of course, it 
might be odd to use the term ‘recognition’ here. When we talk of recognition we do 
usually mean over time. So it may be less misleading to use the term ‘re-
identification’). 
 Of course, some have argued that phenomenal concepts must be more robustly 
recognitional—namely, that possessing a phenomenal concept (and being able to 
deploy that concept in thought) requires diachronic recognition (i.e. the re-
identification of an object as falling under the concept after a temporal gap). For if we 
deny that there is a diachronic recognition condition on phenomenal concepts, then it 
seems possible for someone to token a phenomenal concept in thought without that 
concept being stored in memory. But, one may claim, to even be a concept, a mental 
representation must be stored in memory. If phenomenal concepts aren’t stored in 
memory, then they aren’t even concepts at all.29  
 I don’t think this need cause us worry. The term ‘concept’ may be used more 
or less technically to pick out different kinds of mental representations.30 It may 
indeed be used by most cognitive scientists and “concept researchers” to refer to 
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those mental representations that are stored in memory (as Prinz (2007) claims). 
However, those interested in phenomenal concepts (physicalists and anti-physicalists 
alike) are interested first and foremost in phenomenal thought. For they claim that the 
set of observations put forth by the anti-physicalist, being epistemic, will have to be 
explained by our way of thinking about phenomenal feels, that is, by our phenomenal 
thoughts. Particular constituents of phenomenal thought will play an especially 
important role in explaining these observations, and those have been called 
phenomenal concepts. The term ‘concept’, in this debate, then, given our particular 
endeavor, is used to pick out those mental representations which are constituents of 
thoughts—regardless of what else may be true of them (whether or not, for instance, 
they are stored in memory)31,32.   
 Where does this leave us? For Adi to token a phenomenal concept in her 
firefly green thought, must she have the ability to recognize (or re-identify) firefly 
green feels? That depends on whether this ability is synchronic or diachronic. It 
would seem as though Adi needn’t have the ability to recognize firefly green feels 
after a temporal gap. The recognition condition on phenomenal concepts could then 
turn out to be relatively weak: a phenomenal concept may be recognitional in the 
sense that possessing such a concept (i.e. being able to think with such a concept) 
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requires synchronic identification.33  Recognitional concepts, even those with weaker 
recognition/re-identification conditions, do have the feature we were emphasizing at 
the beginning of this section: their deployment in one’s thoughts requires that she 
have actually experienced the property that she has the ability to recognize/re-
identify. Possessing the recognitional concept RED is not merely a question of having 
the ability to discriminate between red objects and other objects, for presumably 
anyone who isn’t colorblind would have the ability to make the relevant 
discriminations, even if she had never actually seen anything red. To token the 
recognitional concept RED, one must have the ability to re-identify red things and 
have come into perceptual contact with red things.  
 Similarly, for Adi to token the phenomenal concept THISG (referring to 
(general) green feels) she must have undergone the kind of feel in question. Though 
Mary, in her black-and-white room, may have the ability to discriminate between 
colored feels (an ability as of yet untapped), she cannot deploy the phenomenal 
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 As a matter of fact, those who have claimed that phenomenal concepts are recognitional seem, for 
the most part, to have had a rather weak condition in mind. Phenomenal concepts are not recognitional 
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2.2.2. Phenomenal concepts refer directly 
It is said that phenomenal concepts are concepts that refer to phenomenal feels 
directly (see White 2007, Levine 2007, Levin 2007, Tye 2000 among others), a claim 
that is often spelt out in terms of reference-fixing. Tye writes that phenomenal 
concepts enable us to recognize phenomenal feels “via introspection without the use 
of any associated reference-fixing intermediaries” (28). White (2007) also claims that 
unlike other concepts such as HESPERUS and PHOSPHORUS, phenomenal concepts do 
not come to pick out their referents via a mental description associated with the 
concept by the thinker—a description which would uniquely determine the referent. 
HESPERUS comes to pick out Venus because the thinker associates with HESPERUS a 
description like “star that rises here in the evening”, which uniquely picks out Venus. 
The phenomenal concept THISR, on the other hand, comes to pick out, say, 
representational property # 50 (or ® for short), without the mediation of any such 
mental description of it. This claim is sometimes expressed in terms of ‘modes of 
presentation’ as follows: the relation between phenomenal concepts and their 
referents is not mediated by a mode of presentation.  According to White:  
the relation of “pain” to pain […] is not mediated by a mode of presentation of 
pain. In this it differs from the referential relation commonly thought to hold 
between “Hesperus” or “Phosphorus” and Venus. The ordinary assumption is 
that the reference, for example, of “Hesperus” to Venus is mediated by a 
description such as “the first heavenly body visible in the evening” (211). 
 
Unfortunately, the claim that phenomenal concepts refer directly is sometimes 
ambiguous. Some take it to mean not merely that the reference of phenomenal 
concepts is determined directly (i.e. not via a mental description), but also that 




with them. It is important to note that the two claims are very different. To say that 
the reference of a concept is determined directly (however one is to cash out what the 
reference-fixing mechanism is) is not to say that there are no mental descriptions 
associated with that concept at all. After all, one might want to claim (as many in fact 
have claimed since Kripke) that what determines the reference of HESPERUS is not any 
description thinkers might associate with it but rather some causal/historical link 
between the thinker and Venus. This fact does not entail that thinkers do not associate 
any descriptions with their concept HESPERUS, but only that these descriptions are not 
reference-fixing.   
 Of course, the two claims might be linked in this way: if a concept is such that 
there are no descriptions associated with it, then descriptions associated with it could 
not possibly fix its reference—and something other than descriptions would have to 
play the reference-fixing role. Interestingly enough, many of the writers who claim 
that what fixes the reference of phenomenal concepts is not a set of descriptions seem 
to do so by arguing, first, that there are no descriptions associated with these concepts 
at all—hence, that something else must be fixing their reference (see Ismael 1999, 
Carruthers 2000, 2004). But here is another quite important thing to note: claiming 
that phenomenal concepts are not associated with any mental description is to make a 
claim about the relation between phenomenal concepts and other concepts, not 
between concepts and their referents. After all, mental descriptions are merely 
complex mental representations with concepts as constituents. If we have reason to 
think (as argued in section 2.1. on conceptual isolation) that phenomenal concepts are 




phenomenal concepts are associated (even a priori) with some mental descriptions, 
even if those descriptions are not reference-fixing.  
 In any case, let us assume, as many seem to do in the phenomenal concept 
literature, that what determines the reference of phenomenal concepts are not 
descriptions. What else might determine the reference of these concepts? There are 
currently three proposals on the table: demonstrations, recognitional abilities, and 
quotation. I take a look at each in turn. 
 
Demonstrations 
Even if we assume that what determines the reference of HESPERUS is a description 
that the thinker associates with the concept, we might think that (at least some) 
demonstratives, work rather differently. It might seem as though what determines 
their reference is an act of demonstration—maybe a pointing gesture (Kaplan 1989a) 
or a “directing intention” (Kaplan 1989b). Again, this is not to say, of course, that 
thinkers don’t associate various descriptions with their demonstrative concepts. Anna 
could associate with THIS STAR (pointing at Hesperus) a number of descriptions of the 
referent: it’s a heavenly body, it rises here, etc. But the reference of her demonstrative 
is not fixed by these descriptions. It is fixed rather by her act of pointing—or her 
“intention to point at a perceived individual on whom [s]he has focused" (Kaplan 
1989b, 582).    
 Some of the writers who think that phenomenal concepts are demonstratives 
make claims of this sort—though they seem to want to say first that phenomenal 




phenomenal concepts ostend phenomenal feels, where ‘ostension’ is the “name for 
identification without the employment of [associated] representations” (356). He goes 
on to say, a few pages later, that  
to ostend a part of the world one need not know anything about it; as a matter 
of fact, one must only be appropriately related to it. It is an actual, external 
relation between oneself and what one points at—regardless of what one 
knows, or thinks one knows, regardless, that is, of anything ‘in one’s head’—
that makes it, rather than any other thing, the object of one’s ostension (359).  
 
Ismael’s point is, I think, that phenomenal concepts, like some demonstratives, do not 
have any descriptions associated with them. From which it follows, of course, that no 
description can fix the reference for these concepts. Reference must be fixed, then, by 
some act of demonstration.  
 
Recognitional Abilities 
I have claimed above that (narrow) phenomenal concepts are like recognitional 
concepts in one respect: they can be tokened only by subjects who have “come into 
contact” with the referent kind, and have the ability to re-identify (whether 
diachronically or synchronically) other instances belonging to that referent kind. I 
made no claim, then, about what might fix the reference for these concepts. However, 
it seems plausible to assume that what fixes the reference of a recognitional concept is 
not a set of descriptions thinkers associate with that concept, but rather the very 
recognitional (re-identifying) abilities and dispositions of the thinker.  
 Let us go back to an example we used in our earlier discussion of 
recognitional concepts: Adi, in the paint store, thinks “so this is what it’s like to see 




Presumably her recognitional abilities. Janet Levin (2007) claims that nothing other 
than this ability could determine reference here: 
[T]he ability to recognize or reidentify is required to underwrite determinate 
reference to a particular property. The best way—perhaps the only physicalistically 
acceptable way—to determine whether someone’s current “pointing in” denotes what 
it’s like to see some particular shade of red, or a more coarse-grained phenomenal 
property (e.g., red in general, or color) […] is to see what she is disposed to identify 
as other instances of that property (89). 
 
So, if it turns out that Adi cannot re-identify (even at the same point in time) firefly 
green with other shades of light green, then we have reason to think that her 
recognitional concept THIS does not actually refer to firefly green (despite what Adi 
herself might think). 
 Loar (1990), too, endorses such a view of the relation between phenomenal 
concepts and their referents: phenomenal concepts are direct recognitional concepts, 
he claims, where direct recognitional concepts are recognitional concepts that refer 
“unmediated by a higher-order reference-fixer” (87). Loar adds that even “lacking a 
name [for an object] I may still come to recognize instances [of it] here and there” 
(1990, 88). Consider, for instance, subjects in Livingston, et. al’s experiment (1999), 
who acquired two recognitional concepts, GEX and ZOF, without being told explicitly, 
and without explicitly learning, what made one of the “creatures” on the screen a Gex 
as opposed to a Zof. What fixes the reference of their recognitional concepts GEX and 
ZOF is not a description which they associate with GEX or ZOF and which uniquely 
determine the reference of these concepts. After all, subjects do not know what 
differentiates Gexes and Zofes—so they do not even have any associated mental 
description which would uniquely pick out the referent. What determines the 




revised version of “Phenomenal States” (1997) Loar defines direct recognitional 
concepts rather differently, as those recognitional concepts that pick out their object 
or property via a necessary mode of presentation. I ignore this complication now, 
until section 4). 
 Carruthers (2000, 2004) argues that phenomenal concepts are purely 
recognitional: 
A concept is purely recognitional when nothing in the grasp of that concept, as such, 
requires its user to apply or appeal to any other concept or belief (2004, 4). 
 
Carruthers uses the example of “chicken sexers”, who are 
people [who] can be trained to [identify the sex of] very young chicks entirely 
intuitively by handling them, without having any idea of what they are doing, or of 
the basis on which they effect their classifications (2000, 56) 
 
Chicken sexers might have no name for the properties they’re picking out: we can 
imagine them thinking simply, “it’s one of these”; “now it’s one of those”. A chicken 
sexer, then, would have almost no beliefs about the nature of the property she is 
picking out and her recognitional concepts would be, correspondingly, almost purely 
recognitional—though not quite. Carruthers grants that it is unlikely that chicken 
sexers would have no associated descriptions of what it is they are picking out. 
Phenomenal concepts, then, are simply more “extreme” versions of recognitional 
concepts like those used by chicken sexers—recognitional concepts which have no 
descriptions associated with them whatsoever. It will therefore follow that what fixes 
the reference of these concepts cannot be associated descriptions—but rather 






Quotational concepts have an odd relation to their referents: they are concepts that 
“contain” or “embed” or “quote” their referents. What determines the reference of 
these concepts is simply their quoting it. Papineau (2002), Block (2002, 2007) and 
Balog (draft) offer quotational accounts of phenomenal concepts.  On Papineau’s 
2002 account, phenomenal concepts are “compound terms” of the form ‘the 
experience:----’  where the “---” stands for the experience itself (along with its 
phenomenal feel). The phenomenal concept contains the very experience it picks out. 
The quotation involved in such accounts should be understood by analogy to 
linguistic quotation. The referent of ‘I walk the line’ is the very sentence which is 
located between the quotation marks. Quotation can be iterated an unlimited number 
of times: ‘‘I walk the line’’ refers to the quoted sentence which is located between the 
quotation marks, namely the quoted sentence ‘I walk the line’ and so on. Importantly, 
in ordinary text we can quote things other than sentences. Drawings or symbols, for 
instance, can be quoted. Following Balog, I will now use ‘*’ to signal mental 
quotation. The quotation of drawings is actually not unusual; it is sometimes used in 
novels in ways that feel natural enough.
34
 So, Balog claims, just as we can quote in 
natural language (in English) we can quote in thought. If I work on a theory of 
concepts, I may have thoughts like this: I wonder what the structure of a concept like 
*BACHELOR* is. When I think about my own concept BACHELOR I am, plausibly, 
quoting it: I’m using a device that enables me to refer to, or rather to mention it (the 
concept) without using it. The idea now is this: that just as I can quote symbols (or 
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drawings) in a text, I can quote things other than concepts in thought: more 
specifically I can quote experiences. When I think I love these (red-feels) my concept 
THESE in fact quotes those very experiences: it really should look like this, I love 
*®*. (I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of these three accounts later on in Part I 
(see section 3)) 
 
2.3. Accounts of phenomenal concepts 
In this section, I have discussed various features that play important roles in 
physicalist accounts of phenomenal concepts. Phenomenal concepts are thought to be 
related to other concepts in a particular way: thinkers will have no a priori 
dispositions to link thoughts like “X is this feel” to thoughts about the nature of X 
(like “X is physical state such-and-such”). Phenomenal concepts are also thought to 
be related to their referents in two interesting ways: first, they are concepts that 
cannot be tokened unless the thinker has “come into contact” with the referent (has 
undergone the feel). Second, they are concepts whose reference is fixed not by 
descriptions but directly. There are three physicalist proposals concerning what that 
reference-fixing mechanism might be: acts of demonstration, recognitional abilities, 
or quotation.  
 As promised at the beginning of section 2, I will now consider the mainstream 
physicalist accounts of phenomenal concepts (demonstrative, recognitional, hybrids, 
and quotational accounts) and show how they are related to the features discussed in 






2.3.1. Mapping the accounts 
Various accounts of phenomenal concepts are often presented, in the literature, as 
being significantly unlike each other. I don’t think they are. And that is what I show 
below.  
According to recognitional accounts, phenomenal concepts are recognitional 
concepts of some kind. Why make this claim? Because some recognitional concepts 
have three important features: first, they too seem conceptually isolated (in some 
instances). Chicken sexers (discussed by Carruthers) will have dispositions to infer 
very little about the nature of what it is they are picking up on. Phenomenal concepts 
are simply a bit more isolated than the chicken sexer’s (almost) conceptually isolated 
recognitional concepts. Second, it is plausible to claim that the reference of 
recognitional concepts is fixed not by associated descriptions but by recognitional 
abilities. Third, recognitional concepts cannot be tokened before the thinker has come 
into contact with the referent.  
 Demonstrative accounts of phenomenal concepts (defended by Perry (2001), 
Ismael (1999), and O’Dea (1999)) make the claim, rather unsurprisingly, that 
phenomenal concepts are demonstratives of some kind. Why make such a claim? For 
two main reasons: first, because (some) demonstratives are, in some circumstances, 
conceptually isolated from other concepts in ways that give rise to non-deducibility. 
Imagine, then, that Adi is kidnapped and wakes up locked in a strange room. In the 
room she finds a very detailed map of the state of Maryland, which she assumes—
rightly—is the state she is in. She knows, of course, that she is here in some sense—




this (pointing at the space around her) is her location—that she is in this corner of the 
room, and that this is where she sat an hour ago. But she has no way of linking her 
demonstratives with the map she studies. In fact, she can study it all she wants and 
come to know all there is to know about Maryland geography. Nothing will help, for 
what is missing is a connection between the spatial demonstratives she deploys and 
the geographical map. Second, it is plausible to think that the reference of 
demonstratives is not determined by an associated description but by an act of 
demonstration. To claim that phenomenal concepts are demonstrative concepts, then, 
is to claim that they have two of the features we discussed above: 1) they are 
conceptually isolated; 2) they refer directly. Defenders of demonstrative accounts 
usually come to have such a hybrid account. O’Dea (2002) writes that phenomenal 
concepts are “partly recognitional” (178); Perry (2001) argues that our phenomenal 
concepts have “a demonstrative/recognitional core” (141). What obviously motivates 
these writers is the desire to capture the recognitional feature of phenomenal 
concepts—a feature that mere demonstratives don’t necessarily share. Proponents of 
demonstrative accounts, like proponents of recognitional accounts, ultimately hope to 
claim, then, that phenomenal concepts have the three features I discussed in 2.1 and 
2.2.  
 Quotational accounts also attempt to capture these three features. They argue 
that phenomenal concepts quote or embed their referents, phenomenal feels. Such 
embedding, they think, will give rise to conceptual isolation. After all, it seems 
plausible enough to say that the odd concept THIS:® would not be obviously 




plausible to claim that what determines the reference of a concept like THIS:® is the 
quotation within it. Finally, the concept THIS:® cannot be tokened without the referent 
phenomenal feel (®) itself being tokened.  
 
2.3.2. Demonstrative/recognitional vs. quotational  
As I just pointed out, these accounts have very much in common. Still, we might 
wonder which we should prefer—if we should be defend a 
demonstrative/recognitional account or a quotational one (since these two accounts 
are widely considered to be the two main rivals, I focus my discussion on them). Of 
course, a full answer to that question would require taking a look at how these 
different accounts handle the anti-physicalist data. Levine, for instance, claims that 
demonstrative/recognitional accounts can’t explain what Mary learns when she leaves 
the room. And it might seem as though quotational accounts will do a better job than 
demonstrative/recognitional accounts at explaining the core contrast. I leave these 
issues for the next section (I argue there that Levine is wrong (3.3.3) and that 
quotational accounts can’t explain the core contrast any better than any other 
physicalist account of phenomenal concepts.) What I do consider now are some 
independent reasons for thinking that demonstrative/recognitional, or quotational 
accounts, cannot be the right accounts of phenomenal concepts. 
Quotational accounts are, in some ways, the most puzzling of the three 
accounts. After all, we have demonstrative thoughts, and we possess and deploy 
recognitional concepts; phenomenal concepts, on demonstrative and recognitional 




however, seem to be an entirely new species of concepts. The first strike against 
quotational concepts concerns the nature of quotation itself: some consider quotation 
to be simply a kind a demonstrative pointing (Levine (2007) makes something like 
this point). When Adi quotes a sentence like ‘I walk the line’, some argue that she 
simply points demonstratively to the sentence within the quotation marks. If quotation 
can be reduced to demonstrative pointing, then quotational accounts of phenomenal 
concepts may be reducible to demonstrative accounts of phenomenal concepts. Now 
as it turns out, what motivates defenders of the quotational view is a dissatisfaction 
with demonstrative and/or recognitional accounts: Levine (online) and Balog (online) 
both argue along these lines. Balog, for instance, suggests that on 
recognitional/demonstrative accounts, a “phenomenal concept and its referent [are] 
distinct existences related by causation” (17/18). She continues: 
 But it seems that this leaves too much of a distance between, e.g., a phenomenal 
concept one applied to a particular pain as it occurs (let’s call the concept P) and the 
particular pain itself, as on this view their occurrence is independent. 
  
The recognitional/demonstrative view leaves open the possibility of someone 
tokening the concept P while not being in pain. But that is unfortunate, she thinks: 
“anybody who tokens a first personish phenomenal concept of pain purporting to 
refer to a current state is really in pain” (ibid 18). The quotational account 
circumvents this problem by eliminating the “distance” between phenomenal concept 
and referent feels: anyone who has a thought with a phenomenal concept as a 
constituent will have the very feel the phenomenal concept “points to” as a 
constituent as well. Of course, it is still possible for a subject to be mistaken about 




any feel as pain, heat, fear, etc. may be wrong. What the quotational account may 
avoid is the deployment of a phenomenal concept in the absence of any feel whatever, 
for on the quotational account, a deployed phenomenal concept will necessarily quote 
a feel: it will be impossible, then, for someone to think “I am having this feel” while 
she’s having no feels at all. Balog is eager to deny, then, the possibility of a 
“conceptual” zombie as she calls it—an individual identical to our subject Adi 
conceptually but who doesn’t have feels. Z-Adi, Balog wants to claim, couldn’t 
possess phenomenal concepts.  
 As it turns out, defenders of demonstrative/recognitional accounts can, like 
Balog, deny that zombies could possess phenomenal concepts—if they construe 
phenomenal concepts in terms of phenomenal feels.
35
 When I first introduced 
phenomenal concepts in this chapter, I introduced them by making reference to a 
subject’s phenomenal feels: a phenomenal concept is a concept that picks out 
phenomenal feels. It is clear that zombies cannot have phenomenal concepts so 
construed simply because, by supposition, they lack feels altogether. But I went on to 
characterize phenomenal concepts as somewhat conceptually isolated, (weakly) 
recognitional concepts that pick out their referents directly, and so construed 
phenomenal concepts are such that zombies can possess them. But of course, it isn’t 
clear why we want to avoid claiming that zombies possess “phenomenal concepts” 
when construed in this way. So there is no reason to prefer quotational accounts to 
demonstrative/recognitional ones so far. 
 Quotational accounts also come with a higher price tag, for it is hard to see 
how a phenomenal feel could be a component of thought as the quotationalist would 
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have it. It is important to notice that quotational accounts are in fact incompatible 
with many physicalist accounts of phenomenal feels, more specifically with any, even 
partly, functional account of feels. For if, as the functional representationalist 
believes, what makes something a feel is in part its functional role R, then it is hard to 
see how something with functional role R could be a constituent of thought as well. 
After all, it seems that constituents of thought will have their functional roles, say role 
Q, and it is hard to see how the same token representation could have both functional 
roles so as to be both a phenomenal feel and a constituent of thought. If anything, 
then, we should be wary of quotational accounts. 
 
2.4. Phenomenal concepts and what it’s like 
In this section (section 2), I have introduced phenomenal concepts and discussed what 
I take to be their interesting features. Before we can move on and put phenomenal 
concepts to work, there is one last thing it will be helpful to settle: the relationship 
between possessing (narrow) phenomenal concepts and knowing what it’s like. This 
is especially important because some seem to think that the relationship in question is 
extremely tight, such that all there is to coming to know what it’s like to see red is 
coming to possess the (narrow) phenomenal concept THISR.  
 The worry then is this: as mentioned in 2.2.1, narrow phenomenal concepts 
may be like recognitional concepts in that their possession might require some weak, 
synchronic recognitional abilities, i.e. abilities to re-identify the feel when presented 
with others simultaneously. But knowing what it’s like (unlike the tokening of (weak) 




in time. It seems to require other abilities too, like the ability to visualize the 
particular shade of color when it’s not being experienced (and possibly the other 
abilities Lewis (1990) associated with what Mary learns when she learns what it’s 
like). On the other hand, insisting that knowing what it’s like requires strong 
diachronic recognition has somewhat counterintuitive implications. For it would 
follow that when we’re looking at very fine-grained color—as when Adi was looking 
at firefly green in the paint store—most of us don’t know what it’s like to see these 
shades (see Raffman and Levin 2007). After all, most of us are unable to 
diachronically recognize fine-grained shades like firefly green, to remember and 
visualize them. But certainly it seems that we do know what it’s like to see firefly 
green while we’re looking at it—even if not at any later time. 
 The best way to think of this is the following (see Levin’s 2007): there may be 
more or less robust ways of ‘knowing what it’s like’. On the one hand, Adi knows, as 
she looks at the firefly green patch, what it’s like to see firefly green, even while she 
doesn’t have robust (diachronic) recognitional abilities. In this (weak) sense, knowing 
what it’s like just is deploying (weak) phenomenal concepts. But we can take 
knowing what it’s like to require more; and in that sense of the expression, knowing 
what it’s like requires having diachronic recognitional abilities. Adi knows, while 
looking at the firefly green patch, what it’s like to see firefly green in some (weak) 
sense; she doesn’t know what it’s like in some more robust sense.  
 This wraps up our section 2. I introduced phenomenal concepts and their three 
features; I highlighted the connection between these features and traditional accounts 




and “knowing what it’s like”. We are now ready to use these concepts to explain the 
anti-physicalist data.  
 
3. Putting phenomenal concepts to work (the phenomenal concept strategy) 
 
Now that we have a better idea of what the physicalist takes phenomenal concepts to 
be—what features she takes phenomenal concepts to have—we can be more precise 
about how they can be put to work. The goal of this section is to show how the 
physicalist thinks an appeal to phenomenal concepts (concepts with the features we 
discussed earlier) can explain all of the data.  
 
3.1. Conceivability judgments and non-derivability 
Conceptual isolation explains our conceivability judgments rather straightforwardly, 
the physicalist will claim. The folk are asked to think of a physical, or functional, or 
representational twin of Adi who, like Adi, is in functional state such and such; in 
physical state such and such, etc. … However, since the folk lack any a priori 
dispositions to infer from “X is in functional state such and such” that “X has thisg 
feel”, the folk will lack any a priori dispositions to infer from “Adi is in functional 
state such and such” that “Adi has thisg feel”. The folk can therefore wonder whether 
Adi would have thisg feel, they can therefore believe that Adi might have thisr feel, or 
believe that Adi might have no feels at all. Anna our amateur astronomer can wonder 
whether Hesperus is Phosphorus, and can even believe that Hesperus is not 




conceptually isolated, i.e. not a priori linked. And so it goes with the folk and 
phenomenal feels. 
 Non-deducibility and non-derivability similarly look like they can be 
straightforwardly accounted for by an appeal to conceptual isolation. After all, at the 
core of both non-deducibility and non-derivability is the idea that phenomenal facts 
and physical facts are not linked a priori. Knowledge of all the physical, functional, 
representational facts (the P facts) will not enable Mary to deduce that seeing green 
feels like thisg (the Q facts). But knowing phenomenal facts (Q) requires the 
deployment of phenomenal concepts. Since phenomenal concepts are not a priori 
linked to physical concepts, it follows that ‘P → Q’ is not a priori.  
 
3.2. What Mary learns 
As mentioned earlier, the mere fact that phenomenal concepts are conceptually 
isolated from physical concepts will not quite account for what seems substantive 
about what Mary learns upon leaving her room. HESPERUS and PHOSPHORUS are 
conceptually isolated, yet if Anna knows all there is to know about Hesperus, learning 
the concept PHOSPHORUS will be quite boring to her. It will be like learning that there 
is another name for an object one knew everything about in the first place—no big 
deal, really. But clearly, what goes on when Mary leaves the room is very much 
different. What she learns is cognitively significant. Can a physicalist account for 
that? 
 




Perry (2001) argues that beliefs can be detached from perception (and the resulting 
demonstrative beliefs), as his own belief that Fred Dretske wrote Knowledge and the 
Flow of Information turned out to be disconnected from his perceptual experiences of 
Dretske at a party—and the resulting demonstrative beliefs, such as “this man has 
white hair and is interesting to chat with”. When Perry finally learns that the man in 
question is actually Fred Dretske, the knowledge he gains is the “sort of knowledge 
that occurs when one attaches percept and notion” (122).  
Many of us, Perry argues, are in a very similar position. We can think of our 
phenomenal feels demonstratively when we introspect—thisR feel. We can also think 
about the physical or functional or representational properties of our brains. But the 
two kinds of information are detached. Mary, despite knowing all there is to know 
about experiences of red, is in this situation also. She is unable, from within her room, 
to attach her expert, all-encompassing knowledge to the phenomenal demonstratives 
deployed as she introspects (after all, she is unable to token such phenomenal 
demonstratives). What happens to her when she leaves the room is cognitively 
significant, then. It is just as cognitively significant for Mary as learning that this man 
is Fred Dretske was for Perry at the party.   
Though Perry believes that phenomenal concepts are essentially 
demonstrative, what plays a primary role in his explanation of what Mary learns when 
she leaves the room (or what he, Perry, learned at the party) is not reference-fixing by 
demonstration, but rather the conceptual isolation between demonstrative concepts 
and other concepts. What explains the significance of what Perry learns at the party 




demonstrative concept THIS MAN and a perceptual representation of Dretske) where 
there was no such connection before. If Perry’s analogy works, what explains the 
significance of what Mary learns when she leaves the room should be the building of 
a connection between two of her mental representations where there was no such 
connection before—and where the two mental representations in question are 
something like THISR FEEL and REPRESENTATIONAL PROPERTY 50, say, or RP50.  
 As stated, Perry’s analogy is not quite right. After all, Mary, unlike Perry, 
does not possess, before she leaves her room, two unconnected concepts. Mary, 
rather, possesses only one of the two concepts; upon leaving her room she acquires 
another (the demonstrative THISR) and connects it with the first. To help bring out the 
fact that two things happen to Mary upon leaving her room, Nida-Rümelin (1996, 
1998) asks us to consider another woman, Marianna. (This thought-experiment was 
mentioned in section 2.1.2.) Marianna is raised just like Mary and comes to know just 
as much as Mary; but when she is let out of her room, she is not allowed to step 
outside, rather she is ushered, first, to a room full of unlabeled colored wallpaper. In 
that room, Marianna can token phenomenal concepts—as when she thinks “so thisR is 
what it’s like to see…some color”. But here is the point of bringing up the thought-
experiment in this context. Marianna, at this point in time, is much more like Perry 
before he knows that this man is Fred Dretske than Mary is. Marianna possesses the 
concept RED; but she also possesses the concept THISR. But her concepts are not 
“attached”. When Marianna is finally let outside is when she finally gets to attach her 
phenomenal concepts THISR
 




 Perry is wrong, then, to claim that Mary is in just the position he is in at the 
party—and that what she learns is merely what he learns when he learns that this man 
is Fred Dretske. For a lot more is happening to Mary than is happening to him. 
 
  3.2.2. The three things that happen to Marianna 
To be more precise, a total of three things happen to Marianna, because as she takes 
her first look at the colored room, two things happen to her. First, she gets to 
experience color. That is, Marianna’s brain gets to token a new property—not “new” 
in the sense that it is a property Marianna could not think about and know about while 
in her room, but new because her brain has never tokened it before. According to the 
physicalist, of course, that property is a physical property, say property ®: so 
Marianna’s brain gets to token a physical property it never tokened before (we’ll 
come back to this). Second, Marianna introspects that newly instantiated property and 
forms, as a result, the new higher-order phenomenal thought: “so thisR is what it feels 
like to see…some color or other” or “I am having thisR feel”. That is, she now 
introspects directly the functional property she could only think about theoretically 
before. 
 So here are the three things that happen to Marianna.  
(a) Her brain instantiates ®  
Then she gets to think about ® demonstratively, or recognitionally by introspecting as 
follows: 




And finally she gets to connect her new phenomenal concept with other concepts, like 
so:  
(c) Normal perceivers, when they see a ripe tomato, experience thisR feel. 
The physicalist can clearly account for Marianna’s learning of (c)—along just the 
lines that Perry sketches.
36
 But what about Marianna’s coming to think (b)? And what 
about (a)?  
 
Marianna introspects 
As Marianna steps out of her room and introspects, she is finally able to think that she 
is having thisR feel. Some physicalists (Tye 1995 and Perry 2001) have suggested that 
the knowledge she acquires is new demonstrative/recognitional knowledge. Inside 
her room, she could refer to ® using theoretical concepts such as RP50. When she 
thinks—after having left—that she is having thisR feel, she gets to pick out ® 
demonstratively or recognitionally using the concept thisR. Marianna acquires a new 
way of thinking about ®: a demonstrative/recognitional way of thinking. 
  The anti-physicalist, however, points out that merely being able to think about 
someone (or something) demonstratively (or recognitionally) does not seem to 
constitute a (robust) new way of thinking of that person (or that thing). Imagine that I 
know all there is to know about my neighbor before having ever met him. Upon first 
meeting him—hence, upon first being able to refer to him demonstratively or 
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 Stalnaker (2008), in his Locke lectures, expresses some worries about Marianna’s learning of (b). 
After all, he claims, once Marianna has left her black-and-white room and come to see red, she has 
learned what seeing red feels like. She knows that (knows what seeing red feels like) before she learns 
(b). So what is it, Stalnaker asks, that she doesn’t know? The answer seems rather straightforward: 
Marianna doesn’t yet know that she knows what seeing red feels like. She knows that she knows what 





recognitionally—I get to think of him as this man (by pointing my finger at him), 
something I couldn’t do before. But finally being able to think of my neighbor 
demonstratively (or recognitionally) does not seem to constitute a robustly different 
way of thinking about him. After all, by hypothesis I know everything about him. My 
new way of thinking about him can’t be the result of my finding out that he has a 
property I didn’t know he had—say that he’s a serial killer. So when I finally meet 
him, I do not learn he has a new property of which I was ignorant. All I now get to do 
(which I couldn’t do before) is to think “this man is my neighbor” or “this man has 
brown hair” instead of thinking only “John Connor is my neighbor” and “John 
Connor has brown hair”. But merely getting to think demonstrative (or recognitional) 
thoughts that I could not think before isn’t cognitively very significant—it isn’t really 
a new way of thinking about the referent of my thoughts. Levine (2007) makes just 
this point. On a scenario like the one just described, Levine writes, “no real new 
information is introduced via the demonstrative presentation” (157). He continues:  
Mary doesn’t seem to learn just that the state she can describe in such rich 
theoretical vocabulary is happening here and now; that it’s this one. She forms 
a new conception, one with substantive and determinate content, of this state 
(157/158). 
 
Since Marianna’s coming to think of ® differently (when she finally gets to think (b), 
that she’s having thisR feel) is cognitively significant for her, then it can’t be merely 
because she started thinking of ® demonstratively. Something else must be going on 






Marianna’s brain instantiates ® 
Consider what a functional representationalist would claim happens to Marianna 
when she finally instantiates the representational property ®.  She finally becomes 
experientially related to a mental representation (call it MR) with a particular content 
(CR), and (since we’re considering functional representationalists) MR plays a 
particular role in her psychology (say, it is poised to impact beliefs as Tye (2000) 
suggests). Marianna has never been experientially related to that mental 
representation type before. And MR has never played its role in her psychology 
before.  
 Of course, Marianna knows all there is to know about MR, about CR and about 
the experience relation. But her knowing all this means (according to the functional 
representationalist) that she is belief-related to a number of mental representations 
about the experience-relation, MR and CR—representations whose content might be 
[MR plays such and such a role and has content CR]. Certainly Marianna can know all 
that without herself being experience-related to MR and CR.
37
 Moreover, knowing a 
number of things about MR and CR isn’t to be belief-related to a mental representation 
that is anything at all like MR—or whose content is at all like CR. What it does mean 
is that the content of many of Marianna’s beliefs involve (are about) MR and CR; but 
obviously the content of MR itself isn’t anything like [MR plays this role]. The content 
of Marianna’s experience of red presumably involves something about red. How we 
should spell out the content of Marianna’s experience is by no means obvious (see 
Part II), but it is certainly not [MR plays such and such a role].  
                                                 
37
 She supposedly does know enough to be able to put herself in that state, and if she had the 
equipment needed to manipulate her brain into that state, she could do it. But she’s not allowed any 




 It follows that Marianna’s instantiating ® should be significant for her. Not 
because she learns something new—i.e., not because she becomes belief-related to a 
substantively new, non-demonstrative representation (or concept) of ®. But because 
she is now experience-related to a new representation—new in the sense that she had 
never tokened it before.  
 
  3.3.3. Two ways to account for what Mary learns 
The physicalist now has two options to account for what Mary learns when leaves her 
room.  
 
Option 1: biting a bullet 
The first physicalist option involves biting a bullet about Marianna’s thought that (b): 
she is having thisR feel. Levine argues, remember, that Marianna cannot merely have 
come to think of ® demonstratively when she finally gets to think that (b) because 
merely being able to demonstrate something is not cognitively significant. But the 
physicalist can insist nonetheless that Marianna does merely come to think of ® 
demonstratively and accept Levine’s claim that merely coming to think of something 
demonstratively is not cognitively significant. The physicalist, that is, can accept that 
Marianna’s getting to think that (b) is not cognitively significant.  
 How is this a live option for the physicalist? Isn’t this simply giving up on 
explaining what Marianna learns when she leaves the room? I think not. For the 
physicalist should point out what we’ve pointed out above, that there is something 




experientially related to a new representation. This allows the physicalist to claim that 
what is significant for Marianna is not her acquiring of new knowledge (i.e., it isn’t 
her coming to be belief-related to anything substantially new). Rather, it is her 
standing in that experiential relation. The physicalist is not thereby denying that 
Marianna acquires new knowledge. After all, the physicalist thinks that she does 
come to think something she hadn’t thought before when she thinks that (b)—it’s just 
that that isn’t the significant bit. The physicalist can go on: anti-physicalists 
mistakenly assume that it must be Mary’s new knowledge that is significant—that it is 
something that she comes to believe that is significant. This is an understandable 
mistake, since Marianna comes to instantiate ® and think about it at the same time, 
which makes her having the new thought itself seem like the significant event, even 
though it isn’t. Still, the physicalist can claim, the instantiating of ® and the thinking 




Option 2: seeing-as 
The second option for the anti-physicalist is to argue that Marianna can come to see ® 
in a new way (not merely demonstratively) without our needing to posit a new 
property of ®.  Let us consider an ordinary case of coming to think of someone in a 
new way: Amy goes from thinking about Art as just a friend to thinking of him as 
more than that. Does that entail that Amy ascribes to Art a new property, one that she 
didn’t know Art had before? In some ways it does—maybe Amy now thinks that Art 
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 It may be that neither conjunct alone is significant. After all, Marianna could instantiate ® without 
paying attention, or without being able to think about it. Certainly if that were the case the mere 
instantiation of ® might not be very significant. Still the physicalist can deny that the thought 





is attractive, or that he would make a good life partner. But is this to say that there are 
some things about Art that Amy did not know before? That there is a property of 
Art’s (the property of being attractive to Amy) that Amy did not know he had? Not 
necessarily. Amy might come to see Art in a new way—yet it needn’t follow that 
there must be a property of Art that Amy didn’t know about before. Presumably, 
Amy’s coming to think of Art differently has much to do with the way Amy herself 
perceives Art.  
 Now consider Annie who is looking at an ambiguous figure—say the famous 
duck-rabbit—but can only ever see it one way—say, as a rabbit. Assume, however, 
that she knows everything there is to know about the figure: she knows that it looks 
like a duck to some people under some circumstances even though it has never looked 
that way to her. It seems that when Annie finally gets to see the figure as a duck, she 
gets to think of it in a new way—as a figure that looks like a duck. She sees the figure 
as a duck. Yet it isn’t clear that when she comes to see the picture in this new way 
that she learns about a new property of the figure, a property she didn’t know it had. 
For what could this property be? Not the property of looking like a duck. Again, we 
can assume (very plausibly, I think) that Annie knows the figure has the property of 
looking like a duck.  She may know everything there is to know about that property 
too—that it is, say, a dispositional property of the figure that can be reduced to the 
shape itself and its causal powers. It’s just that she unfortunately has never managed 
to see it as a duck.  
 There would seem to be something cognitively significant about coming to 




(as in the case of Annie and the duck-rabbit). Yet these new ways of thinking do not 
involve ascribing to the object of thought (or sight) a new property—a property that 
thinkers didn’t know the objects possessed. Rather, these new ways of thinking 
involve new ways that thinkers relate to the objects in question. Of course, we can 
agree with the anti-physicalist that not every new way to relate to an object will lead 
to a significantly new way of thinking about that object. So we agree that being able 
(finally) to point at my neighbor may involve a new way of relating to him (via 
pointing), though not a cognitively significant new way of relating to him. However, 
being able (finally) to see something as a duck, or someone as a potential lover are 
cognitively significant new ways of relating to a figure, or a person. Yet these 
cognitively significant new ways of thinking needn’t entail the existence of 
correspondingly new properties. 
 A physicalist could therefore insist that Mary’s new way of thinking about ® 
upon leaving her room is very much like Amy’s new way of thinking about Art, or 
Annie’s new way of seeing the ambiguous figure. We can maintain that Mary knew, 
in her room, everything about ®. That includes, presumably, Mary’s knowing that ® 
is a particular kind of phenomenal feel (which it is according to the physicalist); that 
people who see red undergo that particular feel (whatever it is), just as Mary herself, 
when she sees black, undergoes a particular feel. But still, when Mary finally leaves 
her room, she gets to “see” or “perceive” ® differently. She gets to introspect ® as a 
feel—she gets to think of it as an introspected feel. The fact that Mary has a new way 
of thinking of ® does not entail that she finds out that ® has a new property, one 




introspected it as a feel. Spelling out this type of physicalist reply would require the 
physicalist to say a lot more about what counts as a property and what does not. After 
all, an anti-physicalist might say that when Annie finally comes to see the duck-rabbit 
as a rabbit, there is a new property that she learns about, namely that it has the 
property of looking like a rabbit to her. We’ll come back to these very issues in detail 
in 4.1. (The property dualist argument  discussed there is in many ways connected to 
the anti-physicalist’s point about Mary.)  
 
  3.2.4. Where we sum up  
Here, then, are the things that happen to Marianna when she leaves her room. 
(a) Her brain instantiates ®. 
She gets to think:  
(b) I am having thisR feel. 
And she gets to think: 
(c) Normal perceivers, when they see a ripe tomato, experience thisR feel. 
The physicalist can easily account for the significance of coming to think that (c): in 
coming to think (c), Marianna comes to link previously unconnected concepts. I have 
suggested two physicalist strategies for explaining what else goes on with Marianna. 
First, the physicalist can claim Marianna’s coming to think that (b) alone is not 
significant—what is significant is her brain instantiating ® together with her coming 
to think that (b). It is a mistake, then, to attempt to capture what is significant about 
coming to think that (b) alone. Second, the physicalist can argue that what goes on 




sees an ambiguous figure as a duck—which does not seem to require the positing of 
substantive new properties of the figure. Similarly, Marianna gets to see ® differently 
when she thinks that (b)—and this need not require the positing of substantive new 
properties of ®.  
 
3.3. The core contrast 
Finally, there is the core contrast. Remember that what needs to be explained is the 
fact that psychophysical identities remain arbitrary, regardless of how much one is 
told in detail about phenomenal feels or about the physical properties of brains. Other 
ordinary, a posteriori identity claims (‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ or ‘water is H2O’), 
though they might feel arbitrary at first, do not go on to feel that way after one is told 
in detail about Venus or H2O. What might explain this contrast between 
psychophysical identities and other kinds of identities?  
 Presumably, identity claims like ‘water is H2O’ do not remain arbitrary for 
very long because one can learn “how the molecular structure H2O is responsible for 
all the superficial properties by which we identify water” (Levine 2007, 127). Take 
the set of mental descriptions we associate with our concept WATER: a chemist will be 
able to show us how molecules of H2O would come to act in the way that fit these 
descriptions (or else explain them away). Similarly, Anna becomes convinced that 
Hesperus is Phosphorus when she is shown how one single heavenly body can have 
(roughly) all the characteristics her mental descriptions associate with HESPERUS and 
with PHOSPHORUS. A physicalist might therefore attempt to explain the core contrast 




H2O) and the descriptions associated with phenomenal concepts (call these 
phenomenal descriptions). 
 
  3.3.1. Two remarks before we start 
A priori vs. a posteriori descriptions  
In our discussion of conceptual isolation, we pointed out that phenomenal concepts 
are connected with very few (if any) concepts a priori (in the strict sense). A 
physicalist could conclude, then, that there are no descriptions associated with 
phenomenal concepts such as THISR. After all, mental descriptions are made up of 
concepts—if no concepts are a priori connected with phenomenal concepts, then no 
mental description will be a priori connected with them either. 
 Making such a claim would presumably help explain why there is a core 
contrast. After all, if there are no descriptions associated with phenomenal concepts, 
one cannot become convinced that thisR feel is representational property #50 by being 
shown that representational property #50 is responsible for the characteristics that 
these (non-existent) mental descriptions associate with THISR.  
 Unfortunately, this is a non-starter. First, phenomenal concepts are not 
entirely conceptually isolated (especially if we focus on the looser pre-theoretical 
connections). Second, the descriptions to which we would appeal to in ordinary cases 
are far from being a priori. What makes the claim that water = H2O lose its 
arbitrariness? The fact that someone can explain to a thinker how molecules of H2O 
can come to act in the ways that she thinks water acts. Part of this explanation will 




belief that water boils at high temperatures is not a priori. So if a physicalist wants to 
contrast the descriptions associated with phenomenal concepts and the descriptions 
associated with ordinary concepts, she can’t forget that thinkers will associate many a 
posteriori descriptions with their phenomenal concepts (of the kind Levine was 
alluding to, see 2.1). For instance, thinkers who believe of some X that X is thisR feel 
will be disposed to infer that X is the feel I experience when I see red objects. 
Clearly, the description “feel I experience when I see red objects” is not connected 
with the phenomenal concept THISR a priori. Still, dealing with the core contrast 
adequately requires acknowledging that phenomenal concepts will have many such 
descriptions associated with them.  
 
The folk and the “philosophically minded” 
Levine claims that psychophysical identity claims will feel arbitrary no matter how 
much neuroscientists and cognitive scientists might tell us about the mind. But feel 
arbitrary to whom?  
 Many of the folk seem to see nothing wrong at all with psychophysical 
identity claims. On their first day, my philosophy of mind students seemed happy to 
think that the mind was the brain and that feeling in love just was having high levels 
of oxytocin. Not only did they not seem to think these were arbitrary identity claims, 
they seemed puzzled as to why someone might doubt them. So it isn’t the folk’s 
reaction to these identity claims that leads Levine to think that there is a core contrast. 
 Of course, most people don’t think about these things very carefully (not that 




come to see why the identities in question might seem arbitrary; they can come to 
appreciate the core contrast. And that is all that matters. Why is it that when the folk 
give it some thought, they start thinking that these identity claims feel (and always 
will feel) arbitrary?  
  
3.3.2. A NONPHYSICAL description 
In our discussion of conceptual isolation, we pointed out that phenomenal concepts 
seem pre-theoretically connected to a number of concepts, including the concept 
NONPHYSICAL. In that way they might be unlike many ordinary concepts—the 
concept WATER and HESPERUS are not pre-theoretically connected to the concept 
NONPHYSICAL. Rather, thinkers seem to have pre-theoretical dispositions to infer from 
“X is water” that “X is physical stuff”—and from “X is Paris” that “X is a place”. 
These pre-theoretical inferential dispositions reveal that our concepts PARIS and 
WATER are associated with descriptions concerning the nature of Paris and water—
what kind of things those are.  
 If this is the case, then we might think that it is no wonder that thinkers resist 
linking them to concepts connected with PHYSICAL. I also suggested that there might 
be pre-theoretical connections between phenomenal concepts and concepts like 
PRIVATE and INEFFABLE. These inferential connections—from “X is this feel” to “X is 
private” or “x is ineffable”—may very well make it even harder for the subject to 
build inferential connections between phenomenal concepts and the physical concepts 




 The anti-physicalist may want to ask why it is that phenomenal concepts like 
THISF FEEL turn out to be connected with concepts like NONPHYSICAL. Isn’t the best 
explanation for that fact simply that phenomenal feels are indeed nonphysical? The 
answer here is simply no. If phenomenal concepts are linked to the concept 
NONPHYSICAL, this will be a fact about our naïve psychology (as Bloom claims it is), 
not about the ontology of the world. After all, it is widely believed that we are born 
with stores of “specialized knowledge”—what we might call naive theories (whether 
or not they truly deserve to be called theories is irrelevant here). The contents of our 
naïve theories is determined experimentally; it turns out, for instance, that our naïve 
physics seems to link CARRIED OBJECT with concepts of falling straight down—
subjects assume, that is, that carried objects, when dropped, fall straight down. But no 
one takes the connections between those concepts to hold true because that is actually 
the way it is in the world. Classical mechanics—to say nothing of relativity theory or 
quantum mechanics—contradicts naïve physics many times over; naïve physics, in 
the end, reflects merely the way we think about the world. Those who press on and 
ask why we think of the world this way will get, at the most, an evolutionary story 
about how a certain set of beliefs might be useful to organisms like us. 
 What is true for our folk physics concepts may very well be true for the 
concepts involved in our naïve theory of mind, or naïve psychology. Naïve 
psychology, like naïve physics, reflects first and foremost the way we think about 
things, in this case about our own minds and phenomenal states. Why we think of it 
this way may, too, be given some evolutionary explanation. But the fact remains that 





  3.3.3. Worries 
I now consider some worries one might have about the physicalist’s account of the 
core contrast I just described.  
 
Other NONPHYSICAL descriptions 
The existence of a core contrast has been explained by an appeal to a connection 
between phenomenal concepts and the concept NONPHYSICAL. But here is what this 
should lead us to expect: if there are any nonphenomenal concepts which are 
connected to the concept NONPHYSICAL, then we should see similar core contrasts. 
Rey (1992) suggests that concepts like NATION, CLUB, ASSOCIATION, SYMPHONY, etc. 
might be linked with the concept NONPHYSICAL. Yet we do not have similar dualist 
intuitions about clubs and associations. Hence, a mere connection to the concept 
NONPHYSICAL can’t explain why there is a core contrast. 
 Though it does turn out to be surprisingly hard to satisfactorily identify clubs 
or nations with physical descriptions, I doubt that the concepts CLUB and NATION are 
connected with the concept NONPHYSICAL in the way that phenomenal concepts are. 
Perhaps the fact that it is so hard make such identifications will drive someone to 
connect the concept CLUB with the concept NONPHYSICAL. But physicalists are 
claiming that phenomenal concepts are pre-theoretically connected to the concept 
NONPHYSICAL. And it is that fact which is supposed to make the proposed identity 




 There do indeed seem to be nonphenomenal concepts that are connected pre-
theoretically to the concept NONPHYSICAL, the concepts GHOST, SPIRIT, GOD and SOUL. 
And of course, if we tried to identify ghosts, god or the soul with something physical 




What about the folk? 
The second worry is this: assume that what explains the core contrast is the fact that 
we pre-theoretically connect phenomenal concepts and the concept NONPHYSICAL. 
The folk, like the “philosophically-minded”, will pre-theoretically connect 
phenomenal concepts and the concept NONPHYSICAL. Why is it, then, that the folk 
(my students on their first day) seem perfectly happy with psychophysical identity 
claims?  
 Here is one story we might tell. Pre-theoretical connections can become less 
prominent and less salient. My students had read articles and studies that suggested to 
them that love was just high levels of oxytocin. And as a result the pre-theoretical 
connections between their phenomenal concepts and the concept NONPHYSICAL may 
have faded into the background. But this isn’t to say that the connections in question 
are broken. That they are still there may explain why the same students who claim 
that the mind just is the brain don’t bat an eyelash when faced with a mind-switching 
movie plot. Yet, since the pre-theoretical connections haven’t disappeared, it is 
possible to carefully draw the focus back to them. And it’s when these pre-theoretical 
connections become salient again that the core contrast can be appreciated. 
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 The concept NUMBER too might be connected pre-theoretically with the concept NONPHYSICAL, 






3.4. Concluding remark 
I have, in this section, sketched how a physicalist might go about explaining the anti-
physicalist data. But some anti-physicalists believe that the phenomenal concept 
strategy is doomed for more general reasons. It is to these anti-physicalist arguments 
that I now turn.  
 
 
4. General anti-physicalist arguments 
 
General anti-physicalist arguments are meant to undermine any physicalist account of 
phenomenal concepts, but not by focusing on which bits of the data phenomenal 
concepts cannot explain. Rather, the focus is on the features of phenomenal concepts 
(conceptual isolation in particular) which the anti-physicalist argues phenomenal 
concepts could not have within a physicalist framework. Here is the argument in 
broad strokes:  
1) If (at least part of) the relevant data is to be explained, phenomenal concepts 
and physical concepts must be conceptually isolated. 
2) Phenomenal concepts and physical concepts can be conceptually isolated only 
if phenomenal concepts refer to non-physical properties. 
3) Therefore, if (at least part of) the relevant data is to be explained, phenomenal 
concepts must refer to non-physical properties. 
 
In this section, I consider two general arguments against the physicalist phenomenal 
concept strategy, which build on the general schema just presented. The first I will 
call the property dualist argument (though it’s really a family of arguments, see 4.1.); 





4.1. Property dualist arguments 
Property dualist arguments attempt to make a case for premise 2)—that phenomenal 
concepts and physical concepts can be conceptually isolated only if phenomenal 
concepts refer to non-physical properties. The argument for 2) rests on two further 
premises. A very basic (and truncated) version of the first—call it, as has been done, 
the Semantic Premise—goes something like this:  
In order for two concepts to pick out the same object (or property) and to be 
conceptually isolated, the object (or property) in question must have at least two 
properties. (see Loar 1990/97 White (1999, 2003, 2007) and what Block calls the 
“Max Black objection” (2007)) 
 
It follows that for the phenomenal concept THISR and the physical concept  
REPRESENTATIONAL PROPERTY 50 (RP#50) to be conceptually isolated and pick out the 
same physical property ®, ® in turn must have two properties. Of course, the 
Semantic Premise alone does not entail that 2) is true. The two properties of ® may 
very well turn out to be two physical properties of ® and 2) claims that phenomenal 
and physical concepts can be conceptually isolated only if phenomenal concepts pick 
out non-physical properties. The anti-physicalist’s case for 2) therefore requires a 
second premise to the effect that one of the properties of ® (in the psychophysical 
case) must be non-physical.  
 The goal of this subsection (4.1) is to argue, naturally, that the anti-physicalist 
argument for 2) fails—it is not true that phenomenal concepts and physical concepts 






  4.1.1. The Semantic Premise 
The Semantic Premise, in its most basic form, claims that in order for two concepts to 




Discussions of the Semantic Premise usually involve talk of modes of presentation. 
The Premise itself is sometimes expressed as follows: that in order for two concepts 
to co-refer and be conceptually isolated, they must pick out the target object (or 
property) via two different modes of presentation. Unfortunately, the expression 
‘modes of presentation’ is often used ambiguously either to refer to a complex mental 
representation (or mental description) associated with a given concept, or to refer to 
properties of the concept’s referent. Block (2007) points out this ambiguous usage in 
writings by Smart (1959) and Perry (2001) and, to avoid equivocation, distinguishes 
between “conceptual modes of presentation” (CMoPs) and “metaphysical modes of 
presentation” (MMoPs). (White (2007) draws out the same distinction using different 
vocabulary: he talks of “representational modes of presentation” (RMPs) and 
“nonrepresentational modes of presentation” (NMPs)). Representational modes of 
presentation (or conceptual modes of presentation) are “aspects of the way we 
represent the world and not the world itself” (White 2007, 210)—they are associated 
mental descriptions of the kind we’ve already talked about earlier in Part I. 
Nonrepresentational modes of presentation (or metaphysical modes of presentation), 




Semantic Premise, then, can be expressed more precisely as follows: in order for two 
concepts to co-refer and be conceptually isolated, they must be associated with 
different conceptual or representational modes of presentation (different complex 
mental representations); and, in turn, each of these different representational or 
conceptual modes of presentation must be associated with a metaphysical mode of 
presentation (a property) of the target object or property.  
 To further complicate matters, conceptual modes of presentation are usually 
thought to play a number of (different) roles—even by those who use the Semantic 
Premise in arguing for anti-physicalism. Block (2007, 264) notes that representational 
or conceptual modes of presentation are assumed to be those mental descriptions 
associated with concepts that 1) fix reference, 2) account for cognitive significance 
and 3) make metaphysical (nonrepresentational) modes of presentation accessible a 
priori. This explains the claim by some writers, such as White, that phenomenal 
concepts do not have conceptual modes of presentation. After all, phenomenal 
concepts are supposed to refer directly. So even if it turns out that there are some 
mental descriptions associated with these concepts, those descriptions, since they are 
not reference-fixing, do not count as conceptual modes of presentation.  
 Like Block, I find reason to doubt that the same mental description would 
have to play all three roles: fix reference, account for cognitive significance, and 
make MMoPs accessible a priori (see also Burge 1977 and Byrne and Pryor 2006). 
Here I will assume that concepts can refer directly even while we can appeal to (non-
reference-fixing) descriptions to account for their cognitive significance. After all, the 




of the Semantic Premise) is an interest in cognitive significance. Her goal is to spell 
out what is required for a thinker to have two concepts that, though they co-refer, are 
conceptually isolated; that is, learning that her concepts co-refer would be cognitively 
significant for her. This does not require that the conceptual modes of presentation 
(associated mental descriptions) determine reference or make metaphysical modes of 
presentation accessible a priori. Therefore, when I talk of conceptual modes of 
presentation here (more likely I’ll talk of associated mental descriptions), I do not 
mean to claim that these descriptions determine reference. The Semantic Premise, 
recast now to avoid talk of modes of presentation, goes something like this:  
In order for two concepts to co-refer and be conceptually isolated, the  
concepts must be associated with different mental descriptions; and, in turn, 
they must be associated with a property of the target object (or property).  
 
Figure 1 below depicts how this is meant to work for the conceptually isolated, co-
referring concepts HESPERUS and PHOSPHORUS 
 
Hesperus   Phosphorus   concept           
      
           
Morning Star  Evening Star         mental description     
      
 
Property M  Property E   Property    
 
 
            Venus    Target     
 






Why think the Semantic Premise is true? 
White (2007) provides a “four-stage” argument for the Semantic Premise. The 
argument consists in a list of four requirements, the first two of which are the most 
crucial to our current inquiry. First, White claims, we must be able to  
say how the world presents itself to the subject who believes incompatible or 
contradictory things about the same object by providing a set of possible 
worlds that are the way that subjects takes the actual world to be. (222) 
 
A thinker who has two concepts for the same object (or property) may come to 
believe contradictory things about that object (or property) as when Anna the 
astronomer comes to believe that Hesperus is bright and Phosphorus is not bright—or 
when she thinks that Hesperus is not Phosphorus. Clearly Anna is not, in these cases, 
irrational, as she would be were she thinking that Hesperus is bright and Hesperus is 
not bright—or that Hesperus is not Hesperus. Let’s call this rational Anna, Rational 
Anna. When her good friend Irrational Anna makes an irrational claim, there is no 
coherent way that she takes the world to be—there are no possible worlds that are the 
way Irrational Anna takes the world to be. But there is a coherent way that Rational 
Anna takes the world to be and we need to be able to say what that world is like. So 
when Rational Anna thinks that Hesperus is not Phosphorus, what are the possible 
worlds that fit her beliefs? The answer isn’t obvious. The identity claim “Hesperus = 
Phosphorus”, though a posteriori, is considered to be necessarily true. There are no 
worlds, then, in which Hesperus is not Phosphorus. According to White, if we 




Hesperus is not Phosphorus, then Rational Anna is really no different from Irrational 
Anna.  
White goes on to claim that the only way to distinguish Rational Anna from 
Irrational Anna it to posit two different mental descriptions of the referent by Rational 
Anna and two corresponding properties of Venus. The possible worlds corresponding 
to Rational Anna’s thoughts [beliefs?] are those worlds in which there are two stars; 
one which has whatever property Anna associates with Hesperus and another which 
has whatever property Anna associates with Phosphorus. This is, in effect, White’s 
second “requirement”: 
We must satisfy the first requirement by providing two distinct properties of 
the object in question [Venus] which correspond to the subject’s [concepts] 
and which are such that there is a possible world at which they are instantiated 
by different objects. (222)  
 
Note that the possible world corresponding to Anna’s thought that Hesperus is not 
Phosphorus is not a world in which Anna’s thought is true. Since we assume that it is 
necessarily true that Hesperus is Phosphorus, the world corresponding to Anna’s 
thought cannot be a world in which Hesperus is not Phosphorus (there is no such 
world)—i.e. it cannot be a world in which her belief that Hesperus is not Phosphorus 
is true. Rather, the world corresponding to her belief is a world in which there are two 
heavenly bodies, one that is the brightest in the evening, one that is the brightest in 
the morning (and neither of which need be Hesperus/Phosphorus/Venus). Finally, 
notice that the mental descriptions associated with a thinker’s concepts are assumed 
to be accessible to the subject—even if they needn’t be in the forefront of her mind. 
Asked what she thinks of Hesperus, Anna should be able to say something about the 





The Semantic Premise—in full 
The Semantic Premise I have been discussing so far is actually a truncated version of 
the ones Loar and White target. Here is something like Loar’s version: 
In order for two concepts to pick out the same object (or property) and to be 
conceptually isolated, the object (or property) in question must have at least 
two properties; and at least one of these properties must be a contingent 
property of the object (or property) picked out.   
 
What motivates this last clause is presumably the same thing that motivates the more 
basic version of the Premise—a need to distinguish Rational Anna from Irrational 
Anna. If there must be possible worlds corresponding to Rational Anna’s thought that 
Hesperus is not Phosphorus, those worlds must be worlds in which there are two 
stars, one of which has the property of being the brightest heavenly body in the 
morning (property M) but not the property of being the brightest heavenly body in the 
evening (property E), and one of which has property E but not property M. What 
allows for such a possible world—one in which one star has property M but not E, 
and another star has property E but not M—is the fact that at least one of these 
properties is a contingent property of Venus (in this case both). If instead we consider 
Simple Anna who associates with HESPERUS the description “thing that’s Hesperus” 
and with PHOSPHORUS the description “thing that’s Phosphorus”, then we might have 
a case in which the two corresponding properties  (being Hesperus and being 
Phosphorus) actually are necessary properties of Venus (remember that Hesperus = 
Phosphorus = Venus necessarily). And there would be no world corresponding to 
Simple Anna’s thought that Hesperus is not Phosphorus: there would be no world in 




Hesperus but not the property of being Phosphorus, and one of which has the 
property being Phosphorus but not the property of being Hesperus. Indeed, since 
Hesperus is Phosphorus the property being Hesperus just is the property being 
Phosphorus. And therefore, no heavenly body can have the property of being 
Hesperus without also having the property of being Phosphorus. 
Again, take chemically naïve Abbie who believes that water is not H2O. What 
world corresponds to her thought? Well, she must have two mental descriptions 
corresponding to each of her concepts, and there must be two properties of the target 
“stuff” corresponding to each of these descriptions. Take these to be the property of 
filling lakes and oceans (property L for lakes) and the property of being made up of 
two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen (property of being H2O). Now it may be 
that the property of being H2O is a necessary, essential property of the target stuff. 
But as long as property L is a contingent property of that stuff—as it surely seems to 
be—there will be a set of worlds corresponding to Rational Abbie’s thought. That 
will be the set of worlds in which some stuff is H2O and some other stuff has property 
L. Indeed, if property L were a necessary property of the stuff—like the property of 
being H2O—there would be no worlds corresponding to Rational Abbie’s thought, for 
there would be no world in which some stuff is H2O and some other stuff has 
property L. Whatever stuff was H2O, would necessarily have property L as well. 
 As (roughly) stated by Loar, the Semantic Premise is subject to 
counterexamples (see Block (2007)). For instance, pretend for the sake of example 
that Abel is an only child. Give a thinker two concepts of Abel (ABEL1 and ABEL2), 




properties of Abel: first, that of being the person who originated from a particular 
sperm cell of Adam, and second, that of being the person who originated from a 
particular egg cell of Eve (see Block 2007 and White 2007 for discussion). Now, both 
properties would seem to be necessary properties of Abel. Abel is necessarily the 
person who originated from that sperm cell of Adam and that egg cell of Eve. If the 
Semantic Premise as stated is true, then we should expect there to be no possible 
world corresponding to the subject’s belief that Abel1 is not Abel2. (The justification 
for accepting the Semantic Premise, remember, is to ensure that there is a set of 
worlds that corresponds to every rational thought.) However, as Block points out, 
there is a possible world corresponding to the thought that Abel1 is not Abel2. It is a 
world in which there are two people, one of which originated from a particular sperm 
cell of Adam but not from the particular egg cell of Eve, and the other of which 
originated from a particular egg cell of Eve but not from the particular sperm cell of 
Adam. Since there is a possible world corresponding to the rational thought in this 
case, there is no reason to claim—as the Semantic Premise does—that at least one 
property picked out by one concept must be contingent in order for us to distinguish 
between rational thinkers and irrational ones. 
 As it turns out, there is a legitimate worry about necessary properties in the 
vicinity (see White 2007). There can be a world in which there are two people, one of 
whom originated from a particular sperm cell of Adam (but not from the particular 
egg cell of Eve), and another which originated the other way around, only because the 
two properties in question are only contingently co-instantiated. Indeed the mere fact 




us; what matters is that they aren’t necessarily co-occurring. For if they were, then, 
necessarily, anyone who originated from that sperm cell of Adam had to originate 
from that sperm cell of Eve, and there would then be no world corresponding to 
someone’s thought that Abel1 is not Abel2. Thus, there would be no way to 
distinguish that thinker from the irrational one who thinks that Abel1 is not Abel1. So, 
what is crucial here is the fact that the two properties of the target object are only 
contingently co-instantiated. We can coherently describe the world Abbie thinks 
about when she denies that water is H2O because the property of being in lakes and 
oceans (property L) is only contingently co-instantiated with the property of being H-
2O. As a result, there are worlds in which these two properties can come apart and 
each be instantiated by a different object—worlds which actually are the way Abbie 
thinks the actual world is. Similarly for Anna the astronomer in our standard example. 
She can think that Hesperus is not Phosphorus only because the property of rising 
here in the evening (property E) and setting here in the morning (property M) are 
contingently co-instantiated in Venus; there are worlds where they can come apart 
and two different objects can instantiate one of these properties (but not the other). Of 
course, the complete version of the Semantic Premise did sound plausible as first 
stated (in the Simple-Minded Anna). But note that in that example, the two 
corresponding properties (being Hesperus and being Phosphorus) are not merely 
necessary properties of Venus—they are, indeed, necessarily co-instantiated as well.
 The complete version of the Semantic Premise, then, looks like this:  
in order for two concepts to pick out the same object (or property) and to be 
conceptually isolated, the object (or property) in question must have at least 






4.1.2. From the Semantic Premise to anti-physicalism  
Assuming, as the anti-physicalist does, that the Semantic Premise is true, we can 
make the following claim: the phenomenal concept THISR and the physical concept 
REPRESENTATIONAL PROPERTY 50 (RP#50) co-refer (they both pick out ®) and are 
conceptually isolated (in some weak sense). Therefore, thinkers must have a) two 
different descriptions of the referent, and b) the referent ® in turn must have two 
corresponding properties which are only contingently co-instantiated.  
 The first step of the anti-physicalist argument involves filling in the blanks, 
i.e., characterizing the two relevant descriptions and corresponding properties in the 
case of the phenomenal concept-physical concept pair. The description associated 
with RP#50 is rather easy to come by; presumably, it’s something like “property of 
having content such-and-such” (“property of having C” for short), its corresponding 
property being being the property of having content C. But what description ought we 
associate with the phenomenal concept THISR?  Since it is assumed that the description 
in question (the conceptual mode of presentation) should fix the reference [referent?] 
of the phenomenal concept, we might conclude (see White) that there is no 
description associated with phenomenal concepts—or, at the very least, no “non-
phenomenal” description, i.e., no description that doesn’t take as a constituent the 
very phenomenal concept with which it’s associated. White writes in his 1986: “there 
is no physicalistic description that one could plausibly suppose is coreferential a 
priori with an expression like “Smith’s pain at t” (353). As he discusses the 
phenomenal concept picking out pain feels, White, in his 2007, claims that “the only 




(226). From which it seems to follow that the only description a thinker could 
associate with THISR in our example would have to be something like “the state of 
mine that feels like thisR”. And if that’s right, the corresponding property of  ® should 
be something like the property of being thisR feel (see figure 2 on the next page). 
As I’ve already mentioned, this instantiation of the Semantic Premise alone 
won’t yield the conclusion that a property of ® is nonphysical—one could insist, after 
all, that the property of being thisR feel is a physical property. The anti-physicalist 
seems to have at least two arguments (a regress argument and one based on 
contingent co-instantiation) for thinking that that’s not a possibility—that being thisR 
feel cannot be a physical property. I present each in turn. 
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being thisR feel    having content C     Property 
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The Regress Argument 
All that is strictly entailed by the Semantic Premise (it seems) is that being thisR feel 
is not identical to the physical property having content C, since the Premise claims 
that where there are two concepts, there must be two distinct mental descriptions and 
two distinct properties. So a physicalist might want to claim that being thisR feel is 
identical to some physical property other than having C. But, that won’t do, the anti-
physicalist argues. Assume that being thisR feel is identical to some (any) physical 
property P—being thisR feel = being P. Then it should be possible for us to pick out 
that property in two ways, using two distinct concepts. First by using the concept 
PROPERTY OF BEING P. Second by using a concept like PROPERTY OF BEING THISR FEEL. 
Since being thisR feel = being property P, the two concepts above co-refer. But, if 
that’s right and the Semantic Premise is true, then the two distinct concepts must be 
associated with two distinct descriptions and the descriptions must be associated with 
two distinct properties of the referent. Following White’s example in associating a 
description with the concept PROPERTY OF BEING THISR FEEL, we get the following: 
“the property of being thisR feel”. The corresponding property is, rather 
straightforwardly, the property of being the property of being thisR feel (starred in 
figure 3 on the next page).  
 What are we to say, now, of the status of this new property being the property 
of being thisR feel? The physicalist might insist that it is identical to a physical 
property P’, but the same reasoning will then apply again. The anti-physicalist will 




that there must two properties of it, and so on, ad infinitum. To stop the regress, one 
must deny, at some stage in the regress, that the property at stake at that stage is 
identical to a physical property. Alternatively, we can deny—right away—that the 
property being thisR feel is identical to a physical property. No matter where we 
choose to stop the regress, stopping it requires giving up on physicalism.
40
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Figure I.3. The regress argument 
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 Some have suggested (Rey in conversation) that there is (in this case) nothing wrong with an infinite 






The regress argument turns merely on the short version of the Semantic Premise, 
making no reference to the additional clause according to which the two properties of 
the referent must be only contingently co-instantiated. The argument which turns on 
this clause takes us back to White’s first requirement—that we provide a possible 
world corresponding to rational thoughts. Adi can rationally think that thisR feel is not 
representational property #50. The world corresponding to her thought would be a 
world in which there are two things, one of which has the property of being thisR feel 
(but not of having C) and the other one of which has the property of having C (but not 
of being thisR feel). Yet, if physicalism is true, the properties corresponding to Adi’s 
mental descriptions (being thisR feel and having C) are necessarily co-instantiated. 
After all, what physicalism claims is that thisR feel just is having content C. In 
whatever world we find one of these properties instantiated (in whatever world some 
state has the property of being thisR feel), we will find the other instantiated as well 
(the state will have the property of having content C). Just as the properties of being 
Hesperus and being Phosphorus are necessarily co-instantiated, so are the properties 
of being thisR feel and having C. It follows that if physicalism is true, no possible 
world will correspond to Adi’s thought that thisR feel is not representational property 
#50. Being able to describe the world corresponding to Adi’s thought would require 
the property of being thisR feel to be a property of ® that is only contingently co-
instantiated with having C—or only contingently co-instantiated with any other 
physical property. But according to physicalism, the property of being thisR feel is 




describe the world corresponding to Adi’s rational thought requires that the property 
being thisR feel not be a physical property. 
I will now argue that the anti-physicalist arguments fail. The arguments fail, I 
think, for at least two independent reasons: first, because we have good reasons for 
thinking that the Semantic Premise is false. Second, because even if we grant that the 
Semantic Premise is true, the anti-physicalist conclusion does not follow. In 4.1.3 I 
focus on the Semantic Premise—why we might think it is false, and how its falsity 
might affect the anti-physicalist arguments. In the next section (4.1.4 ), I argue that 
even if we assume that the Semantic Premise is true, we still have reason to think that 
the anti-physicalist arguments do not go trough.  
 
4.1.3. Back to the Semantic Premise 
According to the Semantic Premise, there are two important links between the thinker 
and what she picks out in thought. First, there are links between her concepts and 
mental descriptions (or conceptual modes of representation); and second, there are 
links between mental descriptions and properties of the referent. Moreover, the 
Premise is motivated in large part by the need to distinguish rational and irrational 
beliefs, which (White claims) requires that there be a possible world corresponding to 
the world as Anna sees it. There are, therefore, (at least) three ways to attack the 
Semantic Premise. First we could deny that distinguishing rational and irrational 
beliefs requires that there be possible worlds corresponding to rational beliefs. 




associated with two distinct concepts. Third, we could deny that there must be two 
properties of the referent corresponding to each mental description. 
Block argues that there is no need to appeal to possible worlds to explain 
rational thought. We can get by with an appeal to epistemically possible situations—
where a situation is “something that may or may not be possible” (2007, 269).Though 
I agree with Block, I will grant, for the sake of argument, White’s first requirement. I 
start off below with a few comments about the second claim—that where there are 
two concepts there must be two different mental descriptions—though I ultimately 
grant the existence of such a link as well. I then move on to show that we have 
serious reason to doubt the existence of the second link (between mental descriptions 
and properties). 
 
Concepts and mental descriptions 
It may seem as though there are cases in which a thinker possesses two distinct 
concepts even while she associates with each concept the same mental description. 
(Associating one mental description with one concept and none with the other does 
entail associating different mental descriptions with each.) Block (2007) mentions 
two such examples, one involving a proper name (Paderewski) and one, from Loar 
(1988), involving a general term (the French ‘chat’ for ‘cat’). Take a subject, then, 
who comes to falsely believe that there were two Paderewskis living at the beginning 
of the 20
th
 century; one a Polish composer, one a Polish politician. The subject goes 
on, over the years, to forget what she used to think distinguished the two Paderewskis 




century” (266). It may seem, in such a case, that though our thinker has (plausibly 
enough) two concepts (PADEREWSKI1 and PADEREWSKI2), she does not have two 
different mental descriptions associated with each. Now consider an English speaker, 
Allie, who learns from a monolingual French teacher the term ‘chat’—“and then is 
taught the term ‘chat’ again by the same forgetful teacher exhibiting the same cats” 
the next day (ibid). Allie goes on to assume that there are two different kinds of 
creatures (chat1 and chat2) which are different in a way she can’t discern. Over the 
years, she forgets the context of acquisition of her concepts CHAT1 and CHAT2 
(forgetting, for instance, that one was taught to her on Monday, the other on 
Tuesday). Allie is then such that, though she plausibly possesses two concepts (CHAT1 
and CHAT2), she associates the same description with each concept. 
Now, anyone who wants to conclude, on the basis of these examples, that we 
here have two concepts but only one associated mental description must say 
something about what, if not these descriptions, makes the two concepts in question 
distinct. Block claims that thinkers, in these cases, have two different “mental files”, 
however that is to be cashed out—each file specifying that there are two things 
involved (two Paderewskis, or kinds of creatures). Of course, it is not obvious (nor 
does Block think it is) what makes these files distinct. We can explain why a thinker 
came to create two distinct files in these cases, but presumably that explanation will 
appeal to the fact that thinkers had a different description associated with each at the 
time of acquisition. Of course, the different descriptions can fade with time 




completely, we may want to know why we should think that there are still two 
distinct files—and not that the two files themselves have faded into one.  
 There may be very good ways of individuating mental files without appealing 
to mental descriptions. Block suggests that the difference may be a “semantic 
difference”, or that we could suppose that “there is a need for something more than 
semantics—something cognitive but non-semantic” in individuating the files (2007, 
266). I do not mean to suggest, here, that there is no plausible way of spelling out the 
difference between files. What I will do, however, is grant the proponent of the 
Semantic Premise a need for different mental descriptions. The Semantic Premise 
fails for more important reasons, which we’ll take a look at next.  
 
From descriptions to properties 
Granting that there is some kind of difference in the mental descriptions associated 
with the relevant concepts, must each of these descriptions be associated with a 
property of the referent? The claim is plausible enough in familiar cases. Anna the 
astronomer possesses two concepts—HESPERUS and PHOSPHORUS—and associates a 
different description with each (“the star that sets here in the morning”, “the star that 
rises there in the evening”).  And Venus indeed seems to have two properties—
corresponding to each one of Anna’s mental descriptions—i.e., the property of being 
brightest heavenly body in the morning (property M) and that of being brightest 
heavenly body in the evening (property E).  
 Though plausible in this case (and some others like water/H2O), the claim 




and consider Remembering Allie who, unlike Allie, remembers the context of 
acquisition of her concepts. She associates with each of her CHAT concepts the 
following mental descriptions: “the kind of creature I learned about on Monday from 
Mme Pignon” and “the kind of creature I learned about on Tuesday from Mme 
Pignon”. Are we to conclude that cats (the creatures themselves) actually have two 
corresponding properties—the property of being the kind of creature that 
Remembering Allie learned about on Monday from Mme Pignon and that of being the 
kind of creature that Remembering learned about on Monday from Mme Pignon? Or 
consider Romantic Anna the astronomer, who learns about Hesperus in a poem, 
according to which it is the star that Hera gave to Zeus as a wedding present—and 
who comes to believe that this is true. The description she associates with Hesperus is 
just that: “the star that Hera gave to Zeus as a wedding present”. Does it follow that 
Venus itself (the planet) must have two properties including that of being the star that 
Hera gave to Zeus as a wedding present? Or, in a similar vein, imagine that, 
interested in other celestial bodies, Anna comes to possess two concepts for picking 
out the sun—one of which (SUN) she associates with the description “star that 
revolves around the Earth”. Should we conclude that, despite what our scientists tell 
us, the sun actually has the property of being the star that revolves around the Earth? 
The case (suggested to me in conversation by Peter Carruthers) can be modified to 
draw from the Semantic Premise an even more implausible conclusion, namely that 
we should sometimes claim that one object can have incompatible properties. Imagine 
that Anna’s second concept for picking out the sun (SOL) is “the motionless star at the 




astronomer—she has two false beliefs about the sun). According to the Semantic 
Premise, to explain the rationality of Anna’s belief that Sol is not the sun, the sun 
itself must have at least two properties, that of being the star that revolves around the 
Earth and that of being the motionless star at the center of the solar system. But these 
properties are incompatible: one thing cannot both revolve around the Earth and not 
move.  
The Semantic Premise, then, has plenty of counterexamples. Holding onto it 
(as White does) requires biting a substantial bullet, and this is in fact what White 
seems to want to do. He considers a case in which advanced astrophysicists determine 
that the two properties of Venus, which (Regular, not Romantic) Anna thought to be 
properties of Venus (the property of being the brightest heavenly body in the morning 
(property M) and that of brightest heavenly body in the evening (property E)) 
are actually both explained by a single underlying property of Venus’s 
trajectory—say the property of being T. And imagine that being T has far 
greater explanatory power than any of the commonsense properties of Venus 
to which we currently appeal. Suppose finally, that on the grounds that 
properties must pull their weight in a causal-explanatory scheme, it is 
concluded that there is only one property of Venus—the property of being T—
by virtue of which each of the two [mental descriptions] pick[…] it out. (219)    
 
Again, appealing to his first requirement—according to which there must be a 
possible world corresponding to Anna’s thought that Hesperus is not Phosphorus—
White concludes that “we are committed to the existence of properties that do not pull 
their weight in a causal-explanatory scheme” (ibid). Presumably, these are properties 
like M and E in the example he considers, and the property of being the star that 
Hera gave to Zeus as a wedding present or of being the star that revolves around the 




weak properties; properties that do not earn their explanatory keep (to use one of 
Georges Rey’s lovely phrases). They play no explanatory role, that is, in the best 
theory of the referents involved (say of Venus or of cats or of the sun) despite the fact 
they are supposedly properties of these referents (of Venus, or cats, or the sun). They 
seem to be “fine-grained quasi-linguistic-cognitive” properties (Block 2007, 266).  
It is true, of course, that according to White these properties play some 
explanatory role—they explain how subjects can be rational when they think certain 
things, by providing possible worlds corresponding to rational thoughts. I now argue 
that White’s fine-grained quasi-linguistic-cognitive properties do not even play the 
role of providing a possible world corresponding to rational beliefs. For we need not 
claim that Venus, in the actual world, has properties M and E in order to meet 
White’s first requirement (namely provide a possible world corresponding to Rational 
Anna’s thought). The world corresponding to her thought is indeed a possible world 
in which there are two objects (neither of which need be Venus)—one of which has 
property M, the other of which has property E. But I do not see why it should follow 
that Venus, in the actual world, must have these properties. Similarly, there is a 
possible world corresponding to Romantic Anna’s thought that Hesperus is not 
Phosphorus: it’s a world in which there are two objects (neither of which need be 
Venus), one of which has the property of being a star that Hera gave to Zeus as a 
wedding present, the other of which has property E. But I do not see why it should 
follow that Venus, in the actual world, must have these properties. And there is a 
possible world corresponding to Remembering Allie’s thought that chats1 are not 




Pignon taught Allie about the first kind of creature on Monday and about the second 
kind of creature on Tuesday. I do not see why it follows that cats, in the actual world, 
must have the properties in question. We can say the same of Anna’s sun thought: the 
world corresponding to her thought that the Sun is not Sol is a world in which there 
are two stars—one of which revolves around the Earth, the other of which is the 
motionless star at the center of the Solar System. But the sun, in the actual world, 
need not have these properties. 
Ultimately, what enables us to provide a possible world corresponding to the 
rational thoughts in question is not the fact that actual Venus has actual properties in 
the actual world. What enables us to provide this possible world is rather an appeal to 
properties that the relevant thinkers believe are properties of Venus in the actual 
world—properties which thinkers believe are properties of Venus given their mental 
descriptions of Venus, whether or not they actually are. The possible worlds 
corresponding to their thoughts are then worlds in which there are two objects, each 
having the properties thinkers associated (given their mental descriptions) with 
Venus, or of cats, or of the sun. But I see no reason to conclude that Venus, or cats, or 
the sun, in the actual world, must have the properties thinkers believe them to have. 
Even if we agree with White that there must be a possible world corresponding to 
rational thoughts, then, there is no reason to posit properties of actual world referents 
corresponding to each mental description a thinker might have of them.  
To conclude: the Semantic Premise is not in good shape. Even if we grant (as 
I have, for the sake of argument) that two concepts must be associated with two 




referent must correspond to each of these descriptions. There are a number of cases in 
which this claim leads to highly implausible conclusions. Biting the bullet requires 
positing fine-grained, quasi-linguistic-cognitive properties which do not earn their 
explanatory keep. 
 
Back to the anti-physicalist arguments 
If the Semantic Premise is false and we need not posit two properties of the referent 
® in the psychophysical case, then presumably we need not worry about the possible 
regress which would arise if the Premise were true. If we have no reason to believe 
that ® actually has two properties (one of them being thisR feel), then the anti-
physicalist can’t go on to argue that the (non-existent) property in question cannot be 
physical. The first argument for anti-physicalism therefore fails.  
The argument from contingent co-instantiation, however, may still have bite 
even if the Semantic Premise is false. I claimed that we need not posit actual 
properties of actual referents—rather, all that matters is that thinkers believe the 
referent to have some property (corresponding to their mental description) not that the 
referent actually have it. But providing a possible world corresponding to a rational 
thought seems to require that these associated properties (the properties thinkers 
believe are properties of the referents whether or not they actually are) be only 
contingently co-instantiated. The world corresponding to Romantic Anna’s rational 
thought is a world in which the properties she associates with Venus given her mental 
description (that of being the star that Hera gave to Zeus as a wedding present and of 




objects. But how can we provide a world corresponding to Adi’s thought that thisR 
feel is not representational property #50 if the properties Adi associates with ® (in her 
mental descriptions) are necessarily co-instantiated, as they seem to be? This brings 
us to our second argument against the anti-physicalist. 
 
4.1.4. Where the anti-physicalist goes wrong: the a priori requirement 
I have just argued that the Semantic Premise might be false. Though its falsity would 
disarm the Regress Argument, it would leave a version of the second argument (from 
contingent co-instantiation) untouched. I now argue that even if we assume that the 
Semantic Premise is true, both anti-physicalist arguments fail. 
As I noted earlier, the first step in the anti-physicalist’s argument requires 
“filling in the blanks”, namely providing a mental description to associate with the 
phenomenal concept THISR (and providing thereby a corresponding properties). In 
most of our toy examples (including all the ones provided in the section just above), 
the associated descriptions are just stipulated. But it doesn’t seem as though we can 
simply stipulate what mental description thinkers associate with their phenomenal 
concepts. At least White doesn’t think we can: thinkers, he claims, associate only one 
description with any one of their phenomenal concepts—and that description is itself 
phenomenal, i.e. it includes the very phenomenal concept it is associated with (like 
“the state of mine that is painful” or “the state of mine that feels like thisR”). But why 
think that this is right? Remember that White reaches this conclusion because he 
believes that: “there is no physicalistic description that one could plausibly suppose is 




mine). White seems to assume here the relevant mental description can only be one 
that thinkers associate with their concepts a priori. We’ll call this the a priori 
requirement.  
Now White might seem to have a point: phenomenal concepts are not 
connected a priori (in the strict sense we discussed in 2.1) with many other concepts. 
Assuming that a priori descriptions are those descriptions whose constituents are 
concepts a priori connected to phenomenal concepts, it will follow that phenomenal 
concepts will be connected a priori with rather few descriptions. More specifically, 
since physicalists themselves grant that phenomenal concepts will not be a priori 
connected to “pysicalistic” concepts—like BRAIN, REPRESENTATION, or even 
PHYSICAL—White concludes that no description involving these concepts can be 
associated with phenomenal concepts a priori, leaving only phenomenal descriptions 
to do the job. Since we’re now assuming the Semantic Premise is true, there will be 
an odd (phenomenal looking) property corresponding to the phenomenal description. 
Below is a reminder of how an anti-physicalist like White would characterize the 
relevant description and property, which he claims ultimately leads to the conclusion 
that physicalism is false, either via a regress, or because, were it true, we wouldn’t be 
able to explain why Adi is rational to think that thisR is not rp#50.  
There are (at least) two ways to spell out White’s a priori requirement. After 
all, in our discussion of a priori connections (2.1), we distinguished between strict a 
priori connections and pre-theoretical a priori connections. White can either mean 
then that 1) descriptions associated with THISR when filling in the blanks can only be 




descriptions associated with THISR when filling in the blanks can only be composed of 
concepts pre-theoretically connected to THISR. Neither option will get White what he 
wants. Choosing option 1) might indeed yield the conclusion that only phenomenal 
descriptions are associated with phenomenal concepts, but choosing it will leave 
White unable to explain the difference between Rational and Irrational Anna. 
Choosing option 2) simply won’t yield the conclusion that only phenomenal 
descriptions are associated with phenomenal concepts.  
    THISR                        RP#50     concept        
   
      
           
feels like thisr   has content such-and-such                mental description     
                 
      
 
being thisR feel    having content C 
              Property 
        
 
 
    ®        Referent   
   
 
Figure I.4. Filling in the blanks (White reminder) 
 
Strictly a priori 
Let us assume, then, that the only descriptions we can associate with the phenomenal 




it. A concept C is not strictly a priori connected with THISR, if it is possible for a 
thinker to possess the concept THISR and not possess C—in other words a thinker can 
believe of some X that “X is thisR feel” without being disposed to infer that “X is 
…C…” And indeed most concepts will not be strictly a priori connected with THISR, 
not the concept BRAIN, or even the concept RED. Let us grant White, that if this is how 
we should spell out the a priori requirement then only phenomenal descriptions will 
be associated with phenomenal concepts.  
Of course this a priori requirement is a general requirement. It demands that 
the descriptions we associate with HESPERUS or PHOSPHORUS or WATER also be 
descriptions that are connected with them strictly a priori. But it is far from obvious 
that the descriptions usually associated (by White himself) with these concepts are 
connected with them strictly a priori. Does the description “brightest heavenly body 
visible in the evening” seem associated with HESPERUS a priori in this strict sense? 
Couldn’t someone think of some X that is Hesperus without being disposed to infer 
that X is the brightest heavenly body visible in the evening? It certainly seems so. 
Someone might associate with it only the description “Venus in the evening 
according to the Greeks”; or, like Romantic Anna, someone might associate with it 
the description “star that Hera gave to Zeus as a wedding present.” So: does it seem 
impossible for a thinker to possess the concept HESPERUS without possessing the 
concept BRIGTHEST? It does not. Does it seem impossible for a thinker to possess the 
concept HESPERUS without possessing the concept EVENING? It does not. The one 
concept (in that “standard” description) that is most plausibly connected with 




We can make the same point about PHOSPHORUS—with a similar conclusion. 
Which leaves the two a priori descriptions for HESPERUS and PHOSPHORUS looking 
something like: “heavenly body that’s Hesperus” and “heavenly body that’s 
Phosphorus”. (These are basically the description that Simple Anna with these two 
concepts). The point generalizes to other cases. Should we agree with White when he 
says:  
Consider…the property of being the natural kind that falls as rain, fills the 
lakes and oceans, and glows from faucets here (or at the actual world). It 
seems clear that the connection between this property and “water” is a priori 
for normal subjects. 
 
White can’t mean, here, that the connection between these concepts is a priori in the 
strict sense. Do we really want to say that a thinker cannot possess the concept WATER 
without possessing the concepts NATURAL KIND, RAIN, LAKES, OCEANS, FAUCETS, 
FALLING, FILLING, FLOWING? I would think not. It might turn out then that the only 




Why should this worry White? Because he believes that it is by appealing to 
these a priori descriptions that we get to explain the difference between rational and 
irrational thinkers. What explains why it is rational for Anna to think that Hesperus is 
not Phosphorus is the fact that, corresponding to her two associated descriptions, are 
two contingently co-instantiated properties. In the standard case we say that what 
explains why she is rational is the fact that there can be (in a possible world) a 
heavenly body that is the brightest in the evening (but not in the morning) and another 
heavenly body that is the brightest in the morning (but not in the evening). But as I 
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just pointed out these descriptions do not seem to be a priori connected with the 
concepts HESPERUS and PHOSPHORUS—at least in the strict sense. And unfortunately, 
the descriptions that are a priori connected with HESPERUS and PHOSPHORUS won’t be 
able to explain why Anna is ration.  
Indeed, the two plausible a priori descriptions are the following: “heavenly 
body that’s Hesperus” and “heavenly body that’s Phosphorus”.  And they correspond 
to two necessarily co-instantiated properties. Since Hesperus necessarily is 
Phosphorus, the heavenly body that’s Hesperus is necessarily the heavenly body 
that’s Phosphorus. From which it follows that there is no world in which there are two 
things—one of which is the heavenly body that’s Hesperus but not the heavenly body 
that’s Phosphorus, the other one of which is the heavenly body that’s Phosphorus but 
not the heavenly body that’s Hesperus. So there is no world corresponding to Rational 
Anna thought that Hesperus is not Phosphorus after all. And if that’s right, then the a 
priori requirement doesn’t merely entail that i) were physicalism true, it would 
irrational for Adi to think that thisR is not rp#50 (from which White concludes that 
physicalism is false). The a priori requirement also entails that that ii) if HESPERUS 
and PHOSPHORUS co-refer, it would irrational for Anna to think that Hesperus is not 
Phosphorus  
  The point, again, is this: White should not spell out his a priori requirement 
so strictly, because even in regular, toy examples strictly a priori descriptions will not 
be able to explain rational thinking (by providing a possible world corresponding to 




can’t explain why Adi’s thought is rational; but neither can the a priori description 
associated with HESPERUS explain why Anna’s thought is rational.  
 
Pre-theoretical connections 
White might think it is plausible that the only a priori description associated with the 
concept THISR is the description “state of mine that feels like thisR”. But what about 
pre-theoretical connections like the following descriptions: “the state of mine I’m 
thinking about now1”, or “the state of mine I’m introspecting now2”.  Plausibly 
enough, a thinker who thinks of some X that “X is thisR feel” will be disposed to infer 
that “X is the state of hers that she’s thinking about now”.  And these descriptions 
will allow the physicalist to provide a world corresponding to Adi’s thought that thisR 
is not rp#50—and to deal with the regress argument (see figure 5, next page). 
How does this help us deal with Adi’s thought that thisR is not representational 
property #50? Well, it now seems that the two relevant properties—being the kind of 
thing introspected by Adi now and having content C—are only contingently co-
instantiated. The world corresponding to Adi when she thinks that thisR feel is not 
representational property #50 is a world in which there are two properties—one of 
which is the kind of thing introspected by Adi now (but which does not have content 
C), the other one of which has content C (but isn’t the kind of thing introspected by 
Adi now). Even assuming that the Semantic Premise is true, this way of filling in the 
blanks enables us to provide a possible world corresponding to Anna’s rational 





    THISR                         RP#50     concept
           
      
           
kind of thing I’m    has content such-and-such               mental description     
introspecting now                 
      
 
being the kind of thing    having content C    Property 
introspected now by me          
        
 
 
                        ®           Referent 
 
Figure I.5. Filling the blanks—according to the physicalist. 
 
And we can also deal with the regress argument (even while assuming the Semantic 
Premise is true). Remember that the physicalist was committed to a regress because 
she claimed that kinds of role that the descriptions thinkers associate with words 
might fill (I generalize their claims here to concepts). First, associated mental 
descriptions might fill what Byrne and Pryor call the a priori role. Some descriptions 
might play the reference-fixing role. Finally, some descriptions might play the Frege 
role. The latter are those we use to explain the cognitive significance of the thought 
that Bob Dylan is Robert Zimmerman “many philosophers appeal to differences in 
the properties that [thinkers] associate with the name Bob Dylan and Robert 




also be able to explain why a subject who thinks that Bob Dylan is not Robert 
Zimmerman would be rational).  
 Byrne and Pryor go on to argue that the descriptions that fill the a priori role 
need not fill the Frege role. After all, they write, we seem to associate few significant 
descriptions with our concepts a priori—even our nonphenomenal concepts. Thinkers 
will associate a priori with BOB DYLAN descriptions like “is sentient” and “is Bob 
Dylan”—and with ROBERT ZIMMERMAN descriptions like “is sentient” and “is Robert 
Zimmerman”. And they add: “since these properties are associated with both names, 
they cannot help explain the difference in cognitive significance (3).” They argue that 
the converse seems true too: descriptions that fill the Frege role need not fill the a 
priori role. “Being the author of Mr. Tambourine Man for example, might fill the 
Frege role for Bob Dylan simply because it is a very well-known a posteriori fact that 
Dylan wrote Mr Tambourine Man.” 
If White should get rid of the a priori requirement, what should he put in its 
place? One answer is simply: nothing.  Or, he could add another requirement, for 
instance a thinness. I argue that none of this will help. 
  
No a priori requirement 
If Byrne and Pryor are right, then it’s not obvious why we should claim (as White 
does) that the associated mental descriptions—which will explain the rationality of 
thinking certain things—should be a priori. The relevant mental descriptions should, 
first and foremost, fill the Frege Role—and they can fill that role without filling the a 




that’s Hesperus”—which though a priori cannot play the Frege role and explain the 
rationality of Anna’s beliefs. Similarly, the physicalist should move away from a 
priori descriptions like “state of mine that feels like thisR”—which though a priori 
cannot fill the Frege role and explain the rationality of Adi’s beliefs.  
And now the physicalist can help herself to a whole slew of descriptions 
which she grants (agreeing with Levine see 2.1) are a posteriori connected with 
phenomenal concepts. Adi might associate with THISR the description “thing I get 
when I look at ripe tomatoes”.  
    THISR                         RP#50     concept
           
      
           
thing I get when    has content such-and-such      mental 
description     
looking at ripe  
tomatoes                 
      
 
being the thing I get      having content C    Property 
when looking at ripe 
tomatoes          
        
 
 
                ®            Target 





When she thinks that thisR feel is not rp#50, here is the world corresponding to her 
thought then: a world in which there are two things, one of which she gets when 
looking at ripe tomatoes but which doesn’t have content C (say because of facts about 
ripe tomatoes in that environment); and one of which has content C but, in that 
environment, isn’t the feel she gets when she looks at ripe tomatoes. If White gives 
up on the a priori requirement altogether, then, the physicalist has really nothing to 
worry about.  
 
The thinness requirement 
White seems to think that there are two requirements on the relevant descriptions: 
they should be a priori and thin. Could White then replace the a priori requirement 
with the thinness requirement?  
Thin descriptions are descriptions that ascribe to the referent thin properties. 
And thin properties are properties such that “there is nothing to [them] over and 
above what is understood by the subject who understands the predicate[s] that 
express[…them]” (223). He puts it differently too, claiming that thin properties are 
“properties that confer no empirically discoverable essence on the things in which it 
is instantiated” (2007, 233). The description he believes is associated with WATER a 
priori (natural kind in lakes etc.) is a thick one he says, because it ascribes to the 
referent a thick property—a property which could turn out, unbeknownst to the 
speaker, to have a hidden essence (to be identical for instance with another property). 
The description “state of mine that I’m introspecting now” is a thick description as 




out to be identical to some other property unbeknownst to the thinker). So it can’t be 
the relevant description. The description “state of mine that’s thisR feel”, on the other 
hand, is thin. It does not have a hidden essence; it’s just thisR feel, period, nothing 
more. Therefore only that description can be the relevant when we fill in the blanks.  
This requirement, again, won’t do—for it, too, has counterintuitive 
implications in the standard cases. White claims that the description associated with 
water is thick. It would follow that a thinker who associates that description with 
WATER would not be rational to believe that water is not H2O. Similarly--the 
description “thing that’s Hesperus” is not thin—since it ascribes to the referent 
(Venus) a property that does confer on it an empirically discoverable essence. It will 
be obvious to Simple Anna that there is something more to being Hesperus than 
merely what she knows about it. And there is, since Hesperus turns out to be 
Phosphorus (to be Venus). The thinness requirement won’t do. 
 
A recap 
Even assuming that the Semantic Premise is true, property dualism doesn’t follow. 
White’s property dualist argument relies, crucially, on his a priori requirement, which 
claims that the associated descriptions relevant to rationality must be a priori. We saw 
that there were two ways to interpret this a priori requirement. Interpreted strictly, it 
leaves White unable to account for rational thoughts in most standard cases. 
Interpreted more loosely, it leaves White unable to conclude that physicalism is false. 
It leaves White with a two options: get rid of the a priori requirement altogether—




replace it by the thinness requirement—which again leaves White unable to account 
for rational thoughts in most standard cases.  Even if the Semantic Premise is true, it 
does not follow that physicalism is false. 
 
4.1.5. The big picture  
In this section (4.1.), I have argued that the property dualist argument against 
physicalism fails. The argument rests in large part on an instantiation of the Semantic 
Premise according to which two distinct concepts can co-refer only if there are 
distinct mental descriptions associated with each concept, and two distinct properties 
of the referent corresponding to the two mental descriptions. The anti-physicalist 
argues that in the psychophysical case, one of the two distinct properties of the 
referent must be non-physical. If both properties are physical, we end up either with 
an infinite regress or with the inability to provide a possible world that corresponds to 
rational thoughts like “thisR feel is not representational property #50”.  
 I first argued that the Semantic Premise has counterintuitive implications and 
should therefore be rejected. Then I argued that the regress and the worry about 
rational thoughts arise only if the mental descriptions associated with phenomenal 
concepts are characterized “phenomenally” (i.e., using phenomenal concepts). White 
believes this because he relies on an priori requirement which, I showed, puts in him 








In this last section, I consider an argument against the phenomenal concept strategy 
due to Chalmers (2006). Like the property dualist arguments discussed in the last 
section (4.1.), Chalmers argument is one which concludes that no appeal to 
phenomenal concepts—regardless of how they are characterized—can constitute an 
adequate defense of physicalism. More specifically, Chalmers argues that 
phenomenal concepts can’t both effectively defuse the anti-physicalist arguments and 
be physically explicable themselves.  
 
4.2.1. A dilemma for the physicalist 
Here is the argument as he sees it: 
(1) Either we can conceive that Chalmers’ zombie duplicate (call him 
“Zombie Chalmers”) lacks phenomenal concepts, or we can’t conceive that he 
lacks such concepts.  
(2) If we can conceive of Zombie Chalmers lacking phenomenal concepts, 
then a new explanatory gap is formed and phenomenal concepts turn out to be 
physically inexplicable.  
(3) If we can’t conceive of Zombie Chalmers lacking phenomenal concepts, 
then phenomenal concepts can’t explain the explanatory gap.  
(4) It follows that either phenomenal concepts aren’t physically explicable or 
they don’t explain the explanatory gap.  
 
The argument seems powerful. Premise (1) looks like a necessary truth. Premise (2) 
looks to be true. For anything that Chalmers has that Zombie Chalmers can be 
imagined to lack (given that the latter is physically, functionally, and intentionally 
identical to Chalmers) will be physically inexplicable. Premise (3) also seems true. 
For if Zombie Chalmers can’t be conceived to lack phenomenal concepts, then that 
must mean that those concepts are physically or functionally explicable; but Zombie 
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Chalmers lacks phenomenal consciousness—so we have agreed that physical and 
functional facts can’t explain phenomenal consciousness; in which case phenomenal 
concepts won’t be able to do the work required of them, either. Moreover, the 
argument as a whole appears valid.  
On further reflection, however, the argument as it stands can be seen to be 
problematic. For in order for (1) to be a necessary truth, the phrase “phenomenal 
concepts” will have to be taken univocally. But then when we see that term at work in 
the two premises that follow, it seems that it must be taken in a different way in each. 
In premise (2) we are to assume that we can conceive of Zombie Chalmers lacking 
phenomenal concepts, which seems to require characterizing phenomenal concepts in 
terms of phenomenal feels. By definition zombies lack phenomenal feels. Therefore, 
if we take phenomenal concepts to be those concepts that pick out phenomenal feels, 
then surely zombies must lack them too.  
The usage in Premise (3), in contrast, seems to require a different 
characterization of phenomenal concepts—as conceptually isolated concepts which 
are partly recognitional and refer to their physical referents directly. Such a 
characterization, note, doesn’t require bringing up phenomenal feels themselves 
(under that description at least). So we can conceive of Zombie Chalmers having 
these phenomenal concepts—after all, since he shares all of Chalmers’ physical, 
functional, and intentional properties, Zombie Chalmers must also possess 
conceptually isolated partly recognitional concepts that refer directly and pick out a 
property of his brain. 




argument then, as it stands, it commits a fallacy of equivocation. Naturally, it would 
make life easy for physicalists if Chalmers’ argument could be defeated so easily! But 
in fact it can be reformulated to avoid the difficulty, by framing a version of Premise 
(1) that no longer purports to be a necessary truth. Thus: 
(1*) Phenomenal concepts can either be characterized in terms of phenomenal 
feels, or they can be characterized wholly physically. 
(2a) If phenomenal concepts are characterized in terms of phenomenal feels, 
then we can conceive of Zombie Chalmers lacking such concepts. 
(2b) If we can conceive of Zombie Chalmers lacking phenomenal concepts, 
then a new explanatory gap is formed and phenomenal concepts turn out to be 
physically inexplicable.  
(3a) If phenomenal concepts are characterized purely physically, then we 
can’t conceive of Zombie Chalmers lacking such concepts. 
(3b) If we can’t conceive of Zombie Chalmers lacking phenomenal concepts, 
then phenomenal concepts can’t explain the explanatory gap.  
(4) It follows that neither way of characterizing phenomenal concepts can help 
with the problem of phenomenal consciousness − either they introduce a new 
explanatory problem, or they can’t do the explanatory work required. 
  
This argument commits no fallacy that we can see, and all of its premises present at 
least the appearance of truth. So is the phenomenal concept strategy defeated? We 
believe not. For we think that there are sufficient grounds for denying the truth of 
Premises (2b) and Premise (3b). We consider those in turn. 
 
  4.2.2. A new Explanatory Gap
43
 
Defenders of the phenomenal concept strategy should concede that if (2a) is true and 
we can conceive of Zombies Chalmers lacking phenomenal concepts, then 
phenomenal concepts won’t be physically explicable. This is not quite to say that the 
physicalist—or anyone else for that matter—should agree that if (2a) is true then (2b) 
must be true, since (2b) doesn’t merely state that phenomenal concepts aren’t 
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physically explicable. It also states that this is the case because a new explanatory gap 
is formed. In this section we will challenge the claim that the gap is a new one. Of 
course, challenging the move from (2a) to (2b) on these grounds won’t help the 
physicalist much if (2a) still turns out to entail, as we believe that it does, that 
phenomenal concepts aren’t physically explicable for some other reason. But this 
deserves to be cleared up regardless of how helpful it is to our purposes.   
Chalmers believes that a new explanatory gap is formed: why? Remember 
that on this characterization of phenomenal concepts, it is possible to imagine that 
Chalmers’ zombie twin should lack them. The argument for a new gap in explanation 
therefore parallels very closely Chalmers’ original zombie argument. The original 
argument maintained that if we can conceive of two physical duplicates, one of whom 
is phenomenally conscious and one of whom isn’t, then phenomenal feels cannot be 
physically explained. So if we can conceive of two physical duplicates, one of whom 
possesses phenomenal concepts and one of whom doesn’t, then we should conclude 
that phenomenal concepts (characterized in the first-person way) aren’t physically 
explicable, either.  The first gap in explanation, which the physicalist agrees is real, is 
a gap between physical explanations and phenomenal feels. What we have here is a 
second gap, between physical explanations and phenomenal concepts.  
 The explanatory gap argument when applied to concepts—phenomenal or 
otherwise—seems to us to be invalid, however. Putnam (1975) in his famous Twin 
Earth thought-experiment introduced us to Twin Earth, a planet just like Earth except 
that the identical-looking stuff in the lakes, rivers, and so on, isn’t H2O but XYZ. The 




sophisticated laboratory tests. And on Twin Earth lives Twin Oscar, who is a 
microphysical duplicate of Earthling Oscar (abstracting from the fact that his body 
contains XYZ whereas Oscar’s contains H2O – by hypothesis this makes not the 
smallest difference to their cellular, neurological, or cognitive processes). According 
to Putnam and those with externalist leanings when it comes to intentional content 
(like Chalmers in the paper that we are discussing − see below), it turns out that Twin 
Oscar possesses the concept TWATER and not his twin’s corresponding concept 
WATER. We now have two physical duplicates (Oscar and Twin Oscar) one of whom 
(Oscar) possesses the concept WATER while the other one (Twin Oscar) doesn’t. 
This case is very much like that Chalmers and his zombie twin. Chalmers 
possesses phenomenal concepts; his twin doesn’t. And there exists a physicalist story 
as to why that might be the case: Chalmers is causally related, in the right sort of way, 
to phenomenal states; his twin isn’t.
44
 Of course this explanation won’t ultimately be 
very satisfying, since the physicalist’s explanation of what it is to possess a 
phenomenal concept (characterized in this first way) appeals to a relation to 
phenomenal feels. And he (the physicalist) has agreed that there is a gap between 
phenomenal feels and the physical. But notice that what the physicalist is facing, here, 
is the old gap over again. Phenomenal concepts turn out to be physically inexplicable 
simply because they are characterized in terms of phenomenal feels which are 
themselves physically inexplicable. Given this first account of phenomenal concepts, 
the physicalist’s strategy simply fails to deal adequately with the original explanatory 
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 there is no new gap. 
 Even if that’s right, premise (2b) can be weakened by striking out all 
references to a new explanatory gap. And in that case defenders of the phenomenal 
concept strategy should concede that it is true. For those who adopt this strategy say 
that it is because we make use of phenomenal concepts that zombies are conceivable, 
there is an explanatory gap, and so on. No matter how detailed a description I am 
given in physical, functional, or intentional terms, it will always be possible for me to 
think, “Still, all that might be true while this state was absent or different.” And 
defenders of the phenomenal concept strategy claim that it is the conceptual isolation 
of the phenomenal concept THIS that makes such thoughts thinkable, and thus that 
gives rise to the conceivability of zombies and the explanatory gap.  
By the same token, then, if phenomenal concepts are characterized in terms of 
phenomenal feels, I shall be able to conceive of zombies lacking such concepts. If I 
characterize a given phenomenal concept as, “The concept that I hereby deploy when 
thinking about this state”, then no matter how detailed a description of someone I am 
given in physical, functional, or intentional terms, it will always be possible for me to 
think, “Still, all of that might be true while the concept that I hereby deploy when 
thinking about this state was absent or different.” And since this thought is thinkable, 
the explanatory gap remains. Given that we can conceive of a physical, and 
functional, and intentional duplicate who would nevertheless lack phenomenal 
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the first horn of Chalmers’ dilemma would be doing the following: he would be conceding that there 
is an explanatory gap between phenomenal states and the physical while claiming that phenomenal 
concepts can explain the existence of this gap. But then he describes phenomenal concepts in terms 
of phenomenal states. It shouldn’t be surprising that the phenomenal concept strategy, thus 




concepts (characterized in first-person terms), there will be an explanatory gap 
between all physical, functional, and intentional facts and the existence of such 
concepts (so characterized). 
 Suitably weakened, the first horn of Chalmers’ dilemma should be embraced, 
then: if phenomenal concepts are characterized in terms of phenomenal feels, then the 
explanatory gap remains, and phenomenal concepts themselves turn out to be 
physically inexplicable. But this only presents a difficulty for the phenomenal concept 
strategy if the premises on the other horn of the dilemma are also true. Otherwise we 
can claim that our physicalist account of phenomenal concepts can explain why there 
is an explanatory gap between all physical, functional, and intentional facts and the 
existence of such concepts, just as it can explain why there is an explanatory gap 
between all physical, functional, and intentional facts and the existence of 
phenomenally conscious mental states themselves. In both cases the explanation will 
turn on the conceptual isolation attributed to phenomenal concepts.  
 
4.2.3. Explaining our epistemic situation  
Chalmers’ defense of the claim made in Premise (3b) is quite complex, turning 
crucially on his discussion of what he calls “epistemic situations”. Throughout the 
discussion of this conditional, however, it should be borne in mind that phenomenal 
concepts are to be understood in purely physical terms, as conceptually isolated partly 
recognitional concepts deployed in the presence of certain physical states.  
Let us recall the original explanatory gap problem, the conceivability of 




consider claims like, “I am phenomenally conscious.” These problems (and others 
like them) and this claim (and others like it) form what Chalmers’ calls our epistemic 
situation when it comes to phenomenal consciousness. Proponents of the phenomenal 
concept strategy believe that our possession of phenomenal concepts can explain our 
epistemic situation. We have already seen how the physicalist will argue that 
phenomenal concepts explain why there is a gap in explanation, why zombies and 
inverts are conceivable, and what Mary learns. And when I say, “I am phenomenally 
conscious”, it may be that I am in fact saying something like: “I have experiences like 
these”, where THESE is a phenomenal concept. We are now in a position to 
schematize Chalmers’ argument for Premise (3b) as follows:  
(i) If zombies do indeed possess phenomenal concepts (which must be the 
case if Zombie Chalmers can’t conceivably lack phenomenal concepts, 
characterized in the physicalist way), but don’t share our epistemic situation, 
then our having phenomenal concepts can hardly explain our epistemic 
situation.  
(ii) Zombies don’t share our epistemic situation.  
(iii) It follows that the possession of phenomenal concepts can’t explain our 
epistemic situation (given a third-person characterization of phenomenal 
concepts).  
 
According to the first premise of this argument, if Chalmers and Zombie Chalmers 
don’t share the same epistemic situation, then phenomenal concepts can’t explain our 
epistemic situation. Chalmers provides an argument for this claim which parallels, 
again, the original arguments from zombies and the explanatory gap. The original 
arguments can be summarized like this: if you can imagine two physical duplicates, 
one phenomenally conscious and the other not, then phenomenal consciousness can’t 
be explained in physical terms. Now we can say this: if we can imagine two 




the other not, then our epistemic situation isn’t explicable in terms of phenomenal 
concepts. We will grant Chalmers the truth of this premise. 
Premise (ii) asserts that Chalmers and his zombie twin don’t share the same 
epistemic situation. This is more questionable. According to Chalmers (2007, 176), 
for two duplicates to share the same epistemic situation is for their corresponding 
beliefs to have the same truth-values and the same epistemic status “as justified or 
unjustified, and as cognitively significant or insignificant”. Corresponding beliefs, 
Chalmers goes on to say, need not have the same contents. Oscar and Twin Oscar, he 
argues, share the same epistemic situation.
46
 Oscar’s belief that water [H2O] is 
refreshing and Twin Oscar’s corresponding belief that twater [XYZ] is refreshing will 
both be true, even if the two beliefs don’t have the same content. Chalmers argues 
that he and his zombie twin, unlike Oscar and Twin Oscar, do not share the same 
epistemic situation. Chalmers’ belief that he is phenomenally conscious is true, 
whereas Zombie Chalmers’ belief that he is phenomenally conscious is false. Or think 
back to Mary, and imagine her possessing a zombie twin. Mary gains new 
introspectible knowledge when she is finally freed from her room, whereas Twin 
Mary doesn’t gain all of the same knowledge. So they don’t seem to share the same 
epistemic situation. Chalmers concludes that our zombie twins cannot share our 
epistemic situation. 
We now propose to argue that Premise (ii) is false, however, and that zombies 
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a microphysical duplicate of Earthling Oscar who lives on Twin Earth, a planet just like Earth except 
that the identical-looking stuff in the lakes, rivers, and so on, isn’t H2O but XYZ. The latter is a 
substance that can only be distinguished from H2O by means of sophisticated laboratory tests. (Of 
course Twin Oscar cannot be a complete duplicate of Oscar, since his body contains XYZ whereas 
Oscar’s contains H2O. But by hypothesis this is supposed to make not the smallest difference to their 




do share our epistemic situation (in one good sense of the notion of “epistemic 
situation” – we will return to this point in section 4.2.4.). 
Chalmers compares zombie duplicates to Oscar and Twin Oscar. Oscar, on 
Earth, is entertaining a thought that he would express with the words, “Water is 
refreshing.” Our intuition is that Oscar is referring to H2O. When Twin Oscar thinks a 
thought that he, too, would express with the words, “Water is refreshing”, our 
intuition is that he is referring to XYZ, and not H2O. Oscar and Twin Oscar both 
possess concepts that they deploy under the same circumstances (when they are 
thirsty), which are associated with certain kinds of perceptual states (seeing a 
colorless liquid), and so forth. But, according to the externalist, those corresponding 
concepts will have different contents. The content of Oscar’s concept is tied to H2O, 
whereas the content of Twin Oscar’s concept is tied to XYZ. Chalmers seems ready 
to accept the externalist conclusion. He argues that Oscar and Twin Oscar have 
corresponding beliefs with the same truth-values but different contents. When they 
say, “This is water”, both are right, although they are talking about different things: 
Oscar is talking about water (H2O), his twin is talking about twater (XYZ) (Chalmers, 
2006, 11). And yet despite this, they share the same epistemic situation. 
What, then, prevents us from saying the same thing about Chalmers and his 
zombie twin? Chalmers and Zombie Chalmers both have concepts that they deploy in 
similar circumstances in the presence of certain perceptual states, that are 
conceptually isolated, and so on. An externalist (of the sort that Chalmers seems to be 
throughout his paper) could very well say that the contents of Chalmers’ phenomenal 




content of one of Chalmers’ phenomenal concepts will turn out to involve a 
phenomenal feel, whereas the content of his twin’s corresponding phenomenal 
concept can’t possibly involve such a state.
47
 According to Chalmers it seems 
plausible that the content of a zombie’s phenomenal concepts would be 
schmenomenal feels. (These would be states that have the same physical, functional, 
and intentional properties as Chalmers’ states, but that aren’t phenomenally 
conscious; see 2006, 19.) The physicalist would then argue that Chalmers’ and 
Zombie Chalmers’ corresponding beliefs have the same truth-values and are justified 
in similar ways, but they are quite importantly about different things. So Chalmers 
and Zombie Chalmers can share the same epistemic situation after all, just as do 
Oscar and his twin. 
Chalmers argues that defending this kind of reply, “requires either deflating 
the phenomenal knowledge of conscious beings, or […] inflating the corresponding 
knowledge of zombies” (2007, 185). He goes on to argue that either strategy has 
counterintuitive consequences. No one thinks that Zombie Mary learns just as much 
as Mary (an implication of the inflationary move). No one thinks that Mary learns 
just as little as Zombie Mary does (an implication of the deflationary move). When 
we think of zombies, we aren’t conceiving of creatures possessing something 
epistemically just as good as consciousness. We are conceiving of deprived creatures 
with impoverished knowledge of themselves. 
But Chalmers is surely confused here. Arguing that zombies’ phenomenal 
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concepts have different contents enables us to say the following about Mary and her 
zombie twin: they both gain the same amount of knowledge, but (and this is crucial) it 
is the same amount of knowledge about different things. Mary’s knowledge is 
knowledge of phenomenal feels, Zombie Mary’s knowledge is knowledge of 
schmenomenal feels, just like Oscar’s knowledge is of water (H2O) and his twin’s is 
knowledge of twater (XYZ). Physicalists needn’t deflate the knowledge gained by 
Mary or inflate the knowledge gained by Zombie Mary in order for the phenomenal 
concept strategy to work. All we need to point out is that the objects of their 
knowledge are very different.  
Physicalists can now deal with a variety of claims quite effectively. Consider, 
for instance, the discussion that Chalmers imagines between a zombie eliminativist 
and a zombie realist. The eliminativist argues that there is no such thing as 
phenomenal consciousness and the realist maintains that there is such a thing. Here is 
what Chalmers says about them:  
When such a debate is held in the actual world, the […] materialist and the 
property dualist agree that the zombie realist is right, and the zombie 
eliminativist is wrong. But it is plausible that in a zombie scenario, the zombie 
realist would be wrong, and the zombie eliminativist would be right. (2006, 
12.) 
 
But in the zombie scenario, it is just as plausible that the zombies would simply not 
be talking about phenomenal consciousness. Their debate is about the existence of 
schmenomenal consciousness. And the zombie realist, like his twin in the actual 
world, may very well be right; his beliefs, like those of his twin, may very well be 
true.  




the conceivability of zombies. Zombies are thinking about schmenomenal 
consciousness using their phenomenal concepts, which are conceptually isolated from 
their other concepts and partly recognitional. They will conclude from their 
reflections that there is a gap in explanation between schmenomenal consciousness 
and their physical world. They will also conclude that it is conceivable for someone 
to be physically, functionally, and intentionally identical to them and yet lack this 
(where the concept THIS that they deploy picks out a schmenomenal state). And so 
forth. 
This difference-in-content move now allows us to deal with a variety of first-
person claims as well. Zombie Mary, after she leaves her room, may well come to 
believe something that she would express by saying, “This is an experience of blue.” 
What will make this belief true isn’t her actually having a phenomenal experience of 
blue, but rather her having a schmenomenal experience – whatever that turns out to 
be. And so both her beliefs and Mary’s beliefs could plausibly have the same truth-
values. Similarly when Chalmers says, “I am phenomenally conscious”, and his 
zombie twin utters the same string of words, both are in fact saying something 
different. To assume that they are saying the same thing (that they are both talking 
about phenomenal consciousness) is to assume that the contents of their states and 
concepts will be the same. But if there is no reason to assume this about Oscar and 
Twin Oscar, then there is no reason to assume this about Chalmers and his zombie 
twin. Zombie Chalmers is really saying that he is schmenomenally conscious, and we 
have every reason to think that he is right in thinking that, just as Chalmers is right is 




Chalmers, to block this line of reply, may now resort to our intuitions about 
zombies. We have claimed that they will turn out to have something epistemically 
just as good as phenomenal consciousness, namely schmenomenal consciousness. But 
doesn’t that seem wrong? When we are conceiving of zombies, aren’t we conceiving 
of beings with nothing at all that is epistemically like consciousness?  
Well, on our view zombies are still zombies in that they are not phenomenally 
conscious. Their perceptual states don’t have phenomenal feels. In this respect it is all 
dark inside. Yet they have something playing a certain role in their psychology—a 
role analogous to the role that phenomenal consciousness plays in ours. They have 
something epistemically just as good as consciousness, but they don’t have anything 
that is phenomenally as good. And it seems that this is what matters here. The 
schmenomenal states they undergo do not feel like anything. Even though their 
schmenomenal beliefs are true when our corresponding phenomenal beliefs are, their 
beliefs are, sadly enough, not about the same good stuff as our corresponding 
beliefs—they are not about the feel of experiences. Zombies are still, it seems, in 
quite a dreadful situation. So our intuitions about zombies are preserved.  
 
4.2.4. Of Zombies and Zombie Zombies. 
We have shown that there are good reasons to resist Chalmers’ claim that zombies 
fail to share our epistemic situation. If he can’t make this case, then he can’t argue 
successfully for Premise (3b). And so it isn’t true that if zombies conceivably possess 
phenomenal concepts, then phenomenal concepts can’t do the work that physicalists 




There is, however, a further line of reply open to Chalmers, which we consider in the 
present section. 
 
About Epistemic Situations. 
We think that Chalmers will object that in conceiving of an “epistemic situation” in 
such a way that both Chalmers and Zombie Chalmers share the same epistemic 
situation, the facts crucial to our actual epistemic situation have been omitted. For 
when I make the judgment that I might express by saying, “This is a blue-cup 
experience”, I don’t just deploy a conceptually isolated concept in the presence of an 
intentional state representing the presence of a blue cup. In addition, I deploy such a 
concept on the basis of my awareness of this type of mental state (a phenomenal feel). 
And by hypothesis, Zombie Chalmers doesn’t have awareness of any such state. 
While Chalmers and Zombie Chalmers have much in common − in particular, they 
make similar judgments in similar circumstances (all of which can be true) and the 
epistemic liaisons of those judgments (when characterized in third-person terms) are 
all precisely parallel to one another − there are also crucial differences. For Chalmers’ 
judgments are grounded in the presence of mental states like these, and those, and 
this, and that (where the indexicals here express phenomenal concepts), whereas 
Zombie Chalmers’ judgments are not. This seems like it might be an important − 
indeed, vital − part of Chalmers’ epistemic situation. In which case the crucial 
premise in the argument outlined in 4.2.2. is true: zombies don’t share our epistemic 
situation. 




deny that the distinction between a concept and its conceptual mode of presentation 
(or associated mental description) finds any application in connection with 
phenomenal consciousness. Since H2O and XYZ are presented to Oscar and Twin 
Oscar in the same way, we can say of them that (1) they possess concepts that play 
similar roles in their mental lives, and (2) they apply those concepts on the basis of 
the same associated mental descriptions. Only when these two conditions are met can 
we say that the twins share the same epistemic situation. Phenomenal feels, in 
contrast, provide their phenomenal associated descriptions, which are essential to 
them (Kripke, 1972). It follows that a phenomenal feel and another distinct 
(schmenomenal) property cannot be presented to Chalmers and his zombie twin in the 
same way. So the pair of them possess, at most, (1): concepts that play similar roles in 
their mental lives. Since they can’t possibly apply those concepts on the basis of the 
mental descriptions, they cannot share the same epistemic situation, just as Chalmers 
maintains. Seen in this light, Chalmers ought to concede that it was a tactical error (or 
at best misleading) for him to have introduced Oscar and Twin Oscar into the 
discussion. 
Recall, however, the distinction drawn at the very beginning of this section 
(4.2.) between two characterizations of phenomenal concepts – a distinction similar to 
one Chalmers himself makes between phenomenal and schmenomenal concepts. We 
claimed there (again roughly as Chalmers himself does) that we could think of 
phenomenal concepts as applied either in response to phenomenal feels or in response 
physical (functional/representational) properties (for example). According to the 




4.2.2, moreover, phenomenal concepts are to be characterized in physical terms. So 
both Chalmers and Zombie Chalmers should be said to employ concepts whose 
applications are prompted by the presence of certain distinctive sorts of intentional / 
functional state, where those concepts are conceptually isolated from others. In which 
case, to introduce the feel of the state into our description of the conceptual mode of 
presentation of Chalmers’ concepts is to switch illegitimately to the “phenomenal” 
characterization of those concepts. And if we do restrict ourselves to a physical 
account of the concepts involved, in contrast, then the comparison with Oscar and 
Twin Oscar is entirely appropriate: in both cases we have pairs of people whose 
concepts have similar associated mental descriptions and play the same conceptual 
roles, but where those concepts happen to pick out different things.  
 We have alleged that the response that we made on Chalmers’ behalf would 
re-introduce (illegitimately) the first (phenomenal) characterization of phenomenal 
concepts into the defense of Premise (3). Chalmers might reply, however, that this 
allegation is unfounded. For it isn’t the characterization of phenomenal concepts that 
is in question, here. What is at issue isn’t what we mean by “phenomenal concept”. 
Rather, what is in question is the presence, or absence, of the states picked out by 
such concepts, when those concepts are used by their possessors. It is the presence of 
this state (the state, not the concept of the state here deployed) that is partly 
distinctive of Chalmers’ epistemic situation, and which marks its difference from 
Zombie Chalmers’ epistemic situation. 
 But now a problem of a different sort emerges. If Chalmers’ epistemic 




feel), which we can imagine Zombie Chalmers to lack, then this amounts to saying 
that it is an important part of Chalmers’ epistemic situation that he has phenomenally 
conscious mental states, whereas Zombie Chalmers doesn’t. And doesn’t that now 
beg the question? For this is something that is supposed to be granted on all hands. 
Defenders of the phenomenal concept strategy, too, allow that we can conceive of 
someone who is physically, functionally, and intentionally identical to Chalmers (that 
is, Zombie Chalmers), but who lacks any of the phenomenally conscious mental 
states that Chalmers enjoys. And we claim to be capable of explaining how such a 
thing can be conceivable in a way that doesn’t presuppose the existence of anything 
beyond the physical, the functional, and/or the intentional. 
Asserting that this strategy cannot work because phenomenal states 
themselves are part of what is distinctive of Chalmers’ epistemic situation, and 
pointing out that the strategy can’t explain them, is to insist that the phenomenal 
concept strategy should explain phenomenal consciousness. But that was never at 
issue. The phenomenal concept strategy is a strategy for explaining the conceivability 
of zombies, the explanatory gap, and so forth, not for explaining phenomenal 
consciousness per se. To put the point somewhat differently, the phrase “our 
epistemic situation” is supposed to be a handy label for the various phenomena that 
the phenomenal concept strategy is intended to explain (the conceivability of zombies 
etc.). But since that strategy was never intended as a reductive explanation of 
phenomenal consciousness as such, “our epistemic situation” should not be 
understood in such a way as to encompass phenomenal feelings.
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 The true dialectical situation is as follows, we believe. Insofar as they argue 
legitimately, Chalmers and other anti-physicalists are asserting that the best 
explanation of the conceivability of zombies, the conceivability of experiential 
inversions, the explanatory gap, and so on is that our experiences possess distinctive 
properties (call them “qualia”) that cannot be reductively explained in physical, 
functional, or intentional terms. Chalmers might concede that we do possess 
phenomenal concepts, characterized in something like the way that the proponent of 
the phenomenal concept strategy characterizes them (conceptual isolation and so 
forth). But he denies that an appeal to these concepts alone can explain what needs to 
be explained (the possibility of zombies, the explanatory gap, and so forth). His 
opponent, in contrast, asserts that we don’t need to appeal to any special properties of 
phenomenally conscious experience to do the work: the entire explanatory burden can 
be taken up by appeal to the phenomenal concepts in terms of which we think about 
those experiences. 
 
4.2.5. Zombie-Zombie Chalmers 
In order to move this debate forwards, we need to introduce a further character into 
the story: Zombie-Zombie Chalmers. Recall that Zombie Chalmers has been allowed 
                                                                                                                                           
physicalist’s reply to conceivability arguments comes in two stages, the first of which is that the 
conceptual isolation of phenomenal concepts/truths entails that the conditional, (1) If P, then P*, is a 
posteriori necessary (where P is a summary of all physical truths, and P* is a summary of all 
phenomenal truths). But physicalists who adopt the phenomenal concept strategy aren’t attempting to 
show the truth of this entailment. Making the case that (1) is a necessary truth would, it is true, be 
making the case for physicalism. But the phenomenal concept strategy is only intended to be 
defensive. The physicalist is only arguing that the conceivability arguments don’t show that 
physicalism is false, despite what their proponents claim: there is another explanation for why we can 
conceive of these things, an explanation that appeals to phenomenal concepts. So Stoljar misses the 
fact that the phenomenal concept strategy is essentially a defensive strategy. It is a strategy that 
physicalists employ to show that the key anti-physicalist arguments fail. It isn’t meant to make a 




to possess phenomenal concepts, characterized in a third-person way. For example, he 
has concepts that are applied recognitionally on the basis of his perceptual and 
imagistic states, and which are conceptually isolated from all of his other concepts 
(whether physical, functional, or intentional). Possessing such concepts, Zombie 
Chalmers will be able to conceive of a zombie version of himself (Zombie-Zombie 
Chalmers). If on a given occasion he uses the word “this” to express one of his 
phenomenal concepts, then he will be able to entertain thoughts that he might 
articulate by saying, “There might exist someone who is physically, functionally, and 
intentionally identical with myself, but who nevertheless lacks anything resembling 
this type of state.” Since his phenomenal concept is conceptually isolated, there will 
be no hidden contradiction in this thought that he would be capable of detecting a 
priori. 
 Likewise if Zombie Chalmers uses the word “this” to express a phenomenal 
concept that applies to one of his percepts of color. (For these purposes, Zombie 
Chalmers’ perceptions of color need to be characterized purely functionally and 
intentionally, of course. They are perceptual states with a fine-grained intentional 
content representing properties of surfaces that impact the latter’s reflection of light, 
perhaps.) Then he, too, will fall subject to the Mary thought-experiment. He will be 
inclined to think, “Mary brought up in her black and white room couldn’t know what 
it is like to undergo this type of perceptual state, no matter how much she knows 
about the physical, functional, and intentional properties of color vision.” And he will 
be inclined to think this precisely because the concept that he expresses by “this” is a 




 By the same token, Zombie Chalmers will think that there is an explanatory 
gap between all physical, functional, and intentional facts, on the one hand, and his 
own mental states (characterized using phenomenal concepts), on the other. Because 
those concepts are conceptually isolated ones, he will be able to think, “No matter 
how much you tell me about the physical, functional, and intentional facts involved in 
perception, it will still be possible that all of what you tell me should be true, while 
states of this sort are absent or inverted.” So he, too, will be inclined to think that 
there is something mysterious about his perceptual (and imagistic, and emotional) 
states, which puts them outside the reach of physicalist explanation. 
 It is plain that it is Zombie Chalmers’ possession of phenomenal concepts that 
explains why he should find the existence of Zombie-Zombie Chalmers conceivable. 
And likewise it is his possession of such concepts that explains the conceivability to 
him of perceptual inversions, that explains why he thinks Mary would learn 
something new, and that explains why he would think that there is an explanatory gap 
between the character of his own mental states and all physical, functional, and 
intentional facts. Plainly, since Zombie Chalmers is being conceived to lack any 
phenomenally conscious states, it cannot be the presence of such states in him that 
explains the conceivability of Zombie-Zombie Chalmers, and the rest. 
 Zombie Chalmers, when presented with the phenomenal concept strategy for 
explaining the conceivability of Zombie-Zombie Chalmers and so forth, might even 
be inclined to insist that this strategy can’t explain what is distinctive of his own 
epistemic situation. He will allow that Zombie-Zombie Chalmers would make 




on similar grounds. But he will be inclined to insist that something crucial is left out 
by the phenomenal concept strategy. What is left out is that he (Zombie Chalmers) 
bases his judgments on the presence of states like this, and this, and that, whereas, by 
hypothesis, Zombie-Zombie Chalmers is being conceived to lack such states. 
 Now we can bring it all back home. For in connection with everything that 
Chalmers thinks, and for every possibility that Chalmers can conceive, and for every 
argument that Chalmers can offer, Zombie Chalmers can offer a parallel one. Of 
course, from our perspective, conceiving all of this along with Chalmers, we are 
conceiving that they are thinking about different things: Chalmers is thinking about 
phenomenal states, whereas Zombie Chalmers is thinking about schmenomenal 
states. But this difference plays no role in explaining what each is capable of thinking. 
On the contrary, it is their mutual possession of phenomenal concepts (characterized 
in the third-person way) that does that. Since it can’t be the fact that Zombie 
Chalmers possesses phenomenal states that explains his capacity to conceive of 
Zombie-Zombie Chalmers and the rest (for by hypothesis, he possesses no such 
states), we shouldn’t allow that Chalmers’ possession of phenomenal states plays any 
role in explaining how he can conceive of Zombie Chalmers, either.  
 This “zombie-zombie argument”, as one might call it, seems to us to 
decisively shift the burden of proof in this area onto the anti-physicalist.
49
 Since an 
appeal to phenomenal concepts (characterized in a third-person way as conceptually 
isolated and so on) can explain everything that Zombie Chalmers is inclined to think 
and say (and in particular, since it can explain the conceivability to Zombie Chalmers 
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is rather a defensive argument intended to undermine a set of arguments against physicalism (the 




of Zombie-Zombie Chalmers), and since everything that Zombie Chalmers is inclined 
to think and say, Chalmers is also inclined to think and say and vice versa (controlling 
for what will seem from Chalmers’ perspective to be differences of content), the most 
reasonable conclusion to draw is that it is Chalmers’ possession of phenomenal 
concepts, too, that explains the conceivability of zombies, the explanatory gap, and so 
forth. 
 
4.2.6. Replies to Objections. 
Chalmers will surely reply as follows: the zombie-zombie argument presupposes that 
when Zombie Chalmers claims, “I am phenomenally conscious”, he says something 
true, and yet (Chalmers will insist) it much more plausible that this claim is false. 
Surely, in the zombie world, there is no phenomenal consciousness, and so Zombie 
Chalmers’ claim, in that world, that he is phenomenally conscious must be false.
50
 
This can’t possibly be a good reply to the argument of the present paper, 
however. Certainly it can’t be if it assumes that Zombie Chalmers’ concept 
PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS refers to phenomenal consciousness. For as we have 
shown at the beginning of 4.2., Zombie’s Chalmers’ phenomenal concepts plausibly 
refer to his perceptual states (characterized purely functionally and intentionally). 
Actually, it isn’t in the least plausible that a zombie’s phenomenal concepts 
(characterized physically) should be referring to the zombie’s (non-existent) 
phenomenal states (which would make what he says wrong). This would be like 
saying that Twin Oscar’s twater concept actually refers to H2O, in which case he is 
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wrong every time he says, “This water tastes good.” But clearly that is just absurd. No 
theory of concepts does (or should) yield such a counterintuitive claim. Zombie 
Chalmers is correct when he says that he is conscious, because he isn’t saying that he 
has phenomenal states as we understand them. He is correct because he means that he 
has schmenomenal states, and he has them.  
As we have argued, all of Zombie Chalmers’ beliefs turn out to have the same 
truth-values as Chalmers’ corresponding ones. As a realist about phenomenal 
consciousness, Chalmers here on Earth will say, “There are phenomenal states”, and 
he will be right. His zombie twin will utter the same words but will mean that there 
are schmenomenal (i.e. physical, functional, and/or intentional) states, and he, too, 
will be right. Likewise if someone here on Earth denies that there are phenomenal 
states and turns out to be wrong, his zombie twin will likewise turn out to be wrong in 
the zombie world, since he will be denying, there, that there are schmenomenal (e.g. 
functional and/or intentional) states. 
In fact, it seems that such pairs of corresponding beliefs will turn out not to 
have the same truth value only if dualism is true. If dualism is true and Chalmers 
says, “Phenomenal states aren’t physical”, then he will be right; but his zombie twin 
uttering the same words will mean that schmenomenal (e.g. functional and/or 
intentional) states aren’t physical, and he will be wrong; for by hypothesis his 
schmenomenal states are physical. Since Chalmers’ overall goal is to argue for 
dualism and against physicalism, he begs the question when he assumes that his 
zombie twin’s corresponding beliefs don’t have the same truth-values as his own.
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Chalmers is very likely to adopt a rather different tactic, however: he will 
argue that the zombie’s phenomenal statements are false, not because they refer to 
phenomenal states that he doesn’t have, but because they fail to refer altogether. The 
right analogy isn’t between Earth and Twin Earth but rather between Earth and Dry 
Earth. Dry Oscar’s claims about water (e.g., that it is refreshing) are false because he 
is subject to some sort of grand illusion: there is no such thing as water in his 
environment. If this is the right analogy then we would have to grant Chalmers that 
the epistemic situation of zombies isn’t, as a matter of fact, the same as ours. But we 
have two responses to make to this argument. One is to deny that this is the right 
analogy. The other is to say that even if it is, we can still run a version of the zombie-
zombie argument. Let us elaborate. 
How could Zombie Chalmers’ phenomenal concepts fail to refer? For these 
are concepts that, on their third-person characterization, are applied in a recognitional 
way in the presence of content-bearing mental states of a distinctive sort (perceptual 
and imagistic states). How could these concepts fail to refer to the very states that 
prompt their application? One option would be to claim that there is something else 
built into their content. For example, as Chalmers once suggested (1996, p. 204), they 
might include the commitment that they should not refer to any physical or functional 
property. But this would be inconsistent with the claim that phenomenal concepts are 
conceptually isolated. Concepts that are so isolated must lack any commitments of 
this sort. 
Another option would be to claim that the presence of phenomenal 
                                                                                                                                           
arguments, not as an independent argument in support of physicalism, nor as a purported reductive 




consciousness is a constitutive aspect of the content of a phenomenal concept. In 
which case Zombie Chalmers’ “thoughts” involving phenomenal concepts will be 
either false or truth-valueless because employing a contentless concept. (Chalmers 
develops such a position at length in his 2003.) But this option is entirely question-
begging in the present context. Chalmers (2003) develops his account of the content 
of phenomenal concepts within the framework of his own anti-physicalist position, 
assuming that there are irreducible qualia and such like. But that position is supposed 
to be established on the basis of arguments from the conceivability of zombies and so 
forth, and hence cannot be taken for granted in the evaluation of those arguments. 
Moreover the horn of Chalmers’ dilemma we have been addressing for most of the 
paper (sections 4 and on) presupposes the third-person characterization of 
phenomenal concepts. And given such a characterization, there is no reason whatever 
to think that the thoughts of Zombie Chalmers, employing such a concept, should be 
empty. 
Even if we allow that Zombie Chalmers’ phenomenal concepts might fail to 
refer, however, we can still run a version of the zombie-zombie argument. For we 
surely need to explain the inferences that the zombie makes, and the reasons why he 
thinks (granted, mistakenly) that he can conceive of a zombie version of himself. The 
fact that the zombie’s beliefs are false (because containing an empty term) doesn’t 
mean we are under no obligation to explain his reasoning and his behavior. We can 
explain why it is that little John wants to be nice by appealing, in part, to his (false) 
belief that Santa will only give him presents if he is nice. Although his concept SANTA 




the zombie’s reasoning and behavior? Clearly, the presence of phenomenal feels can’t 
explain that reasoning. Just as in the case in which we assume that the zombie’s 
phenomenal concepts refer to physical states, so in the case in which his concepts are 
empty, his reasoning can’t be explained by an appeal to phenomenal states. The only 
thing that can truly explain the relevant bits of reasoning is the fact that Zombie 
Chalmers has a concept (in the original case, referring to a physical property, now 
being allowed to be empty) which is conceptually isolated from all physical, 
functional, and intentional concepts. 
What emerges, then, is that the zombie-zombie argument can still work even 
if we allow that Chalmers and Zombie Chalmers don’t share the same epistemic 
situation (because all of the latter’s beliefs involving phenomenal concepts are false 
by virtue of failing to refer). Since it is the conceptual isolation of Zombie Chalmers’ 
(empty) phenomenal concepts that explains the conceivability to him of Zombie-
Zombie Chalmers and so forth, parity of reasoning suggests that in Chalmers’ case, 
too, it is the conceptual isolation of his phenomenal concepts and not the presence of 
phenomenal consciousness itself which explains the various problematic thought 
experiments. We want to emphasize, however, that we are actually very unwilling to 
allow that the corresponding beliefs of Chalmers and Zombie Chalmers should differ 
in truth value. We think that it is much more plausible that Zombie Chalmers’ 









It is worth noting in closing that there is both a weaker and a stronger conclusion that 
might be drawn from our defense of the phenomenal concept strategy. The weaker 
conclusion is that the arguments from zombies, from the explanatory gap, and so 
forth, to the mysterious and/or non-physical nature of phenomenal consciousness is 
decisively blocked. For everyone can agree that our phenomenal concepts fit some or 
other variant of the third-person descriptions canvassed in Section 2. Everyone can 
agree that it is possible for us to form concepts of experience that are purely 
recognitional, or that “quote” percepts or images, or whatever. What they will 
disagree about is whether our phenomenal concepts are exhausted by such factors. 
Anti-physicalists will insist that something has been left out, namely that those 
concepts pick out non-relational, non-intentional properties of experience like these. 
So if the zombie and explanatory gap thought experiments can be fully explained in 
terms of our possession of phenomenal concepts, then there is no longer any 
argument from those thought experiments to the existence of qualia, the 
mysteriousness of consciousness, property dualism, and so forth. Such claims might 
still be correct, but the arguments for them have collapsed. 
The stronger conclusion that might be drawn from our discussion is this. Once 
we see that all the puzzling factors can be explained in terms of our deployment of 
phenomenal concepts; and perhaps especially once we see in those terms that even 
the conceived-of zombies will be able to conceive of zombie versions of themselves, 




phenomenal concepts than is described in the third-person description. (Remember, 
however, that the third-person description is not supposed to be any sort of analysis or 
partial definition of our phenomenal concepts.) So the most reasonable conclusion is 
that a phenomenal state just is a perceptual state with a certain distinctive sort of 
intentional content (non-conceptual, perhaps) that occurs in such a way as to ground 
the application of phenomenal concepts. Hence we can conclude that phenomenal 
consciousness can be fully reductively explained (somehow – of course there are a 
number of mutually inconsistent competing accounts, here)
52
 in physical, functional, 
and/or intentional terms.  
We have provided a number of reasons for thinking that Chalmers’ argument 
against the phenomenal concept strategy is unsuccessful. On the contrary, that 
strategy still stands as providing a powerful response to a wide range of anti-
physicalist thought-experiments, enabling us to draw the anti-physicalist sting from 
the latter.  
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According to representationalists, phenomenal characters can be reduced to 
representational contents. It is no wonder, then, that spelling out a representationalist 
account involves saying quite a bit about these representational contents, their roles, 
as well as their relations to other contents and to the external world. After all, if the 
mind itself is representational, virtually every mental state will involve a relation to a 
representation and its content; but presumably not every mental state will be 
phenomenally conscious. The states that are phenomenally conscious, like perceptual 
experiences, must therefore either have contents unlike the contents of other states 
(including subpersonal states and propositional attitude states); or the role that 
perceptual representations play in cognition must be different from the role played by 
the representations involved in propositional attitudes (remember that 
representationalists are for the most part functionalist-representationalists); or a bit of 
both. 
Concepts play a central role in the representationalist’s attempt to cash out the 
difference between the representational contents to which phenomenal characters are 
reducible (i.e., experiential contents) and the representational contents of 
propositional attitudes (most importantly, belief). Again this should come as no 




constituents of beliefs. Spelling out the difference between experiential contents and 
belief contents should therefore require saying something about the relation between 
experiential contents and concepts. Very generally, conceptualists about experiential 
contents will claim that the contents of experience are related to concepts in the way 
that belief is related to concepts. That is, experiential content, for the conceptualist, is 
importantly similar to belief content. Nonconceptualists, on the other hand, deny that 
experiential contents are related to concepts in the way that belief contents are: 
experiential contents, for the nonconceptualist, are importantly different from belief 
contents.  
 Ultimately, it also looks as though the relation between phenomenal contents 
and concepts will have an impact on what the representationalist can and should say 
about the relationship between experiential contents and the external world. Seeing 
why that is requires a detour through Inverted Earth.  
 
1.1. Inverted Earth detour 
Block (1990) presents a well-known argument against representationalist accounts of 
phenomenal characters. The argument requires that we imagine a duplicate of our 
world in which each thing is identical to each thing here on Earth except for its color, 
which is inverted. Every object on this Inverted Earth is the complementary color of 
its counterpart object here on Earth, such that ripe bananas on Inverted Earth are blue 
(not yellow), grass is red (not green), etc. We are asked to imagine an Earthling 
subject, let it be Sara, who is whisked away, unbeknownst to her, to Inverted Earth 
and equipped, while she travels, with a pair of inverting contact lenses. Here on Earth 




grass red etc. On Inverted Earth too they have this effect; however, since every thing 
there is the complementary of every thing here, the lenses, when worn by Sara on 
Inverted Earth, make every thing there look just as it would here: bananas yellow, 
grass green, etc. As a result, Sara, upon waking, notices nothing and lives out her life 
on Inverted Earth.  
Block makes the following two claims: 1) the phenomenal character or feel of 
Sara’s Inverted visual experience of a blue VW bug will stay the same as the 
phenomenal character of her visual experience of the blue bug on Earth; but 2) the 
phenomenal content of her Inverted blue bug experience will eventually switch from 
representing blueness (as it did on Earth) to representing yellowness (which is the 
real color of the bug on Inverted Earth). At some time t in her Inverted life, then, the 
phenomenal character of her bug experience will have the same phenomenal 
character as her Earth bug experience, though the experiences will not both have the 
same phenomenal content. Hence, we have sameness in phenomenal character 
without sameness in phenomenal content, and Block concludes that reductive 
representationalism must be false.  
1) The phenomenal character of Sara’s VW bug experience on Inverted Earth 
at t is the same as the phenomenal character of the experience she had of the 
counterpart bug on Earth.   
2) The phenomenal content of Sara’s VW bug experience on Inverted Earth at 
t is not the same as the phenomenal content of her Earth (counterpart) bug 
experience. 
3) Reductive representationalist must be false. 
 
A representationalist may attempt to resist Block’s conclusion by denying either of 
the argument’s two premises. The first—according to which the phenomenal 




remains the same—seems strongly intuitive. There is little reason to think that our 
subject’s visual system would undergo any major changes during her lifetime. If the 
inverted lenses continue to function throughout that lifetime, they will keep on 
transforming visual information in such a way that objects will keep looking to her as 
though they are the complementary of their “actual” colors. And, assuming that on 
Inverted Earth the bug remains, throughout her lifetime, the same color—i.e., the 
complementary color of its Earth counterpart—it seems as though the bug will keep 
looking to her like its counterpart on Earth would. However, since our intuitions 
sometimes get it wrong, some representationalists have toyed with the idea of arguing 
that we get it wrong here (see Tye 2000, 6.2 for an attempt at this sort of reply).  
It has seemed much easier, however, for representationalists to deny premise 
2), i.e., to deny that the content of Sara’s Inverted bug experience will eventually 
change. Block himself is quite willing to admit that premise 2) is true only if 
externalism about experiential content is true—more especially a particular kind of 
“causal” externalism, according to which the content of an experience depends on 
what causes it. If what causes Sara’s bug experience on Inverted Earth is a yellow 
bug, then a causal externalist might claim that her experience will represent 
yellowness. But, and this is the worrisome bit, Inverted Earth remains a problem for 
the representationalist even if we deny that (causal) externalism about phenomenal 
content is true. 
Block makes the claim that the contents of our subject’s color concepts would, 
like the content of her experience, shift after a while spent in her new environment—




so the content of any belief taking the concept BLUE as a constituent would shift along 
with it. Representationalists usually grant this, though they may not think it affects 
them much. After all, a shift in the content of a subject’s belief needn’t entail a shift 
in her experiential content, and it is the latter that the representationlist is most 
concerned with. But clearly, if experiential contents are (even partially) conceptual—
if they take, say, some concepts as constituents—then a shift in the contents of Sara’s 
concepts could result in a shift in her experiential contents. In fact, if phenomenal 
contents are conceptual, resisting the conclusion of Block’s argument will require that 
the representationalist argue not just that externalism is false of experiential content 
but that it is false of our concepts as well. Here are the live options for the 
representationalist:  
(1) She may argue that the content of experience is narrow and experience is 
wholly nonconceptual.   
(2) She may argue that the content of experience is narrow, that experience is 
wholly (or partly) conceptual, and that the content of concepts is (at least 
partly) narrow.  
 
The first strategy is, in some ways easier: it requires arguing for two claims only. It is 
the purpose of this chapter to determine not which looks easier (i.e., requires arguing 
for fewer claims), but which is most plausible, by spelling out what the relation 
between concepts and experiential contents might be.  
In any case, it should be clear that spelling out the relation between 
experiential contents and concepts is very important for the representationalist. Not 
merely because the representationalist needs to say something about the difference 
between experiential contents and other contents (like belief-contents), but also 




1.2. Plan of Part II 
We’ll begin the next section with a discussion of the debate between conceptualists 
and nonconceptualists—separating out possession conceptualists/nonconceptualists 
and constituent conceptualists/nonconceptualists. The distinction is crucial to the 
debate (see Byrne 2004, Bermudez and Cahen 2008, Speaks 2005). We’ll spend the 
rest of Part II showing that partial conceptualism is the best alternative by first 
considering the best arguments for nonconceptualism (section 3). I argue that they fail 
(though maybe not entirely). Though they make the case that conceptualism is false, 
they do not rule out the third alternative: partial conceptualism. In section 4, we’ll 
consider the best arguments against nonconceptualist accounts and present an 
argument from concept acquisition which I think succeeds. We’ll conclude with a 
discussion of partial conceptualism (section 5).  
 
2. The conceptual/nonconceptual debate 
 
The conceptual/nonconceptual debate is complex and multifaceted, yet this much 
seems relatively clear: the central disagreement between conceptualists and 
nonconceptualists is one about how similar experience and belief are. All proponents 
in the debate agree that experience, like belief, is a representational state involving a 




what, beyond this basic structure, experience and propositional attitudes have in 
common, especially when it comes to their relation to concepts.
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As mentioned earlier, conceptualists are those who think that experiences and 
beliefs are importantly similar; nonconceptualists deny that claim. It follows that 
taking a stand in this debate—as either a conceptualist or a nonconceptualist about 
experience—requires that one have, operative in the background, an account of belief 
and its relation to concepts. After all, what account one has of experience is defined 
in contrast to what one might say about belief: experience is either similar to or 
different from belief. Insofar as there is disagreement about belief and its relation to 
concepts, there is room for disagreement about what shape the 
conceptual/nonconceptual debate should take. Since at least two different relations 
between beliefs and concepts have figured prominently in the literature, there are at 
least two conceptual/nonconceptual debates. First, the debate between possession 
conceptualists and possession nonconceptualists; second, the debate between 
constituent conceptualists and constituent nonconceptualists.  
 
2.1 Possession conceptualism 
Here is the first proposal about the relation between beliefs and concepts: for a 
thinker to be able to have a particular belief (say, the belief that there is a banana on 
the table), she must possess the relevant concepts (at the very least, the concepts 
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BANANA and TABLE). This proposal about belief focuses on the conditions on belief: 
for a state to be a belief that there is a banana on the table, the believer herself must 
possess the relevant concepts. With this in mind, here is what we can say about 
experience. 
Possession conceptualists will say that the same is true of experience. In other 
words, the conceptualist claims that the conditions on experience are the same as the 
conditions on belief, such that for a perceiver to have a particular experience—to see 
that there is banana on the table—she must possess the relevant concepts BANANA and 
TABLE. If it turns out that Sara does not possess the concept BANANA, then her 
experience would be more accurately described as her seeing that there is a yellow 
object on the table. And if she doesn’t possess the concept YELLOW, the conceptualist 
would want to say that Sara sees that there is some colored object on the table. In 
characterizing what Sara perceives, we should be sensitive to how she apprehends the 
world. And the way she apprehends the world, the conceptualist adds, is a function of 
the concepts she possesses (see Bermudez and Cahen 2008).  
Possession nonconceptualists, however, maintain that Sara can be adequately 
described as seeing that there is a banana on the table, even if she does not possess the 
concept BANANA. Though possession nonconceptualists, like possession 
conceptualists, believe that in characterizing what Sara perceives we should be 
sensitive to the way in which she apprehends the world, they believe that the way she 
apprehends the world is not a function of the concepts she possesses. Tye and Crane 
are paradigm possession nonconceptualists. For Tye, to say that “a mental content is 




as theorists, exercise when we state the correctness conditions for that content” (Tye 
2000, 62). And Crane argues that a person “X is in a state with nonconceptual content 
iff X does not have to possess the concepts that characterize its content in order to be 
in that state“ (Crane 1992, 149). 
 
2.2. Constituent conceptualism 
The second proposal about the relation between concepts and beliefs is more directly 
one about what the constituents of the belief states are. This proposal can be spelt out 
at two different levels depending on yet another variable; namely, on one’s account of 
what concepts are. There are those (they might constitute a majority, as Byrne (2004) 
claims) who take concepts to be abstract constituents of propositions, and those (still 
prominent enough, see for instance Tye (1995, 2000) and Dretske (1981, 1995)) who 
take concepts to be mental representations of some particular sort.  These views were 
mentioned briefly in the introduction—as the semantic view of concepts and the 
psychological view of concepts (Laurence and Margolis 2007). We’ll now say a little 
more about them. 
 
2.2.1. The psychological and the semantic view of concepts 
The psychological view 
We mentioned the psychological view of concepts briefly in the introduction. 
According to it (Laurence and Margolis 2007), concepts are mental representations, 
which can be combined in various ways to form more complex representations. The 




representation GRASS IS GREEN—a representation I am belief-related to if I believe 
that grass is green. This view of concepts fits in nicely within the 
computational/representational theory of mind and this, combined with the fact that it 
can be used to account for the productivity of thought, “provides considerable 
motivation for adopting the psychological view of concepts”  (Laurence and Margolis 
2007, 5).  
Laurence and Margolis go on to defend this psychological view, but 
surprisingly, they say little about what makes a mental representation a concept. 
Presumably not all mental representations are concepts, even if all concepts are 
mental representations. At the very least, we will say, concepts are those mental 
representations that are the constituents of our propositional attitudes (like beliefs). 
Many claim concepts are mental representations that are stored in (long-term) 
memory (see also Tye 1995, 2000; Carruthers 2000, Machery 2005, Prinz 2007). Or 
that they are the mental representations used in the  “higher cognitive processes 
(categorization, inductive and deductive reasoning…, etc.)” (Machery 2005, 444).  
To say that concepts are the constituents of belief, on the psychological view, 
then, is to say that the mental representations we are belief-related to are the right 
kind of mental representations (the ones that are stored in memory, or used in higher 
cognitive processes).  
 
The semantic view 
According to the semantic view, concepts are abstract constituents of abstract objects, 




representation with the content [grass is green]. And one way to think of these 
contents is in terms of abstract objects (propositions), which are bearers of truth-value 
(they are either true or false) and mind-independent. Some go on to say (following in 
the footsteps of Frege; see Peacocke 1992, Zalta 2001) that these propositions are 
structured and, like sentences, are composed of more “basic” constituents. These 
more basic constituents are concepts. In line with the literature, we will call these 
abstract constituents Fregean senses.  
To say that beliefs take concepts as constituents, on the semantic view, means 
that the content of belief-representation will be a Fregean proposition—one that takes 
Fregean senses as constituents. With this in mind, some will say the following about 
experience.  
 
2.2.2. Constituent conceptualists vs. constituent nonconceptualists 
Constituent conceptualists will claim that the content of experience, like that of belief, 
is a Fregean proposition; or she may think that the mental representations a subject is 
experientially related to are composed of stored representations. Constituent 
nonconceptualists, on the other hand, will argue that experience is such that it takes 
radically different kinds of constituents. Experience may take as constituents actual 
objects or properties (as on the Russellian view) or possible worlds instead Fregean 
senses; or experience may take as constituent mental representations that do not play 
a role in reasoning instead of mental representation that play such a role.  
The debate between constituent nonconceptualists and constituent 




representation) involved in believing and experiencing. Constituent conceptualists 
argue that the contents of experience and belief are of the same kind such that the 
content of an experience could, in principle, be the content of a thought. Brewer, for 
instance, says: “a mental state with conceptual content […] is one whose content is 
the content of a possible judgment by the subject” (Brewer 2005, 217). Or to put it in 
terms of representations: constituent conceptualists argue that the representations 
subjects are related to when they experience (experience-representations for short) 
could be belief-representations. Constituent nonconceptualists, by contrast, argue that 
the content, or mental representations, involved in thinking and experiencing are of a 
different kind; the content of an experience could not be the content of a thought; an 
experience representation could not be a belief-representation.  
 
2.3. Differences 
It is important to note that these two debates are different debates, and the positions 
they carve out are different positions.  
 
2.3.1. The possession nonconceptualist 
For instance, it is possible for one to be a possession nonconceptualist while being 
either an constituent nonconceptualist or an constituent conceptualist. To see this, let 
us assume, along with the possession nonconceptualist, that our subject Sara can see 
that there is a banana on the table, even when she doesn’t possess the concept 
BANANA, or the concept TABLE, or any other relevant concept like the concept OBJECT, 




view, is to say that Sara cannot have beliefs in which these concepts figure as 
constituents. This view (possession nonconceptualism) is, naturally, compatible with 
constituent nonconceptualism: the fact that Sara cannot have thoughts in which the 
concept BANANA figures is perfectly compatible with Sara’s experience being such 
that concepts cannot figure in it at all. But, more importantly, possession 
nonconceptualism is compatible with constituent conceptualism. The fact that Sara 
cannot have beliefs in which the concept BANANA figures is perfectly compatible with 
Sara’s having experiences in which some concepts—maybe even the concept 
BANANA—figure. Concerns about which concepts a thinker possesses are concerns 
about which particular concepts can figure into that thinker’s beliefs. And the fact that 
particular concepts (i.e., BANANA or TABLE) can or cannot figure in a thinker’s beliefs 
does not entail anything about which particular concepts can or cannot figure in the 
thinker’s experience. Nor does it entail that no concepts whatever can figure in a 
thinker’s experience. Of course, this position is a strange one to occupy. Again, on 
this view, Sara might not be able to think that there is a banana on the table—the 
concept BANANA might not be able to figure in her beliefs. Yet the concept BANANA 
could figure in her experience. However odd the position, it is important to notice that 
it is an available, consistent option.  
Now it may be that possession nonconceptualists take themselves to be 
constituent nonconceptualists as well. For instance, they may assume that 
(A) if a particular concept cannot figure into a subject’s beliefs, then that concept 
cannot figure into the subject’s experience either.  
 
So, possession nonconceptualists believe that a subject can see that there is a banana 




concepts (BANANA, TABLE, YELLOW, FRUIT, OBJECT, etc.). But if (A) is true then, none 
of these relevant concepts would be able to figure in the subject’s experience either. 
If, however, no relevant concept can figure in a subject’s experience of a banana, it 
seems crazy to insist that experience still takes concepts as constituents—after all, 
what concepts would those be? Concepts that are irrelevant to the current experience, 
say the concept DEMORACY or ROBOT? Experience, we would have to say, is such 
that, whatever its constituents are, they aren’t concepts. In other words, it is 
absolutely nonconceptual. 
Possession nonconceptualism and assumption (A) might entail constituent 
nonconceptualism, but—and this is what matters here— possession 
nonconceptualism alone does not entail constituent nonconceptualism. And some 
writers (Byrne 2004, for instance) simply deny assumption (A). He concludes that 
even if a particular concept cannot figure into Sara’s thought, it is possible for that 
very concept to figure in her experience. It is possible, then, to be a possession 
nonconceptualist and a constituent conceptualist. 
 





Figure II.1 Possession nonconceptualism 
 
2.3.2. The possession conceptualist 
Possession conceptualism vs. constituent (non)conceptualism 
Possession conceptualism might be compatible with either constituent conceptualism 




conceptualist that subjects must possess (i.e., be able to think with) the concept 
BANANA to be able to see that there is a banana on the table. And notice that, by itself, 
the possession conceptualist thesis tells us nothing about whether or not it can take 
concepts as constituents. This is because the thesis doesn’t make any claims about 
why it is that a subject cannot see that there is a banana unless she possesses the 
concept BANANA.  
We may believe, for instance, that the possession conceptualist thesis holds 
because, unless a concept C that stand for some thing T can figure in thought, one 
cannot bear the experience relation to another (even nonconceptual) representation of 
T. In other words, we might think that, if Sara cannot think with the concept BANANA 
(if she cannot be “belief-related” to a complex mental representation of which 
BANANA is a constituent), then she cannot be experience-related to any complex 
representation which has as a constituent some representation of bananas, even if that 
representation is not the concept BANANA. I’m not sure why anyone would think that 
this is true. Still, the fact that it is available makes it such that possession 
conceptualism is compatible with constituent nonconceptualism.   
Of course, we could believe, rather more plausibly, that the possession 
conceptualist thesis holds because, unless a concept (like BANANA) can figure in 
belief, it cannot figure in experience. And if a concept for some thing cannot figure in 
experience, then a subject cannot see that there is that thing. In other words, we may 
believe that if Sara cannot think with the concept BANANA, then that concept cannot 
figure in her experience (notice that this is assumption (A) all over again). And if the 




way about the other concepts relevant to Sara’s thought) it follows that no relevant 
concept can be a constituent of Sara’s thought. This particular elaboration of the 
possession conceptualist view (as conjoined with (A)) entails constituent 
conceptualism: seeing that there is an X right there requires that a concept for that X 
figure into the perceiver’s experience of it. And this entails that concepts can be 
constituents of experience, which the constituent conceptualist believes is true. 
 




Possession Conceptualism  √ √ 
 
 
Figure II.2. Posession conceptualism 
 
 
Concept deployment: a complication 
We have assumed, so far, that possession conceptualism says the following: a subject 
can see that there is a banana on the table, only if she possesses (i.e., can think with) 
the concept BANANA. And this claim is made within the background of a claim about 
belief; namely, that a subject can believe that there is a banana on the table only if she 
possesses the concept BANANA. However, some possession conceptualists claim 
somewhat more than that about belief—as a result, what they say about experience is 
different too.  
Here is what some possession conceptualists think is true of belief: a subject 
can believe that there is a banana on the table, only if she 1) possess the concepts 
BANANA and TABLE and she 2) deploys those concepts in thought. The possession 




see that there is a banana on the table, only if Sara 1) possess the concepts BANANA 
and TABLE and she 2) deploys those concepts in experience (McDowell 1994, Brewer 
1999, and Sedivy 1996 are thought to be such possession conceptualists; see Siegel 
2005).  
What is it to deploy a concept, whether it be in thought or in experience? I 
take it that it requires that the concept in question actually figure in a belief or 
experience. Possessing a concept requires only that the concept be able to figure in 
someone’s thought—to say that Sara possesses the concept BANANA is to say that the 
concept BANANA can figure in her thought, that it has the capacity to figure in her 
thought. Deploying a concept requires more than this ability, it requires that the 
concept actually figure in a given thought. To say that Sara is deploying the concept 
BANANA in a thought is to say that the concept BANANA does actually figure in that 
thought.  
Understood this way, possession conceptualism is incompatible with 
constituent nonconceptualism. After all, possession conceptualism now claims that 
for Sara to see that there is a banana on the table, the concept BANANA 1) must be 
capable of figuring in Sara’s thought and 2) must actually figure in her experience. 
Sara’s experience, then, has to be such that it can take concepts as constituents. But 





















Figure II.3. Possession and deployment conceptualism 
 
2.4. Partial Conceptualism 
The rest of Part II will focus, for the most part, on the debate between constituent 
conceptualists and constituent nonconceptualists—in what follows, then, 
‘conceptualist’ and ‘nonconceptualist’ will mean constituent conceptualist and 
constituent nonconceptualist. Most discussions of the relation between concepts and 
experience have been between possession conceptualists and possession 
nonconceptualists—something which even those leading the discussions failed to 
realize until the last few years. Tye, for instance, wants to argue that experience has a 
different kind of content from belief—something constituent nonconceptualist 
believe—but his arguments for the conclusion have been, as he himself 
acknowledged (see Tye 2005), arguments for possession nonconceptualism.  
 It will be more important for the purposes of the representationalist to say 
something about whether or not concepts can be the constituents of experience. As 
mentioned in the introduction, the Inverted Earth thought-experiment will affect the 
representationalist differently depending on what she says about concepts as 




What has been said so far may have given the reader the impression that the 
conceptual/nonconceptual debate is a debate between two rival views of experience. 
This impression is misleading: there is a third option available, and it is the option I 
favor and will defend in Part II. We’ll call this third alternative partial conceptualism 
though it could just as well be called partial nonconceptualism. Like the other two 
accounts, partial conceptualism about experience can be construed either at the level 
of representations or at the level of content. We can say, then, that according to partial 
conceptualism, the content of experience is a hybrid content, one that can take two 
different forms. In the first form, the content of experience includes at least two kinds 
of propositions: a Fregean proposition and a proposition that isn’t Fregean, in which 
case we can think of the content of experience as layered, with a Fregean layer and 
another—say Russellian—layer. Or, if one wants to deny that there are independent 
“layers” of experience in this way, we can think of the content of an experience as 
one proposition with two kinds of constituents: some Fregean constituents and some 
other kinds of constituents.
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 Alternatively, we can say that, according to partial 
conceptualism, the mental representations subjects are experientially related to take 
two kinds of constituents: first, those “basic” mental representations that are stored 
and processed in the right way (i.e., concepts); second, other mental representations 
that can’t be constituents of thoughts.  
Interestingly enough, the literature itself often makes the 
conceptual/nonconceptual debate look as though there are only two live options. As a 
result, arguments for nonconceptualism are often merely arguments against 
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conceptual accounts, and they fail to rule out partial conceptualism.
55
 Similarly, 
arguments for conceptualism are often arguments against nonconceptualist accounts, 
and they too fail to rule out partial conceptualism.
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 Byrne (2005) adds that 
conceptualism should be the default position in this debate. It is not obvious why that 
would be: most may agree that thought is conceptual, but it is hard to see, without 
argument, why the reasons for believing thought to be conceptual necessarily apply to 
experience. Byrne is right, of course, when he says that “all parties agree, in effect, 
that perceiving is very much like a traditional propositional attitude, such as believing 
or intending” (23). We have acknowledged the fact that proponents in the debate all 
agree that thinking and experiencing involve 1) a relation to 2) a mental 
representation 3) with a certain content. The meaty question, however, is what, 
beyond this structure, experience and thought share. And I fail to see how the mere 
fact that they share this representational structure gives us a reason to think that the 
mental representations involved, or the contents involved, are of the same kind.  
In any case, now that we have a better grip on the relevant distinctions, let’s 
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2001). 
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3. The case for nonconceptualism 
 
As mentioned earlier, arguments presented in support of nonconceptualism are, for 
the most part, simply arguments against conceptualism. In this section, we’ll look at 
three strands of argument for nonconceptualism (or against conceptualism): first, the 
least consequential of these arguments, i.e., the argument from continuity (3.1); then 
an argument from systematicity (3.2.); and finally the argument from richness and 
fineness of grain (3.3).  
This last argument (section 3.3) is complex. An elaboration of it requires 
discussing some of the important moves made in response to the initial arguments by 
conceptualists, and the replies offered, in turn, by nonconceptualists. Those 
nonconceptualist replies amount to, naturally, more arguments against conceptualism. 
And though they could be discussed separately (as in Speaks 2005), they are best 
understood when located within the larger discussion of richness and fineness of 
grain. In any case, the upshot is that section 3.3, though it presents one type of 
argument against conceptualism, really sets out several arguments against it.  
 
3.1. Continuity 
The argument from continuity is perhaps the least convincing argument against 
conceptualism, but it is worth rehearsing. It starts with a claim that is intuitive 
enough; namely, that 1) non-human animals (at the very least primates, but including 
possibly other mammals) have perceptual systems not altogether unlike ours. It 




say it is plausible that some of the representations (or contents) that make up our 
perceptual states are shared by non-human animals. However, the argument 
continues, 3) non-human animals do not possess any concepts. This leads to 4) the 
content of their perceptual states must be nonconceptual, then, since they are contents 
that can be had even when one does not possess any corresponding concept. It 
follows that 5) some of the representations (contents) that make up our perceptual 
states (those we have in common with non-human animals) are nonconceptual.  
 There are several things to note here. First, the argument’s conclusion is 
explicitly not that human perceptual states are wholly nonconceptual. At most, the 
argument, if it succeeds, shows that human perceptual states are partially 
nonconceptual. Peacocke himself writes: “It follows that some perceptual 
representational content is nonconceptual” (2001, 613-4). Second, the argument as 
presented here (and in the literature) is an argument against possession 
conceptualism: its conclusion is that it is possible to have perceptual representations 
(contents) without possessing any of the relevant concepts, as is the case (according 
to premise 3)) with non-human animals and infants. But the mere fact that possession 
conceptualism is false (in the case of animal’s perceptual states) does not entail that 
constituent conceptualism is also false. (In section 2.3.1. we saw that possession 
nonconceptualism is compatible with constituent conceptualism.) In fact, it is part of 
Byrne’s constituent conceptualist strategy, in this case, to grant that possession 
nonconceptualism is true for animals; to grant, that is, that animals can see that there 




argue that the perceptual states of animals could be made up of concepts nonetheless 
(as the constituent conceptualism claims they are). 
One might reasonably hold [that animals don’t possess concepts] together 
with the view that perceptual content, in humans and lower animals, is the 
same kind of content that can believed—hence denying [the argument’s 
conclusion] (Byrne 2005, 10). 
Unfortunately, in some respects, Byrne’s position is slightly odder than he himself 
has realized. For the argument from continuity takes as a premise the claim that 
animals do not possess any concepts. Which presumably means that animals cannot 
think with any concepts, and therefore that their “belief” states (whatever those are) 
cannot take concepts as constituents. It is rather strange to maintain, as Byrne would 
have to if he grants the premises of the continuity argument (as he seems to), that the 
perceptual states of animals take concepts as constituents while their belief states do 
not.  
 In any case, the claim gets a bit stranger, I think, if we remember that to claim 
that a perceptual state is conceptual or nonconceptual is to contrast it with belief.  But 
presumably we shouldn’t contrast perceptual states with anyone’s belief. Human 
perceptual states are nonconceptual if they turn out to be unlike human belief—
conceptual if they are like human belief. So we might think that the perceptual states 
of non-human animals are nonconceptual if they turn out to be unlike animal belief—
and conceptual if they turn out to be like animal belief. And according to premise 3), 
animal belief doesn’t take concepts as constituents. So if animal perceptual states do 
take concepts as constituents, then their perceptual states are, it turns out, unlike their 
beliefs (they take different kinds of constituents), and hence their perceptual states 




 Of course, this is merely a technicality, and it shouldn’t worry Byrne at all. 
For as long as perceptual content in animals is the kind of content that can be believed 
by a human being, the conclusion of the argument from continuity can be blocked. 
For it can then be true that humans and animals share part of their perceptual 
contents, and that they don’t possess any concepts—even while it is false to conclude 
that the content that we share is nonconceptual. 
 In any case, we now come to another worry about this argument: why assume 
that non-human animal thought is so drastically unlike human thought, as premise 3) 
would have us do? Though the first and second premise of the argument (that non-
human animals have perceptual systems and states at least in part like ours) are 
widely believed to be true, the same cannot be said of the third premise. The claim 
that animal thought is drastically unlike human thought—if it should count as thought 
at all—is controversial enough to raise doubts about the success of the argument. 
Moreover, if we have reason to believe that animal thought is so unlike human 
thought that it doesn’t deserve to be called thought—maybe we should call it proto-
thought (see Byrne)—,why think that animal perception is so much like human 
perception that they share some content? “If lower animals merely proto-think”, 
Byrne asks, “why don’t they merely proto-perceive?” (10) 
 
3.2. Systematicity 
Fodor (1975, 1988, 1990) famously noted that human thought is productive and 
systematic.  This gives us reason, he argued, to make a claim about the kinds of 




experience is systematic—denying thereby that we have reason to think that the kinds 
of representations involved in experiencing are the same kind of representations 
involved in thinking. This is, in essence, one of Tye’s arguments for 
nonconceptualism (see especially his 1995). 
 Productivity was mentioned in the introduction. Thought is productive 
because we seem able to entertain an infinite number of new thoughts, like the 
thought that purple giraffes take their time while bowling. But given that we are finite 
beings, there is no way that we could store an infinite number of representations. We 
can, however, explain productivity by positing a finite set of “simpler” 
representations and a system to combine and recombine them. Thought is also 
systematic in the following way: the ability to think certain thoughts will be 
systematically connected with the ability to think certain other thoughts. Consider the 
thought that Mary loves John. No native speaker of English will have the ability to 
think that Mary loves John without also having the ability to think that John loves 
Mary. We can generalize and say that having the ability to think any thought with 
content p entails having the ability to think thoughts with contents L(p) where L(p) 
are the logical permutations of p (Rey 1997). This ability is best explained, we might 
think, by an underlying sentential representational structure: thinking that Mary loves 
John involves the tokening of a complex mental representation with a simpler 
component “corresponding to” John, one “corresponding to” Mary, and one 
“corresponding to” the two-place predicate love. Thinking that John loves Mary 
involves the tokening of the same three representations, combined differently.
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 Thoughts are also systematic in a somewhat different way, i.e., inferentially. Not only is the ability 




Tye argues that there are two reasons for thinking that the constituents of 
experience are unlike those of thought (and propositional attitudes more generally). 
First “there are no general systematic connections between pains of the sort found in 
thought” (1995, 120); second, unlike thought, “pain is not productive; we cannot 
generate endlessly many new kinds of pain in the way that we can generate endlessly 
many new thoughts” (ibid).  This is not Tye’s only argument. For, he adds, scientific 
evidence supports an alternative view about the representational structure of 
experience. So, he says, “we know that in visual perception, the retinal image is 
reconstructed in the visual cortex, so that in quite a literal sense adjacent parts of the 
cortex represent adjacent parts of the retinal image.” What’s more, “topographic 
organization of this sort is also found in the somatosensory cortex. There is, for 
example, an orderly topographic representation of the surface of the human body that 
is dedicated to touch” (1995, 120). He concludes that perceptual representations are 
“patterns of active (or filled) cells occurring in topographically structured three-
dimensional arrays or matrices” (1995, 121). (See also his 1991.) We can think of the 
activity in a given cell as “representing (in the manner of a simple symbol) that there 
is tissue damage at the body region to which the cell is dedicated” (ibid). The case 
can be generalized for color perception and, ultimately, to any experience. Tye 
therefore concludes that experiential representations are unlike belief representations: 
their constituents are quite different. The simple symbols that represent damage at a 
certain body region are not concepts—they aren’t stored memory representations.  
                                                                                                                                           
“John loves Mary”), but the ability to make certain inferences is systematically connected to the ability 
to make certain others. No one can infer P from P&Q&R without also being able to infer P from P&Q 




Tye’s argument for nonconceptualism isn’t very convincing. Though Tye 
claims that experience, unlike belief, isn’t systematic, it is far from obvious that he’s 
right. After all, there are different kinds of pain—diffuse pains, stabbing pains, 
pressing pains—and it may well be the case that the having the ability to experience a 
stabbing headache requires the ability to experience stabbing toothaches or other sorts 
of pains (assuming one can experience toothaches at all). This may amount to some 
sort of systematicity. And even if the case for systematicity is hard to make for pains, 
it seems quite easy to make for visual experiences (I take it the same applies to 
auditory and tactile experiences): a creature who can see a red square and a blue 
circle will in all likelihood also be able to see a blue square and a red circle. Some 
even try to make the case that bee representations are systematic (Tetzlaff and Rey, 
forthcoming). The experimental data seems to suggest, Tetzlaff and Rey argue, that 
bees have a number of systematic states, such that if they represent the hive as a 
certain angle x from the feeder, then they can represent the feeder as being at that 
very angle x from the hive. Now, these representations may not be “perceptual” 
representations of the bees; rather, they may be thoughts—this is how Tetzlaff and 
Rey think of them at least. Still, if it turns out that bees have systematic (thought-) 
representations despite the relative simplicity of their brains, then it seems plausible 
that our extremely more complex visual system would have such representations too.  
 
3.3. Richness and fineness of grain 
The argument from richness and fineness of grain is perhaps the best-known 




granted by both nonconceptualists and conceptualists. Experience is rich and fine-
grained; that much isn’t really contentious. The disagreement is rather a disagreement 
about whether conceptualists have the resources to account for the richness and 
fineness of grain of experience. What is it, then to say that experience is rich and fine-
grained? 
 
  3.3.1. Rich and fine-grained 
The claim that experience is rich isn’t the claim that experience is as rich as we 
sometimes think it is. The latter claim is controversial; the former much less so. So, it 
may seem to us as though our experience is like a high resolution digital picture, as 
though, every thing before us—the banana, the table, etc.—is represented exactly, in 
sharp detail. Much data suggests that experience isn’t quite that rich and that detailed: 
drastic changes made to scenes we are perceiving can go unnoticed if attention isn’t 
directed the right way (see for instance Simons and Chabris 1999). If our experience 
really were so rich, we would, it seems, notice a difference immediately. But being 
skeptical about what some call the “picture-view” of experience (see Dennett 1991, 
O’Regan 1992, Noe and O’Regan (2002)) isn’t quite being skeptical that experience 
is rich in the sense that matters for the conceptual/nonconceptual debate. For the 
claim here is simply that experience is richer than thought, not that it is as rich as a 
picture. The richness claim, then, is this: Sara’s experience of a banana on a table is 
richer than her thought that there is a banana on the table. Her thought contains 
information only about the banana and its general location relative to the table. Her 




more than just that: it necessarily contains information as to whether the banana is on 
the right side of the table, or on the left, or in the center; whether the banana is 
yellow, or spotted, or black or green, etc.
58
 In that sense, then, experience is rich.  
Experience is also considered to be fine-grained; that is, it represents precise 
and determinate properties, relations, etc., in a way that thought does not. Sara’s 
experience represents the banana as being at an exact place on the table, not just 
generally on the left or on the right, but exactly this far from a particular edge. Her 
experience represents the color of the banana as being a determinate shade of 
yellow—say, yellow17—and not just any yellow.   
Richness and fineness of grain are quite different features of experience—
though they are often (and for good reason, as we’ll see) discussed together. It is 
worth noticing, for instance, that they could come apart: experience could be fine-
grained without being rich—and vice versa. An experience of a uniformly yellow 
wall may be not be rich—at least not compared to most experiences we undergo. 
(Though it might be richer than the corresponding thought that the room is yellow, 
since it would represent the location of one’s body with respect to the walls in the 
room, etc.) Still, the experience can be fine-grained, for it is a particular shade of 
yellow that the room is represented as having. Similarly, experience could be rich 
without being fine-grained, as when Sara’s experience of the banana represents it as 
being on the left side of the table and green. Neither of those properties are specified 
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in the corresponding (simple) thought that the banana is on the table (so the 




  3.3.2. The arguments: a first pass 
To say that experience is rich, then, is to say that it is richer than thought. To say that 
experience is fine-grained, is to say that it is fine-grained in a way that thought is not. 
Making both of these claims, then, involves drawing a contrast between experience 
and thought as nonconceptualists want to do. Here is one way to get from richness to 
nonconceptualism: 
(1) Experience is richer than thought. 
(2) Since experience is richer than thought, there must be times when experience 
represents a property for which a thinker possesses no concept. 
(3) Therefore, there must be times when experience is nonconceptual. 
 
And here is how we get from fineness of grain to nonconceptualism: 
(1) Experience is more fine-grained than thought, i.e., it represents properties like 
yellow17. 
(2) Often, subjects do not possess concepts that are fine-grained enough, concepts 
like YELLOW17.  
(3) Therefore, experience sometimes represents properties for which a subject 
does not possess a concept, i.e., experience is sometimes nonconceptual. 
 
First, we should notice that these arguments are not arguments for the conclusion that 
experience is always nonconceptual. At the most, these show that experience is 
sometimes nonconceptual. Second, like the continuity argument, these arguments are 
arguments against possession conceptualism, and explicitly so. The point is that 
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 It is not clear, however, that our experience can fail to be fine-grained at least when it comes to 
certain properties: representing something to be yellow, it would seem, requires that I represent it as 
being a certain particular shade of yellow. It may be that some experiences of shape can fail to be fine-





experience represents more properties than one may possess concepts for, or 
properties that are so fine-grained that one obviously doesn’t possess concepts for 
them. If the arguments succeed, they show, at most, that possession conceptualism is 
false. This last point has driven those interested in the debate between constituent 
nonconceptualists and constituent nonconceptualists to quickly dismiss the richness 
and fineness of grain arguments. After all, it is possible, on the constituent 
conceptualist view, for a concept to figure in experience even if it cannot figure in 
thought (i.e., even if the subject in question does not possess it, that is, cannot think 
with it). So even if experience is so rich that it represents a property (say the property 
being an antelope) for which Sara doesn’t possess a concept (she can’t think with the 
concept ANTELOPE), nothing prevents that very concept from figuring in her 
experience, if not in her thought. Likewise, her experience might be so fine-grained 
that it represents yellow17 even while Sara does not possess the concept YELLOW17 
(i.e., cannot think with the concept YELLOW17). However, nothing prevents YELLOW17 
from figuring in Sara’s experience, if not in her thought. For these reasons, Byrne and 
Speaks conclude that “the richness [/fineness of grain] of experience is not relevant to 
the question of whether the contents of perception are absolutely nonconceptual” (7). 
This dismissal, however, is too quick; fineness of grain and richness do pose a 
challenge for the constituent conceptualist. 
 
 3.3.3. Against constituent conceptualism: a second pass 
This second version of the argument from fineness of grain is easiest to see on the 




that the complex mental representations a subject is experientially related to are made 
up exclusively of concepts. But concepts—on the psychological view—are mental 
representations of the right kind. And there seems to be general agreement among 
representationalists that the “right kind” of mental representation will be, at the very 
least, a “stored memory representation, which one brings to bear in an appropriate 
manner (by, for example, activating the representation and applying it to the sensory 
input)” (Tye 1995, 139). Carruthers, in that spirit, writes that, so far as he is 
concerned, concepts are “discrete, memorable, recombinable components of thoughts 
and judgments, whose tokenings in thought will play an important role in inference” 
(2000, 135). After all, the constituents of thought must be able to support inferences, 
and this can be done only if two token mental representations can be recognized (re-
identified) as being two tokens of the same type. This is true of very simple 
computing machines. Imagine, then, a machine that can compute modus ponens:  
For example, if it encountered “Fa” and “Fa→Gb” on the input portion, it 
would print out “Gb” on the output portion; and it would do so for any such 
physical patterns that entokened well-formed sentences in the language (Rey, 
213). 
Clearly, such a machine can compute modus ponens only if it is able to identify the 
two tokens of ‘Fa’ as tokens of the same type. The machine must “remember”. If 
concepts are mental representations, then, they better be stored mental 
representations. And the constituent conceptualist is now in trouble, for she finds 
herself making the highly implausible claim that every property represented in 
experience—for instance yellow17—is represented conceptually, i.e., by a stored 
mental representation. The claim simply seems to go against the empirical data, 




re-identified by subjects even seconds after the initial experience (see Hurvich (1981) 
and Raffman (1996)). We discussed this somewhat in Part I: Sara might single out, on 
a chart, a paint chip of just the color she would like for her living room. But she is 
clumsy, drops the chart, and, upon staring at it again, finds herself unable to re-
identify the shade she had selected just a few seconds earlier. The empirical facts 
suggest, as Tye puts it, that “normal perceivers typically have no schema in memory 
for red29 or red32” (104), though these properties are nonetheless represented in their 
experience.
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 We may reformulate the argument from fineness of grain as follows: 
(1) A concept is a stored mental representation 
(2) Empirical data suggests that fine-grained properties represented in experience 
aren’t represented by stored mental representations. 
(3) Empirical data suggests that fine-grained properties represented in experience 
aren’t represented by concepts. 
(4) Therefore, experience isn’t wholly conceptual.  
There may be an argument from richness here as well. After all, memory, like all 
cognitive resources, is limited. If every property that is represented in experience did 
get stored, as the conceptualist would claim it must, it would quickly create an 
“information overload” (Tye 2005, 520). Experience is rich enough that it seems 
impossible, computationally, for all the information represented to be stored in 
memory without severely hindering the functioning of the system as a whole. We 
may conclude that if some properties represented in experience aren’t represented by 
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 This is true even of those who claim to have a photographic memory. The technical term used in the 
scientific literature is eidetic memory (see Palmer 1999, 593). Subjects with eidetic memory can scan a 
picture for 30 seconds or so, but after it has been removed, they claim to see it, still, in all its vividness 
and detail. Eidetic memories seem to be unlike other mental images. They are unlike afterimages; they 
don’t move around as subjects move their eyes, and subjects “typically experience them as ‘outside the 
head’” (Palmer 1999, 593). There is, however, a fair amount of skepticism about the accuracy of 
eidetic memory. Though it is good, it is far from perfect. Subjects will not remember every detail of 
the scene; in fact, they sometimes “make up” details. Moreover, the data does not suggest that subjects 




stored mental representations, they cannot be wholly represented by concepts, and 
conceptualism must be false. The argument can be outlined as follows: 
(1) A concept is a stored mental representation 
(2) Experience is so rich that, at some point, it is bound to represent a property for 
which there is no stored mental representation. 
(3) At some point, some representations in experience won’t be concepts. 
(4) Therefore, experience isn’t wholly conceptual.  
This kind of argument can be leveled at constituent conceptualism even if the 
constituent conceptualist in question takes concepts to be, not mental representations, 
but abstract constituents of propositions. For even though concepts are, on this view, 
abstract entities, we may believe—as even McDowell himself does—that for these 
Fregean senses to truly be concepts, they need to be associated with an ability, on the 
part of the thinker, to re-identify the property later on in time.  
What ensures that [something] is a concept—what ensures that thoughts that 
exploit it have the necessary distance from what would determine them to be 
true—is that the associated capacity can persist into the future, if only for a 
short time. (1995, 57) 
Since it seems empirically false that the abstract constituents of experiential content 
are associated with a capacity to re-identify the property yellow17 or yellow18 even a 
short time into the future, then it would seem that constituent conceptualism is false.  
 Though these arguments do spell trouble for the constituent conceptualist, 
there is a straight-forward reply available to her. Remember that constituent 
conceptualism is the view according to which whatever the constituents of experience 
turn out to be, they are possible constituents of belief. The fineness of grain and 
richness arguments show that all the constituents of experience cannot be concepts, 
but it isn’t obvious that all the constituents of belief are concepts either. If it turns out 




representations—then experience can take these latter representations as constituents 
as well and be wholly conceptual. Demonstratives seem like the best candidates for 
these constituents of belief. 
 
  3.3.4. Demonstratives 
Demonstratives usually play the following role in the conceptual/nonconceptual 
debate: they are used by possession conceptualists as a reply to the argument from 
richness leveled against them. According to the possession conceptualist, one cannot 
experience some property p unless one possesses a concept for p. But if experience is 
rich, then it represents properties (yellow17) for which a subject will possess no 
concept. The demonstrative possession conceptualist reply is this: subjects may not 
possess general concepts for every property represented by their rich experience (like 
yellow17), but they could possess a demonstrative for each property. Experience, it 
turns out, could represent the very many properties it represents demonstratively.  
 The role that I want demonstratives to play here is not quite the same. The 
goal is to see whether we can use demonstratives to rescue (temporarily, at least) the 
constituent conceptualist by claiming that demonstratives might be those constituents 
of thought that do not require being stored in memory. This may strike those familiar 
with the debate between possession conceptualist and possession nonconceptualist as 
odd. After all, one important objection to the possession conceptualist’s 
demonstrative move is to insist that demonstratives, like general concepts, require 
memory storage. McDowell makes this a requirement: demonstratives are 




by the thinker to re-identify the object that falls under the demonstrative (see also 
Kelly 2001). But if it turns out that demonstratives, like concepts, require memory 
storage, then they can be of no use to the constituent conceptualist. The constituent 
conceptualist, that is, must deny that there is a re-identification condition on 
demonstrative concepts. In fact, she may have to deny that demonstratives are, strictly 
speaking, concepts. This, as already mentioned, does not take away from the 
conceptualist essence of the view: for as long as demonstratives—whether or not they 
are concepts—are constituents of belief, the constituent conceptualist can allow for 
them to be constituents of experience. (Remember that the constituent conceptualist’s 
claim is that experience takes the same constituents as belief, no matter what the 
constituents of the latter are.) 
 So, the conceptualist does not need to hold on to the re-identification 
condition on demonstratives. What’s more, the re-identification condition seems 
much too strong for demonstratives. Kelly’s (2001) defense of the condition is not 
very convincing. Imagine, he says, that Sara is presented with triangle-square pairs, 
the triangle always being presented on her left and the square on her right. When 
asked whether these are the same shapes, Sara consistently answers no. After this task 
is completed, she is shown ten triangles in a row. Each time, she is asked the same 
question: is this the same shape you saw earlier on your left? Half the time Sara 
answers that it is, half the time that it isn’t. Though she can clearly discriminate 
between a triangle and a square when they are presented simultaneously, Sara cannot 
re-identify a triangle when presented with one. The right conclusion, Kelly argues, is 




explain her behavior in various ways, it is “impossible for us to allow that such a 
person possesses the concept expressed by the phrase ‘that shape’ (said while 
pointing to what is in fact a triangle)” (Kelly 2001, 13). 
Kelly’s conclusion doesn’t quite follow. Sara can think, while sitting at the 
circus watching a tiger jump through a fiery hoop, that this tiger is amazing. And of 
course, there may be no way she could reliably re-identify said tiger, no matter how 
quickly after entertaining her thought she was asked to do it. After all, all tigers look 
pretty much the same to her, and as she watches this one perform she is not paying 
attention to those features of it which would help her tell it apart from other tigers. 
We can extend this case, it seems, from token demonstratives like THIS TIGER to type-
demonstratives. The demonstrative expression Sara utters at the circus refers to the 
token tiger she is pointing to, but demonstrative expressions like THIS SHADE or THIS 
SHAPE demonstrate a type. When Sara thinks that this shade would be pretty on her 
living room walls, she is not thinking about the particular token patch of color she is 
currently looking at. She means to refer to its shade, and she is thinking that she 
wishes that it (the shade) could be the shade of her living room walls too. Similarly, 
when we have thoughts about this shape, we aren’t usually thinking about the 
particular token triangle, say, but about its shape, which can be the shape of many 
other things. Thinking about types (using type-demonstratives in thought) doesn’t 
seem to require that we be able to re-identify the type demonstrated any more than 
thinking about tokens does. I can think, while at the hardware store, that I want this 
shade for my living room walls even if there is no way I could ever re-identify the 




experiment. She may think that this shape is magical (pointing to a triangle), though 
she can’t in fact re-identify that shape again. What makes Sara’s triangle case so 
puzzling, unlike the hardware store one, is that the difference between a triangle and a 
square is so salient to us it is hard to imagine what must be going on in the mind of 
someone who can’t tell the difference between them. But again, we seem to have no 
problem at all grasping this sort of thing in the case of color—or even of very 
intricate shapes. 
For the purposes of Part II, we will take demonstratives to be constituents of 
thought that need not be stored in memory. Determinate color shades and all the 
many properties represented in experience, the conceptualist will claim, are 
represented demonstratively.  
 
Two problems for the demonstrative view 
Demonstrative accounts have faced a number of criticisms; we’ll review two of them 
now. First, Sean Kelly (2001) argues that demonstratives are too “coarse-grained” to 
do the work that conceptualists want them to do. Kelly argues that demonstrative 
accounts cannot account for the fact that experience is situation-dependent: a 
uniformly colored white wall will, depending on lighting for instance, look slightly 
different shades. At sunset, it might in fact look orange; at any given time, that wall 
will look off-white, gray, light yellow, say.
61
 How can this experience be captured 
demonstratively? After all, any demonstrative pointing to the color of the wall will 
have the same content: the wall is uniformly colored. If there is one property (here a 
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 It is interesting to notice, actually, that the wall does, in some sense, look white. It sometimes takes 
work to come to see that, though the wall is uniformly white, it actually does look yellow or shades of 




color property), then all the demonstratives in experience will be pointing to it and 




Misrepresentation and hallucinations also seem problematic for demonstrative 
accounts. We might wonder, the argument goes, what happens when a subject 
hallucinates a banana. What is the content of the demonstrative in the subject’s 
experience? After all there is no yellow there to be “picked up” by the demonstrative. 
It would therefore seem to be empty. Moreover, we might wonder how to explain an 
experience that misrepresents a yellow banana as green, say. If a demonstrative points 
directly to features of the world, it would seem that the content of the misperceiver’s 
color demonstration and the content of a normal subject’s demonstration would be the 
same. After all, the ‘this’ points to objective yellow in both cases. 
 
Why pointers can’t do the job 
The pointer demonstrative account might appear promising, but I’ll now argue that it 
fails to provide a real option for the conceptualist. Here is why: though 
demonstratives in experience and demonstratives in thought are pointers, and hence, 
in that respect mental constituents of the same kind, they aren’t enough of the same 
kind. There are, after all, many ways of typing any two things. A banana and a loaf of 
bread are of the same kind in that they are both edible foodstuffs, but they are of 
different kinds in that a banana is a fruit while a loaf of bread is not. And so it goes 
for any two pointers. A pointer in experience and a pointer in belief are of the same 
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kind in that they are both pointers. In fact, some might want to claim that there are 
pointers within the encapsulated visual system. Pylyshyn (2003) posits visual tags, 
which he calls FINSTs and which he compares to demonstrative pointers. FINSTs are 
deployed by the early visual system (pre-attentively) to track proto-objects. In some 
respects, then, a FINST, a pointer in experience, and a pointer in belief are all of the 
same kind. But the conceptualist doesn’t care about just any which way of typing the 
constituents of experience: for instance, it isn’t enough that the constituents of 
experience, like the constituents of thought, are mental representations and hence, in 
that respect, the same kind of things. The constituents of experience have to be 
enough like the constituents of thought that they (the constituents of experience) 
could, in principle, be constituents of thought. It isn’t enough to say, then, that 
demonstratives in experience are pointers and hence, that they are, in some way, like 
demonstratives in thought. The conceptualist must further argue that the pointers in 
experience are so similar to those in thought that pointers that are now in experience 
could, in principle, become constituents of thought. FINSTs, though they are pointers, 
aren’t the right kind of pointers—for surely they could not, even in principle, be 
constituents of thought. This isn’t to say that the deployment of FINSTs within early 
vision isn’t necessary for the deployment of demonstratives in thought. Still, the two 
pointers are of a different kind, such that a FINST couldn’t figure in thought, for 
FINSTs are characterized (at least partly) functionally: they are the immediate (and 
mostly automatic) outputs of a mechanism that “is related to focal attention but is 
more primitive and operates earlier in the information-processing stream.” They 




proto-objects, in order subsequently to determine certain of their properties” 
(Pylyshyn 2003, 201). Demonstratives in thought may be pointers, but they are not 
the immediate, mostly automatic, outputs of the FINST mechanism. Their role is not 
to allow the visual system to pick out some number of proto-objects so that their 
properties can be determined. So FINSTs are pointers of the wrong kind, in that they 
could not be, even in principle, constituents of thought.  
Pointers in experience, like FINSTs, are the wrong kind of pointers. First, 
because it seems plausible that pointers in experience, like FINSTs, should be 
characterized at least partly functionally. Rey (1997) suggests that representations in 
experience, unlike those in thought, enter into “characteristic processing” as a result 
of being “parameterized in specific ways.” In experience a pointer to a shade will be 
parameterized for “hue, lightness, saturation and relative position”, whereas the 
concept YELLOW (or the concept YELLOW17) figuring in Sara’s belief isn’t so 
parameterized and, as result, doesn’t enter into characteristic processing.  
Second, pointers in experience do not point to the same sort of mental 
representation as do demonstratives in thought. Demonstratives in thought point to 
experiential representations; demonstratives in experience point to some prior 
representation—say, a feature map. One could not “pluck”, as it were, a pointer from 
one program and insert it into another—the same goes here. One cannot pluck a 
pointer in experience and insert it, even in principle, into thought. And it won’t help 
the conceptualist to argue that pointers in experience and pointers in thought point to 
the same representation. Imagine for a moment that pointers in experience, like 




pointers in experience can’t point to more pointers in experience. They must, that is, 
point to a “part” of experience that isn’t itself demonstrative. But what kinds of 
constituents will that part of experience take, if not demonstratives? The 
conceptualist’s only possible answer is: more concepts. But what concepts? Not 
demonstratives; but certainly not general concepts either. (After all, if pointers in 
experience “pointed to” general concepts, then it’s not clear that an appeal to pointers 
could capture fineness of grain.) If that is right, though, the relevant part of 
experience would have to be nonconceptual—something the conceptualist isn’t 
willing to accept.   
 Finally, the kind of mental pointing that goes on in belief seems importantly 
connected with attention.
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 Levine writes: “the point is, when I demonstrate that fly 
on the wall, visually attending to it seems to be an essential component of the 
process” (online, 13, emphasis mine). Chuard claims that there is an attention 
constraint on demonstratives: “if a subject S forms a demonstrative concept C for a 
property f, S is able to focus her attention on an instance of f in her perceptual field” 
(2006, … see also Evans 1982). However, the mental pointers that the conceptualist 
claims figure in experience do not seem related to attention in the same way. In a 
number of cases, it seems as though some properties are represented in experience 
without a subject’s attention being directed at them. Here are two examples (the first 
is from Chuard, under review). 
 First, consider Sara, who is back at the paint store, looking at a color chart. 
She has focused her attention on the color chip whose color is the one she thinks she 
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wants for her living room. Yet, as she looks intently at that color chip, her experience 
does not stop representing the shade of the chips closest to her focus of attention. That 
is, these shades remain represented in her experience, despite the fact that Sara is not 
focusing her attention on them. Or consider the case of situation-dependency we 
discussed earlier. A uniformly white wall will actually look (at any one time) light 
gray here, and then light yellow there, and then dark gray. But this is something 
which subjects might not notice until their attention is drawn to it (when they first 
take a painting class, say). Presumably, their experience represents these various 
shades even before they take a painting class. This is why, I take it, novice painters 
sometimes try to render the wall in question by painting a uniformly white surface, 
only to find that their painting does not “look” right (and sometimes they can’t quite 
say why it doesn’t look right). If the experience of naïve subjects did not represent 
these shades of gray and yellow (but represented only the one shade of white) before 
their attention was drawn to it, then naïve painters would think that a uniformly white 
surface does look just right (if it’s the right shade)—that it matches their experience. 
But they don’t—and it is not merely a problem of finding the right shade. This, I 
think, is evidence that the subjects’ experiences represent these shades prior to their 
focusing their attention on them.  
 So again, it seems that the mental pointers that the conceptualist wants to posit 
as constituents of experience are not the right kinds of pointers. Whereas attention 
seems to play an important role in determining what the mental pointer in thought 






  3.3.5. Where we conclude 
The arguments from richness and from fineness of grain, though they initially seem to 
be arguments against possession conceptualism (and hence for possession 
nonconceptualism) can be recast as arguments against constituent conceptualism. And 
these arguments are somewhat successful. After all, the demonstrative move can’t 
quite rescue the conceptualist. As such, I do think that these arguments are successful 
arguments against conceptualism. However, the arguments fail as arguments for 
constituent nonconceptualism. After all, as mentioned in section 2, there is a middle 
position—and, at most, the arguments we discussed here (in 3.3) are arguments for 
this middle position. The arguments from richness and fineness of grain show, at 
most, that experience must be partly nonconceptual.  
 
3.4. Last remarks 
My goal in section 3 was to present some important arguments for 
nonconceptualism—arguments whose conclusions are usually that experience is 
entirely nonconceptual (entirely made up of nonconceptual elements). The first two 
kinds of arguments were very unconvincing. The fact that the experiences of infants 
and animals seem to be enough like ours that they should share (some) constituents 
does not entail 1) that the constituents of their experiences cannot be entirely made of 
concepts that they cannot use to think and 2) that the constituents of their experience 
cannot be partly made up of concepts (which they cannot use to think), as the partial 




Also, experience, like belief, seems systematic, and systematicity therefore gives us 
no reason to think that experience cannot be conceptual (or partially conceptual). The 
arguments from richness and fineness of grain come the closest to making the case 
that nonconceptualism is true. I do think these arguments show that experience cannot 
be entirely made up of concepts (as the conceptualist would like to claim). However, 
the arguments do not show that experience is thereby entirely made up of 
nonconceptual constituents. At the most, they show that experience is partially 
conceptual. To make the case that experience is indeed partially conceptual, I need to 
argue that experience cannot be entirely made up of nonconceptual elements. We’ll 
consider arguments against nonconceptualism. 
 
 
4. The case against conceptualism 
 
Arguments against nonconceptualism are usually arguments for conceptualism. If the 
arguments from fineness of grain and richness go through, however, they won’t be 
arguments for conceptualism tout court, but rather for partial conceptualism. We’ll 
discuss, in this section, three important arguments against nonconceptualism: first, an 
argument (perhaps the best-known) defended by McDowell (1995) and Brewer 
(1999, 2003), according to which our perceptual beliefs cannot be justified if 
experience is nonconceptual (4.1). Second, Noë’s (1999) argument (4.2). And finally, 
what I take to be the most compelling argument, an argument from concept-





4.1. Justifying beliefs 
Experience can justify beliefs, “that much seems obvious,” writes Byrne (2005). 
Sara’s seeing that there is a banana on the table provides her with a justification, it 
seems, for believing that there is a banana on the table. Her seeing that there is a 
dragonfruit on the table would justify her belief that there is a dragonfruit on the 
table, but it would not justify her belief that there is a banana on the table. How does 
this fact, which “seems obvious”, support conceptualism?  
By itself, of course, it doesn’t. But McDowell (1995) and Brewer (1999) make 
an additional claim: experience can justify belief only if experiences and beliefs take 
the same kind of constituents. (Or, put in terms of content, as McDowell and Brewer 
do, only if experiential contents and belief contents are of the same kind.) McDowell 
is driven to this conclusion by a further assumption that experience can be only one of 
two things: 1) a representational state with concepts as constituents, or 2) a mental 
state that isn’t representational at all—a state rather more like a sense datum.  Now, 
given the limited options here—and the serious shortcomings of the second one—we 
may well conclude, as McDowell does, that experience can justify belief only if it 
takes concepts as constituents.  
But surely, if this is McDowell and Brewer’s reasoning, we should point out 
that experience can be neither of the two states presented earlier. After all, it seems 
that mental states can be representational even if their constituents couldn’t be 
constituents of thought. That is, presumably, the case for “subpersonal” perceptual 
states, i.e., states within encapsulated systems of the kind that Marr (1982) posits in 




then: I’ll assume, as I have all along, that states (like subpersonal states) might be 
representational without being conceptual. Now, what follows? Let us assume that 
experiences do justify belief. Can we explain how that happens only if we claim that 
experience has the same kinds of constituent as thought?   
Nonconceptualists, naturally, think that they too can explain how experience 
justifies belief, even if turns out that the constituents of experience aren’t concepts. 
They point out that experience has accuracy conditions, if not truth conditions. So we 
can talk of experiences being inaccurate, as Sara’s would certainly be if she 
hallucinated a banana on the table. Most of the time, Sara’s experience is indeed 
accurate and represents a banana on the table only when there is a banana on the 
table. Nonconceptualists have argued (see Peacocke (2001) and Heck (2000)) that 
representational states with accuracy conditions can justify belief. It is enough, they 
argue, that Sara’s seeing of a banana has conditions under which it is accurate; here, 
conditions under which there is, in fact, a banana on the table. An experience with 
such accuracy conditions would justify, on this view, the belief which is true in the 
same conditions. This is how Heck (2000) puts it:  
If, for example, the information carried by a given perceptual state is a 
scenario, a set of ways in which the space around the observer might be 
arranged, as on Peacocke’s view, there will be no bar whatsoever to 
perceptions’ standing in semantic relations with beliefs: some beliefs about 
how space is arranged will be inconsistent with its being arranged in one of 
the ways the scenario includes; others, required by it; others, made probable 
by it; others, in context, could be reliably inferred form it; and so on. (505)  
In conclusion, the epistemological argument just presented doesn’t quite succeed. But 





4.2. Seeing as 
Everyone in the debate, it seems, acknowledges that there is a difference between 
seeing and seeing as. Sara can see that there is a banana on the table without seeing it 
as a banana. Even a possession conceptualist may agree, then, that for Sara to see a 
banana as a banana, she has to possess the concept BANANA, even while insisting that 
Sara’s mere seeing that there is a banana on the table does not require concept 
possession  
Two things are worth noticing immediately. First, granting that seeing as 
requires concept possession does not commit one to possession conceptualism. After 
all, possession conceptualism is the view that to have any experience, one must 
possess the relevant concepts. But someone might grant that only some experiences 
involve seeing as and hence, that only some experiences require that we possess the 
relevant concepts, not all. 
Second, though one may grant that seeing as requires concept possession, nothing is 
thereby entailed about the kind of constituents experience may take. This is the point, 
made early on in section 1, that the possession-only version of possession 
conceptualism is compatible with both constituent conceptualism and constituent 
nonconceptualism.  
One may attempt, however, to supplement the claim that seeing as requires 
concept possession so as to yield a more interesting conclusion. There are at least two 
ways to go about accomplishing this goal: one may argue that all seeing is seeing as. 
If that is right, then we have an argument for possession conceptualism. (This appears 




(1) Seeing as requires that subjects possess the relevant concepts. 
(2) All seeing is seeing as.  
(3) Therefore, all seeing requires that subjects possess the relevant concepts 
(possession conceptualism about (visual) experience as a whole). 
 
There is an alternative, however. Note that we have only mentioned, so far, the first 
version of possession conceptualism—the possession-only version, as we have called 
it. But we did discuss, in section 2, a second version of possession conceptualism—
one that appeals not just to concept possession but to concept deployment as well. 
That second version of possession conceptualism makes the claim that Sara cannot 
see that there is a banana on the table unless she 1) possesses the concept BANANA 
and 2) deploys it in experience. In section 2, I went on to explain that this second 
version of possession conceptualism, if true, entails that constituent 
nonconceptualism must be false. One may then argue as follows:  
(1) Seeing as requires that subjects possess the relevant concepts and deploy these 
concepts in experience. 
(2) Experiences of seeing as can’t be absolutely nonconceptual. 
(3) Experience as a whole isn’t absolutely nonconceptual. 
 
The conclusions of both arguments are interesting because they either implicate 
experience as a whole—the first argument—or make a claim about the kind of 
constituents experience can take—the second argument. They each have a premise in 
need of defense. A defense of the first argument requires a defense of the claim that 
all seeing is seeing as. A defense of the second argument requires a defense of its first 
premise—that seeing as requires not only possessing the relevant concept but 




requires possessing the relevant concept, it is far less obvious that it requires 
deploying that concept in experience.  
  One may wish to combine the two arguments just presented to make a 
stronger argument against constituent nonconceptualism. The combined argument 
would go like this: 
(1) All seeing as requires both concept possession and concept deployment. 
(2) All seeing is seeing as.  
(3) All seeing requires concept possession and concept deployment. 
(4) All seeing is incompatible with constituent nonconceptualism. 
  
Let us now turn to a discussion of the two first premises in turn. 
Noë argues (1999) that all seeing is seeing as. Experience, he writes, 
necessarily presents things to us as being a certain way. The claim is certainly 
intuitive: when Sara first sees the dragonfruit, her experience does not present the 
thing in front of her as being a dragonfruit, but it does present the thing in front of her 
as being some way or other—as some kind of thing or other. Sara, though she does 
not see the fruit as a dragonfruit sees it as some thing—as an object, as a fruit, as big, 
etc. So, we may conclude, seeing some thing always involves seeing it, at the very 
least, as an object. “To have visual experiences is not to judge that things are some 
way or other, but it is to represent things as being some way or other” (7). 
 Granting, then, that all seeing is seeing as, do we have any reason to believe 
that all seeing as requires concept possession and deployment as premise (1) would 
have it? I have said, already, that it seems intuitive that seeing as would require 
concept possession, but less so that it would require concept deployment. I’ll now 




instances it requires concept possession and deployment. The first premise, I’ll 
conclude, doesn’t quite hold up.   
Grant that all seeing is seeing as, such that any seeing is necessarily a seeing 
of some thing as an object, as colored, presumably as three-dimensional, etc. Does 
such seeing as require that a subject possess the concepts OBJECT, COLORED and 
THREE-DIMENSIONAL—i.e., that the subject be able to think with these concepts? 
Some evidence suggests that seeing something as an object, or as colored doesn’t 
require possessing these concepts. Pylyshyn (2003) claims that “individuation of 
what, for now, I will call visual objects is a primitive operation” of the early visual 
system (173).
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 The footnote here is telling: “in every case considered here, “object” 
is understood in terms of whether something is perceived as an individual” (italics 
mine). But the primitives in early perceptual representations aren’t of the right sort to 
be constituents of thought. Some ways of seeing, then, may not depend on the 
concepts we possess—i.e., can think with—as much as they depend on the adequate 
functioning of our visual system. Though concept possession may not be required to 
see things as objects, colored etc… we may insist that concept possession is indeed 
required to see things as anything beyond these visual primitives. Seeing some thing 
as a dragonfruit, then, may indeed require possessing the concept DRAGONFRUIT.  
What, now, of concept deployment? Does seeing something as a dragonfruit 
require possessing the concept and deploying it in experience? Here and there Noë 
hints that he does believe concept deployment (he calls it ‘exercise’) is required to see 
some thing as what it is. For instance, “when we have perceptual experiences, we 
exercise our grasp of concepts” (1) and “experiences require the mastery and exercise 
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of concepts” (7). But there is no argument offered for this conclusion. In fact, one 
may want to deny that seeing as requires concept deployment by insisting that 
concept possession may be enough to causally influence the inputs of visual 
processing (which will come up in the next section 4.3.)  So, when Sara sees some 
thing, not merely as a thing anymore but as a dragonfruit, the pattern of saccadic 
movement over the thing may change. Seeing the duck-rabbit figure as a duck, or as a 
rabbit doesn’t require that the concepts DUCK and RABBIT be deployed in each 
experience. It may simply involve different saccadic patterns over the figure, which 
yield different inputs for the visual system and hence, different experiential contents. 
Now, I will argue, in 4.3., that causal explanations of that sort aren’t always available; 
they aren’t available, for instance, in the case of color.  
  We are left with a (limited) argument against nonconceptualism: 
(1) All seeing is seeing as.  
(2) Most seeing as requires either concept possession or concept possession and 
deployment. 
(3) Therefore, most experiences aren’t wholly nonconceptual. 
 
4.3. Concept acquisition 
Acquiring concepts can change the way things look, feel, sound or taste to us. 
Training to distinguish between very complex but subtly different visual patterns—
‘gexes’ and ‘zofs’—makes such patterns look importantly different to experimental 
subjects (Livingston et. al 1999); intensive bird watching can turn what used to look 
like countless gray birds on a beach into what now look to the expert like a family of 
knots and three groups of plovers (Carruthers 2000, see also Pylyshyn 2003, Tanaka 




experience of Pinot Noir (Melcher and Schooler 1996); studying interior decorating 
or going to art school can change one’s phenomenal experience of color (Burns and 
Shepp 1988); and so on and so forth. 
Assuming that concept acquisition does change the content of a subject’s 
experience, how might we account for that change?
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 There are two possible 
explanations. First, one may claim that one’s newly acquired concepts enter in the 
content of one’s experience we’ll call such an explanation a constituent explanation. 
Second, one may claim that one’s newly acquired concepts causally modify the 
perceptual processing of one’s experiential content—we’ll call such an explanation a 
causal explanation. To illustrate, consider our subject Sara: at t1 she is a naïve 
birdwatcher, but at t2 she has become an expert. Her experience at t1 and her 
experience at t2 are different: at t1 a bird-filled beach looks to Sara like just that, a 
beach filled with birds. At t2, however, the beach looks to Sara as though it is filled 
with knots and plovers (the example is from Carruthers 2000). On the constituent 
account, the explanation for the change is the following: the concepts KNOT and 
PLOVER figure in Sara’s experience at t2 though they did not at t1.
 66
 According to the 
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 One might maintain that what seems like a change in experiential content is actually not a change in 
the content itself but rather a change in what we can infer from that content. The data presented in the 
following section on “causal mechanisms”  strongly suggests that this is not a live option.   
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 Note that for this particular explanation to be adequate, one must believe something like assumption 
(A): that if a particular concept cannot figure in someone’s thought, then it cannot figure into 
someone’s experience, such that if the concept KNOT cannot figure into the subject’s thought (as when 
she’s naïve), that concept cannot figure into her experience either. To see this, assume that (A) is false: 
assume that the concept KNOT cannot figure into the subject’s thought (she’s naïve) but is nonetheless a 
constituent of her experience. Now, if that’s the case, the constituent story will lack the resources to 
explain the subject’s changed experience once she’s become an expert. Because according to the 
constituent account, what makes the expert’s experience different from the naïve subject’s is the fact 
that the concept KNOT is a constituent of the expert’s experience but not of the naïve subject’s. If one 
wants to maintain that (A) is false (as Byrne does for instance), one cannot give the constituent 
explanation. Of course, one may endorse some more restricted version of (A), such as: if a high-level 





causal account, acquiring the concepts KNOT and PLOVER changes something in the 
visual processing of the birds on the beach, giving rise to a different experience. The 
argument against nonconceptualism goes like this:  
(1) Constituent explanations are unavailable to the nonconceptualist. 
(2) Causal explanations, however, fail to account for all the changes in 
experiential content caused by concept acquisition. 
(3) Therefore, nonconceptualists are unable to fully account for the concept 
acquisition data. 
It should be rather obvious that the first premise is true. Constituent explanations 
require that a subject’s newly acquired concepts—KNOT and PLOVER—become part of 
her experiential content at t2. But the (constituent) nonconceptualist denies that 
concepts can be constituents of experiential content—ever. A nonconceptualist 
hoping to explain the concept acquisition data, then, has no choice but to give a 
causal explanation. However, as we’ll now see, causal explanations fail to account for 
all the changes caused by concept acquisition. 
 
4.3.1. Causal mechanisms 
Cognition can impact perception at the very least at two loci: very early on in 
perceptual processing and rather late in processing (see Pylyshyn 2003).
67
 The 
mechanism in play is selective attention, and there are indeed two kinds of 
attention—early and late (Palmer 1999). A fair amount of data suggests that experts 
have learned where to look—where to direct attention. Biederman and Shiffrar (1987) 
show that “what distinguishes good chicken sexers from poor ones is, roughly, where 
they look and what distinguished feature they look for” (Pylyshyn 2003, 86). Good 
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 I assume that Pylyshyn is right and that the processing that goes on “in between” is encapsulated and 




chicken sexers usually train through repeated trials, i.e., without being told what to 
look for explicitly. Unsurprisingly, then, the data shows that explicitly telling naïve 
chicken sexers what to look for and where speeds up the learning process 
considerably (Shiffrar 1978). Birdwatchers, subjects in Livingston, et. al’s 
experiments, wine tasters, etc., seem to learn, at the very least, to focus their attention 
the right way. Now, where one looks presumably has a tremendous impact on what 
becomes the input of the visual system: “Overt eye movements determine what 
optical information is available to the visual system; covert selective attention 
determines what subset of this information gets full processing” (Palmer 1999, 532). 
Experts, then, by directing their attention differently from naïve subjects, change the 
input to their visual systems and thereby modify the output experience.  
Selective attention later on in processing involves “one perceptual feature being 
weighted more or less than another and/or combined in different…ways in the post 
perceptual categorization process” (87). Chess masters seem to be experts whose 
knowledge impacts perception in the later stages of processing. Chess masters often 
seem to display a “rapid visual processing and better visual memory” of chess board 
configurations (84) but, interestingly enough, not of just any such configuration. 
When the pieces on the board are arranged in a random manner, chess experts behave 
pretty much like beginners—they are no better at processing the particular 
arrangements or at remembering them. It is only when the pieces on the board are 
arranged in a way that is consistent with the rules of chess that the experts are better 
at processing and remembering the boards. Some interpret “the data as showing that 




classify or encode a large number of relevant patterns” (Pylyshyn, 85). At this late 
stage, then, cognition seems to impact perception by accessing data stored in long-
term memory (again, see Pylyshyn, 85) and by allowing what is being processed to be 
compared to stored representations. The functioning of late auditory attention also 
suggests that stored representations are activated. The fact that subjects will hear their 
own names even when it is broadcast to an unattended channel suggests that the 
information in unattended channels is processed and, when some of it is recognized as 
one of a handful of “dictionary units with permanently lowered thresholds,” attention 
is directed to it. It looks, then, as though stored representations must be activated for 
late attention to impact perception. But these stored representations seem to be very 
much like concepts. And if concepts must be deployed for late attention to affect 
perception, an explanation of changes in experiential content using late attention 
looks less like a purely causal explanation (in the sense I’ve meant here) and more 
like a constituent explanation.  
 
4.3.2. Problems for nonconceptualism 
Nonconceptualism faces two problems here. First, there seems to be a consensus that 
cognition does in fact impact perception both via early attention and via late attention. 
If accounts of experience must allow for both kinds of influence, and if, as seems to 
be the case, explanations appealing to late attention really amount to constituent 
explanations, then the nonconceptualist is in trouble. For the nonconceptualist will 
not be able to allow for the part played by late attention. But even if it turns out that 




second problem: a causal story which appeals only to early selective attention cannot 
fully explain the effects of concept acquisition. 
Imagine, then, a subject S and a uniformly red postcard, which looks, at t1, red 
to her. At t2, S has graduated from art school, and her postcard, as a result, looks 
scarlet to her. Can we really explain the change between t1 and t2 simply by appealing 
to a change in early selective attention? It seems not. A difference in saccadic eye 
movements (or even covert attention) can make quite a different in the processing of 
shape (and of a complex scene) because the features of the shape or scene a subject’s 
eyes saccade to the most dictate, to a large extent, what information is processed by 
her visual system. The naïve subject looking at a bird-filled beach will display one 
kind of pattern of saccadic exploration, and, as a result, the information processed 
will be of a certain sort and the resulting experience will have a certain content. 
Having just become an expert birdwatcher, the subject will display a new pattern of 
saccadic exploration, with saccades to features of the scene that were previously 
ignored. The new pattern of exploration is responsible for the new information 
processed and hence, in the end, for the subject’s new experiential content. Can we 
account for the change in our art school graduate’s experience this way? She may 
move her eyes over the picture differently, but there is no reason for this new saccadic 
pattern to cause information to be processed that wasn’t processed before. After all, 
no matter where the subject’s eyes saccade to, they encounter the same color 
information that they encountered when she was naïve. The expert birdwatcher, by 
looking where the naïve subject does not, provides her visual system with different 




naïve subject does not, provide her visual system with different color information; the 
same color information is available everywhere. And since we cannot make the case 
that the input to the subject’s visual system would be different at t2, we cannot make 
the case that her experiential content would be different at t2 either. Nonconceptualist 
accounts of experience, it would seem, cannot fully explain the changes in 
experiential content due to concept acquisition.  
 
4.4. Concluding 
At the end of section 3, we concluded that experience could not be entirely 
conceptual. However, that conclusion left us with two alternatives: either experience 
could be entirely nonconceptual, or partially conceptual. The argument from concept-
acquisition, however, makes the case that experience cannot be entirely 
nonconceptual. To account for the changes in Sara’s experience of color, we need to 
say that her newly acquired concept gets to figure into her experience. And so this 
brings us to the following conclusion: experience is partially conceptual.  
 
 
5. Partial conceptualism 
 
The goal of this section is to spell out in a bit more detail what a partial conceptualist 
account might look like. First, I discuss one more motivation for partial 




before, i.e. situation-dependence. I then present some possible partial conceptualist 
models of experience (5.2). I end section 5 spelling out where this leaves us 
concerning Block’s Inverted Earth. 
 
5.1. One more motivation 
The arguments reviewed here may all draw our attention to important features of 
experience; however, as I hope I have shown, these arguments are not arguments 
against partial conceptualism. Rather, they emphasize features of experience that 
most participants in the debate agree need to be accounted for. The most natural way 
of accounting for all these features—some of which suggest experience is 
nonconceptual, some of which suggest it is conceptual—is to claim that experience is 
a bit of both.  
 It will be helpful to mention one more consideration in favor of partial 
conceptualism. (A similar case was used in our discussion of situation-dependency, 
see 3.3.4). Let us focus on Sara’s rich experience of, say, orange cliffs. When she sees 
the cliffs, she sees them as orange regardless of the weather or the time of day. That 
she sees them as orange explains some of her actions—including the fact that as she 
attempts to paint the cliffs, she colors them orange. Sara will notice, however, that the 
painted result most often doesn’t look right; the orange drawing does not look like the 
cliffs because, though there is a sense in which the cliffs look orange to us, the way in 
which they do that is actually by looking to be a variety of different shades of 
different colors. Being a good painter requires “seeing” these colors—seeing, for 




the morning actually look pink in places, beige in others, very light orange in others; 
etc. “Seeing” in this way requires practice. But what suggests that these nuances are 
indeed represented in experience is the fact that when they are pointed out, one does, 
of course, see them. If all that was represented in Sara’s cliff experience, prior to 
anyone pointing out the color nuances, was orange, then painting the cliffs as simply 
orange would look right enough. After all, the painting at that point would be like her 
representation, i.e., it would represent a large pane of orange. But, and this is the 
point, such a painting does not look right—though it may not be immediately salient 
why it doesn’t look right. A painting with a mix of orange, purple and pink, in 
roughly the right places, however, looks right. This does strongly suggest that these 
nuances are represented in experience even before attention is drawn to them. 
 
5.2. Some partial conceptualist models  
At least a few philosophers are already partial conceptualists in the sense described 
here, whether they realize it or not. Tye, by accepting seeing as arguments, is led into 
a partial conceptualist view of experience as a whole. He writes: “clearly some 
representation in visual experience is a conceptual matter (e.g., the representation of 
object types such as car, ball, and telescope)” (2000, 75). But he goes on to say that 
as for the question of which levels of representational content in experience 
metaphysically determine its phenomenal content, my own view (Tye 1995) is 
that the relevant levels are nonconceptual. (76) 
 
 Unlike Tye, I believe that the levels of experiential content that determine its 
phenomenal character are partially conceptual. The argument from concept 




differences in phenomenal characters merely nonconceptually. As claimed above, it 
seems that they cannot deal with color cases.  
Carruthers (2000), moved by seeing as arguments and arguments from 
concept acquisition, explicitly writes that “perceptual contents are often imbued with 
concepts (whether general or individual), while also containing representations which 
are analog in relation to those concepts” (2000, 136). Peacocke also has a hybrid 
view, one according to which the content of experience has three layers, two of which 
are different in kind from the content of thought, together with a conceptual third 
layer. We’ll start here by taking a closer look at Peacocke’s account. 
 
Levels of content 
The first layer of content of experience, on Peacocke’s view, is a scenario, that is, a 
way of “filling up the space around the perceiver” (1995, 61). Specifying a scenario 
requires two things. First, we need to fix an origin and axes. So,  
for instance, one kind of origin is given by the property of being the center of 
the chest of the human body, with the three axes given by the directions 
back/front, left/right, and up/down with respect to that center. (ibid)  
This is only one kind of origin; Peacocke is explicit about the fact that origins “will 
not be a specific place and set of directions in the real world” (62), a claim which fits 
nicely with some problem-solving in vision theory. From the first inputs on the retina 
to an actual grabbing motion, the coordinate frames of the visual mental 
representations must undergo a number of transformations, from being, first, oculo-
centric (with the origin at the center of the eye), to being head-centric, to being torso-




The second thing needed to fix a scenario, Peacocke claims, involves a filling 
in of space around the origin and axes: 
for each point (strictly, I should say point type), identified by its distance and 
direction from the origin, we need to specify whether there is a surface there 
and, if so, what texture, hue, saturation, and brightness it has at that point, 
together with its degree of solidity. The orientation of the surface must be 
included. So must much more in the visual case: the direction, intensity, and 
character of light sources; the rate of change of perceptible properties, 
including location; indeed, it should include second differentials with respect 
to time where these prove to be perceptible. (63) 
 
The actual content of one of Sara’s visual experiences of a banana will be, on this 
view, a positioned scenario; that is, a way of filling up space together with an actual 




 Peacocke is motivated, for the most part, by concerns about fineness of grain 
and richness, which his account accommodates well. After all, there are a number of 
possible positioned scenarios consistent with the belief ‘that bananas are yellow’ each 
specifying, for each point in the space, the particular “hue, saturation, and brightness 
[…] at that point” (1995 63). The hue, saturation, brightness, etc., specified of each 
point of the positioned scenario space are unlikely to be ones for which I possess 
concepts. (Actually, most people might not even possess the concepts HUE, 
SATURATION and BRIGHTNESS, though those might be ways that the visual system 
presents information independently of concept possession—see 3.2.) 
                                                 
68
 It is not clear that scenarios that aren’t positioned can be contents at all, since the scenario without an 
assignment of actual origin and axes cannot be correct or incorrect in the same way that the thought 





Peacocke argues that there is another layer of content—protopropositional 
content—layered, so to speak, on top of scenario content.  “Protopropositions” he 
says, “are assessable as true and false. A protoproposition contains an individual, 
together with a property or relation” (2003, 118). Protopropositional content seems to 
be roughly Russellian in character—hence, not yet conceptual.  
On top of all this, Peacocke argues, part of the content of experience may be, 
in some cases, the same kind of content as that of belief: we should “insist on the 
partially conceptual character of the perceptual content when one sees something to 
be a dog, or a tree” (115). He says later: “It is not clear that there is good reason for 
denying the overwhelmingly plausible view that we see things as trees or hear a 
sound as of a car approaching” (123). 
 
Mental representations 
There are several models of mental representation which would be congenial to 
partial conceptualism. The first is Dretske’s speedometer model (used in Carruthers 
2000); second is Tye’s map model.  
Dretske likes to draw analogies to speedometers, and here is how the analogy 
is supposed to work here. A speedometer can represent the speed of a car in a very 
fine-grained way, while it also represents it in a much coarser way. The hand of the 
speedometer as it moves will represent speeds finely, but the speedometer can also 
include marks for each 10 mph speed range. When the hand is somewhere (fine-
grained) between 0 and 10 mph, the mark stipulates that this is “Speed 1”; when the 




etc. In this way, the speedometer represents both fine-grained and coarse-grained 
information (see Carruthers 2000, 135). Similarly, experience may represent the 
shades of orange cliffs nonconceptually (using mental representations that are rather 
more fine-grained than concepts), while at the same time “marking” the similar 
shades as orange  (conceptually).  
Tye (1995) argues (not quite successfully, as claimed in 3.2.) that experience 
representations are not conceptual because, he says, experiences are not systematic or 
productive. He concludes that experience representations are map-like. (He sees the 
fact that “adjacent parts of the cortex represent adjacent parts of the retinal image” as 
evidence that there is “an orderly topographic projection of the retinal image onto the 
brain” (1995, 120). He goes on to say that “the obvious suggestion, then, is that 
[perceptual sensations] themselves have a topographic or map-like structure” (ibid, 
121).  
Since Tye does grant that experience can be partially conceptual (it is only the 
level that is relevant to phenomenal characters that is entirely nonconceptual), he 
argues that the map-like representations are representations “to which descriptive 
labels are attached” (ibid). Though these labels need not be concepts, they can be. For 
someone to see something as a duck, one of the labels attached to the topographic 
map must be the concept DUCK. 
Though it is not obvious that we should think of mental representations as 
map-like, the picture that Tye gives is the right kind of picture. So, even if the content 
of Tye’s representation might be a “map-like content” (in that it represents space 




representations themselves be symbolic.
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 Each “simple” representation represents 
facts about hue, saturation, and brightness at some location (given some origin). And 
we can add that clusters of these representations can be become “attached” to a 
different kind of a representation, i.e., a concept.    
 The fact that we can make sense of what a partial conceptualist account of 
experience might look like is encouraging. However, some issues remain, and we 
now turn to consider what the implications of adopting partial conceptualism will be 
for a representationalist trying to deal with Block’s Inverted Earth. 
 
5.3. Back to Block 
In the introduction to Part II, I discussed Block’s Inverted Earth thought experiment.  
Block uses it to argue against the representationalist. After all, if, during her time on 
Inverted Earth, the content of Sara’s experience of a blue VW bug changes but the 
phenomenal character of that experience stays the same, the representationalist is in 
trouble. For the representationalist, a change in experiential content means a change 
in phenomenal character (and vice versa). The representationalist, as argued in the 
introduction, needs to worry most about the outcome of the conceptual/nonconceptual 
debate. Indeed, the representationalist seems committed to saying that Sara’s 
experiential contents must stay the same, no matter how long she spends on Inverted 
Earth (after all, her phenomenal characters stay the same). Now, if partial 
conceptualism is the most plausible account of experience, then it turns out that 
concepts are constituents of experience. Any attempt to argue that Sara’s experiential 
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 Tye himself says, while discussing the topographic map involved in pain sensations, that “activity in 
any given cell [which makes up the map] may be conceived as representing, in the manner of a simple 




contents stay the same on Inverted Earth will require arguing that Sara’s concepts 
also “stay the same”, no matter how long she spends on Inverted Earth. But most 
representationalist seem fine with granting Block that our beliefs would change on 
Inverted Earth—that the content of our color concepts would shift. If I am right about 
partial conceptualism, then representationalists should not be so quick to grant 
Block’s claim about concepts. 
 
 





My goal in this dissertation has been to examine the role played by concepts in the 
defense and elaboration of reductive representationalism. Part I considered the role 
played by phenomenal concepts in the defense of reductive representationalism 
against anti-physicalism. My focus there was on concepts of experience. Part II 
focused on whether there can be concepts in experience—a question which the 
representationalist must answer to fully spell out her account and defend it adequately 
against further objections, such as Block’s Inverted Earth.  
 There is still much to be done. As should have become obvious at the very end 
of Part II, fully spelling out an account of reductive representationalism requires that 
representationalists say something more about concepts; namely, about whether their 
contents are wide or narrow. To successfully defend representationalism against 
Block’s Inverted Earth will require arguing either for some theory of narrow content,  
or for a theory of wide content unlike the one Block assumes in his article. (For 
instance, Tye (2000) argues that the nonconceptual layer of experience has wide 
content but defends a teleological/co-variational theory of wide content, which allows 
him to say that Sara’s nonconceptual experiential content would not shift on Inverted 
Earth). 
 Also, some of the first defenders of the phenomenal concept strategy are now 
backtracking. Tye is working on a book called “Consciousness Revisited: 
Materialism without phenomenal concepts” (forthcoming 2008). I doubt that Tye is 
denying that there are phenomenal concepts (at least in the broad sense of concepts 




instance) that phenomenal concepts cannot do the job physicalists typically want 
them to do (especially in the case of Mary). Whether he’s right is one important 
question left to answer.   
 In any case, let me summarize the progress I have made here. In Part I, I have 
argued that phenomenal concepts can, despite what anti-physicalists believe, explain 
the relevant data within a physicalist framework. The physicalist can explain what 
Mary learns in either of two ways—either by making the case that the significant bit 
of what happens to Mary is her actually undergoing the experience, or by claiming 
that what Mary learns is a form of “seeing as”. The physicalist can explain the core 
contrast by appealing to pre-theoretical connections between phenomenal concepts 
and the concept NONPHYSICAL. Finally the physicalist can deal with property dualist 
arguments, either by arguing that the Semantic Premise is false, or by pointing out 
that there are other ways of “filling in the blanks”.  
 In part II, I have argued that experience can be neither entirely conceptual nor 
entirely nonconceptual. A modified version of the famous argument from richness 
and fineness of grain shows that experience cannot be entirely conceptual. And the 
argument from concept-acquisition shows that experience cannot be entirely 
nonconceptual. So, going forward, any plausible view of representationalism must 
involve some form of partial conceptualism. This will by no means resolve all of the 
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